Legal Positivism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Positivism identifies law, not with all valid reasons for decision, but only with the source-based subset of them. It is no part of the ... StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy Menu Browse TableofContents What'sNew RandomEntry Chronological Archives About EditorialInformation AbouttheSEP EditorialBoard HowtoCitetheSEP SpecialCharacters AdvancedTools Contact SupportSEP SupporttheSEP PDFsforSEPFriends MakeaDonation SEPIAforLibraries EntryNavigation EntryContents Bibliography AcademicTools FriendsPDFPreview AuthorandCitationInfo BacktoTop LegalPositivismFirstpublishedFriJan3,2003;substantiverevisionTueDec17,2019 Legalpositivismisthethesisthattheexistenceandcontentoflaw dependsonsocialfactsandnotonitsmerits.TheEnglishjuristJohn Austin(1790–1859)formulateditthus: Theexistenceoflawisonething;itsmeritanddemeritanother. Whetheritbeorbenotisoneenquiry;whetheritbeorbenot conformabletoanassumedstandard,isadifferentenquiry.(1832 [1995:157]) Thepositivistthesisdoesnotsaythatlaw’smeritsare unintelligible,unimportant,orperipheraltothephilosophyoflaw. Itsaysthattheydonotdeterminewhetherlawsorlegalsystems exist.Whetherasocietyhasalegalsystemdependsonthe presenceofcertainstructuresofgovernance,notontheextentto whichitsatisfiesidealsofjustice,democracy,ortheruleoflaw. Whatlawsareinforceinthatsystemdependsonwhatsocialstandards itsofficialsrecognizeasauthoritative;forexample,legislative enactments,judicialdecisions,orsocialcustoms.Thefactthata policywouldbejust,wise,efficient,orprudentisneversufficient reasonforthinkingthatitisactuallythelaw,andthefactthatit isunjust,unwise,inefficientorimprudentisneversufficientreason fordoubtingit.Accordingtopositivism,lawisamatterofwhathas beenposited(ordered,decided,practiced,tolerated,etc.).Austin thoughtthethesis“simpleandglaring”.Whileitis probablythedominantviewamonganalyticallyinclinedphilosophersof law,itisalsothesubjectofcompetinginterpretationstogetherwith persistentcriticismsandmisunderstandings. 1.DevelopmentandInfluence 2.TheExistenceandSourcesofLaw 3.MoralPrinciplesandtheBoundariesofLaw 4.LawandItsMerits 4.1TheFallibilityThesis 4.2TheSeparabilityThesis 4.3TheNeutralityThesis Bibliography AcademicTools OtherInternetResources RelatedEntries 1.DevelopmentandInfluence Legalpositivismhasalonghistoryandabroadinfluence.Ithas antecedentsinancientpoliticalphilosophyandisdiscussed,andthe termitselfintroduced,inmediaevallegalandpoliticalthought(see Finnis1996).Themoderndoctrine,however,oweslittletothese forbears.Itsmostimportantrootslieinthepoliticalphilosophies ofHobbesandHume,anditsfirstfullelaborationisduetoJeremy Bentham(1748–1832)whoseaccountAustinadopted,modified,and popularized.Formuchofthenextcenturyanamalgamoftheirviews, accordingtowhichlawisthecommandofasovereignbackedbyforce, dominatedEnglishphilosophicalreflectionaboutlaw.Bythe mid-twentiethcentury,however,thisaccounthadlostitsinfluence amongworkinglegalphilosophers.Itsemphasisonlegislative institutionswasreplacedbyafocusonlaw-applyinginstitutionssuch ascourts,anditsinsistenceoftheroleofcoerciveforcegaveway totheoriesemphasizingthesystematicandnormativecharacteroflaw. Themostimportantarchitectsofcontemporarylegalpositivismarethe AustrianjuristHansKelsen(1881–1973)andthetwodominating figuresintheanalyticphilosophyoflaw,H.L.A.Hart(1907–92) andJosephRaz,amongwhomthereareclearlinesofinfluence,but alsoimportantcontrasts.Legalpositivism’simportance, however,isnotconfinedtothephilosophyoflaw.Itcanbeseen throughoutsocialtheory,particularlyintheworksofMarx,Weber, andDurkheim,andalsoamongmanylawyers,includingtheAmerican “legalrealists”andmostcontemporaryfeministscholars. Althoughtheydisagreeonmanyotherpoints,thesewritersall acknowledgethatlawisessentiallyamatterofsocialfact.Someof themare,itistrue,uncomfortablewiththelabel“legal positivism”andthereforehopetoescapeit.Theirdiscomfortis sometimestheproductofconfusion.Lawyersoftenuse “positivist”abusively,tocondemnaformalisticdoctrine accordingtowhichlawisalwaysclearand,howeverpointlessor wrong,istoberigorouslyappliedbyofficialsandobeyedby subjects.Itisdoubtfulthatanyoneeverheldthisview,butitisin anycasefalseandhasnothingtodowithlegalpositivism.Amongthe philosophicallyliterateanother,moreintelligible,misunderstanding mayinterfere.Legalpositivismisheresometimesassociatedwiththe homonymicbutindependentdoctrinesoflogicalpositivism(themeaning ofasentenceisitsmodeofverification)orsociologicalpositivism (socialphenomenacanbestudiedonlythroughthemethodsofnatural science).Whiletherearehistoricalconnectionsandcommonalitiesof temperamongtheseideas,theyareessentiallydifferent.Theview thattheexistenceandcontentoflawdependsultimatelyonsocial factsdoesnotrestonaparticularsemanticthesis,anditis compatiblewitharangeoftheoriesabouthowoneinvestigatesthe socialworld,includingnon-naturalisticaccounts.Tosaythatthe existenceoflawdependsonfactsandnotonitsmeritsisathesis abouttherelationamonglaws,facts,andmerits,andnot otherwiseathesisabouttheindividualrelata.Hence,many traditional“naturallaw”moraldoctrines—including thebeliefinauniversal,objectivemoralitygroundedinhuman nature—donotcontradictlegalpositivism.Theonlyinfluential positivistmoraltheoriesaretheviewsthatmoralnormsare validonlyiftheyhaveasourceindivinecommandsorinsocial conventions.Suchtheistsandrelativistsapplytomoralitythe constraintsthatlegalpositiviststhinkholdforlaw. 2.TheExistenceandSourcesofLaw Everyhumansocietyhassomeformofsocialorder,somewayofmarking andencouragingapprovedbehavior,deterringdisapprovedbehavior,and resolvingdisputesaboutthatbehavior.Whatthenisdistinctiveof societieswithlegalsystemsand,withinthosesocieties,oftheir law?Beforeexploringsomepositivistanswers,itbearsemphasizing thatthesearenottheonlyquestionsworthaskingaboutlaw.Whilean understandingofthenatureoflawrequiresanaccountofwhatmakes lawdistinctive,italsorequiresanunderstandingofwhatithas incommonwithotherformsofsocialcontrol.SomeMarxists arepositivistsaboutthenatureoflawwhileinsistingthatits distinguishingcharacteristicsmatterlessthanitsrolein replicatingandfacilitatingotherformsofdomination.(Thoughother Marxistsdisagree:seePashukanis1924).Theythinkthatthespecific natureoflawcastslittlelightontheirprimaryconcerns.Butone canhardlyknowthatinadvance;itdependsonwhatthenatureoflaw is. ForBenthamandAustin,lawisaphenomenonofsocietieswitha sovereign:adeterminatepersonorgroupwhohavesupremeand absolutedefactopower—theyareobeyedbyallormost othersbutdonotthemselvessimilarlyobeyanyoneelse.Thelawsin thatsocietyareasubsetofthesovereign’scommands: generalordersthatapplytoclassesofactionsandpeopleandthat arebackedupbythreatofforceor“sanction”.This imperativaltheoryispositivist,foritidentifiestheexistenceof lawwithpatternsofcommandandobediencethatcanbeascertained withoutconsideringwhetherthesovereignhasamoralrighttoruleor whethertheircommandsaremeritorious.Ithastwootherdistinctive features.Thetheoryismonistic:itrepresentsalllawsas havingasingleform,imposingobligationsontheirsubjects,though notonthesovereignitself.Theimperativalistacknowledgesthat ultimatelegislativepowermaybeself-limiting,orlimitedexternally bywhatpublicopinionwilltolerate,andalsothatlegalsystems containprovisionsthatarenotimperatives(forexample,permissions, definitions,andsoon).Buttheyregardtheseaspartofthe non-legalmaterialthatisnecessaryforeverylegalsystem.(Austin isabitmoreliberalonthispoint).Thetheoryisalso reductivist,foritmaintainsthatthenormativelanguage usedindescribingandstatingthelaw—talkofauthority, rights,obligations,andsoon—canallbeanalyzedwithout remainderinfactualterms,typicallyasconcatenationsofstatements aboutpowerandobedience. Imperativaltheoriesarenowwithoutinfluenceinlegalphilosophy (butseeLadenson1980andMorison1982).Whatsurvivesoftheir outlookistheideathatlegaltheorymustultimatelyberootedin someaccountofthepoliticalsystem,aninsightthatcametobe sharedbyallmajorpositivistssaveKelsen.Theirparticular conceptionofasocietyunderasovereigncommander,however,is friendless(exceptamongFoucauldians,whostrangelytakethisrelic astheideal-typeofwhattheycall“juridical”power).It isclearthatincomplexsocietiestheremaybenoonewhohasallthe attributesofsovereignty,forultimateauthoritymaybedividedamong organsandmayitselfbelimitedbylaw.Moreover,sovereigntyisa normativeconcept.Alegislatorisonewhohasauthorityto makelaws,andnotmerelysomeonewithgreatsocialpower,anditis doubtfulthat“habitsofobedience”isacandidate reductionforexplainingauthority.Todistinguishgenuineobedience fromcoincidentalcomplianceweneedsomethingliketheideaof subjectsbeingorientedto,orguidedby,thecommands.Explicating thiswillcarryusfarfromthepower-basednotionswithwhich classicalpositivismhopedtowork.Theimperativalists’account ofthecharacterofindividuallawsisalsosubjecttodecisive objections(Hart1961[2012:26–78];andHacker1973).Treating alllawsascommandsconcealsimportantdifferencesintheirsocial functions,inthewaystheyoperateinpracticalreasoning,andinthe sortofjustificationstowhichtheyareliable.Forinstance,laws conferringthepowertomarrycommandnothing;theydonotobligate peopletomarry,oreventomarryaccordingtotheprescribed formalities.Norisreductivismanymoreplausiblehere:wespeakof legalobligationswhenthereisnoprobabilityofsanctionsbeing appliedandwhenthereisnoprovisionforsanctions(asintheduty ofcourtstoapplythelaw).Moreover,wetaketheexistenceoflegal obligationstobeareasonforimposingsanctions,nota consequenceorconstituentofit. HansKelsenretainstheimperativalists’monismbutabandons theirreductivism.Onhisview,lawischaracterizedbyasingular formandbasicnorm.Theformofeverylawisthatofa conditionalorder,directedatthecourts,toapplysanctionsifa certainbehavior(the“delict”)isperformed.Onthis view,lawisanindirectsystemofguidance:itdoesnottellsubjects whattodo;ittellsofficialswhattodotoitssubjects undercertainconditions.Thus,whatweordinarilyregardasthelegal dutynottostealisforKelsenmerelyalogicalcorrelateofthe primarynormwhichstipulatesasanctionforstealing(1945[1961: 61]).Theobjectionstoimperativalmonismapplyalsotothismore sophisticatedversion:thereductionmissesimportantfacts,suchas thepointofhavingaprohibitionontheft;thelawisnotindifferent between,ontheonehand,peoplenotstealingand,ontheother, stealingandsufferingthesanctions.Butinonerespectthe conditionalsanctiontheoryisinworseshapethanisimperativalism, forithasnowaytofixonthedelictastheduty-definingcondition ofthesanction—thatisbutoneofalargenumberofrelevant antecedentconditions,includingthelegalcapacityoftheoffender, thejurisdictionofthejudge,theconstitutionalityoftheoffense, andsoforth.Whichamongalltheseisthecontentofalegal duty? Kelsen’smostimportantcontributionliesinhisattackon reductivismandhisdoctrineofthe“basicnorm”.He maintainsthatlawisanormativedomainandmustunderstoodassuch. Mightdoesnotmakeright—notevenlegalright—sothe philosophyoflawmustexplainthefactthatlawimposesobligations onitssubjects.Moreover,lawisanormativesystem: “Lawisnot,asitissometimessaid,arule.Itisasetof ruleshavingthekindofunityweunderstandbyasystem”(1945 [1961:3]).Fortheimperativalists,theunityofalegalsystem consistsinthefactthatallitslawsarecommandedbyonesovereign. ForKelsen,itconsistsinthefactthattheyarealllinksinone chainofauthority.Forexample,aby-lawislegallyvalidbecauseit iscreatedbyacorporationlawfullyexercisingthepowersconferred onitbythelegislature,whichconfersthosepowersinamanner providedbytheconstitution,whichwasitselfcreatedinaway providedbyanearlierconstitution.Butwhatabouttheveryfirst constitution,historicallyspeaking?Itsauthority,saysKelsen,is “presupposed”.Theconditionforinterpretinganylegal normasbindingisthatthefirstconstitutionisvalidatedbythe following“basicnorm:”“theoriginal constitutionistobeobeyed”.Now,thebasicnormcannot bealegalnorm—wecannotexplainthebindingnessoflawby referencetomorelawwithoutaninfiniteregress.Norcanitbea socialfact,forKelsenmaintainsthatthereasonforthevalidityof anormmustalwaysbeanothernorm—nooughtfromis.Itfollows, then,thatalegalsystemmustconsistofnormsallthewaydown.It bottomsinahypothetical,transcendentalnormthatisthecondition oftheintelligibilityofany(andall)othernormsasbinding.To “presuppose”thisbasicnormisnottoendorseitasgood orjust—presuppositionisacognitivestanceonly—butit is,Kelsenthinks,thenecessarypreconditionforanon-reductivist accountoflawasanormativesystem. Therearemanydifficultieswiththis,notleastofwhichisthefact thatifwearegoingtoacceptthebasicnormasthesolutionitis notclearwhatwethoughtwastheprobleminthefirstplace.One cannotsayboththatpresupposingthebasicnormiswhatvalidatesall inferiornormsandalsothataninferiornormispartofthelegal systemonlyifitisconnectedbyachainofvaliditytothebasic norm.Weneedawayintothecircle.Moreover,itdrawstheboundaries oflegalsystemsincorrectly.TheCanadianConstitutionof1982was lawfullycreatedbyanActoftheU.K.Parliament,andonthatbasis CanadianlawandEnglishlawshouldbepartsofasinglelegalsystem, rootedinonebasicnorm:“The(first)U.K.constitutionisto beobeyed”.YetEnglishlawisnotbindinginCanada,anda purportedrepealoftheConstitutionActbytheU.K.wouldbewithout legaleffectthere. Iflawcannotultimatelybegroundedinforce,orinapresupposed norm,onwhatdoesitsauthorityrest?Themostinfluentialsolution isperhapsH.L.A.Hart’s.HissolutionresemblesKelsen’s initsemphasisonthenormativefoundationsoflegalsystems,but HartrejectsKelsen’stranscendentalist,Kantianviewof authorityinfavorofanempirical,Weberianone.ForHart,the authorityoflawissocial.Theultimatecriterionofvalidityina legalsystemisneitheralegalnormnorapresupposednorm,buta socialrulethatexistsonlybecauseitisactually practiced,thatis,usedtoguideconduct.Lawultimately restsoncustom:customsaboutwhoshallhavetheauthoritytodecide disputes,whattheyshalltreatasbindingreasonsfordecision,i.e., assourcesoflaw,andhowlawsmaybechanged.Ofthesethree “secondaryrules”,asHartcallsthem,the source-determiningruleofrecognitionismostimportant,for itspecifiestheultimatecriteriaofvalidityinthelegalsystem.It existsonlybecauseitispracticedbyofficials,anditisnotonly thattherecognitionrulebestexplainstheirpractice,itistherule towhichtheyactuallyappealinargumentsaboutwhatstandardsthey areboundtoapply.Hart’saccountisthereforeinonesense conventionalist(seeMarmor1998andColeman2001):ultimatelegal rulesaresocialnorms,althoughtheyareneithertheproductof expressagreementnorconventionsintheSchelling-Lewissense(see Green1999).ThusforHarttoothelegalsystemisrule-basedallthe waydown,butatitsrootisasocialnormthathasthekindof normativeforcethatcustomshave.Itisaregularityofbehavior regardingwhichofficialstake“theinternalpointof view:”theyuseitasastandardforguidingandevaluating theirownandothers’behavior,andthisuseisdisplayedin theirconductandspeech,includingtheresorttovariousformsof socialpressuretosupporttheruleandthereadyapplicationof normativetermssuchas“duty”and “obligation”wheninvokingit. Law,then,hasitsultimatebasisinthebehaviorsandattitudesof itsofficials.Intheeyesofsomethisstillseemstoimplya mystifyingreduction:howcanwegeneratetheoughtsofthelegal worldfromtheisofofficialconsensus?Concernsofthistypepart motivateScottShapiro’sunderstandingoflawandhisattemptto breakwithHart’stheory:laws,hesuggests,shouldbeconceived ofas“generalizedplans,orplanlikenorms,issuedbythosewho areauthorizedtoplanforothers”(2011:155).Understanding lawonthemodelofsocialplanning,Shapirosuggests,freesusfrom misplacedconcernsaboutitsmetaphysicalbasis.JustasyouorIcan adoptaplanforourdayjustbywillingit,soalegalsystem’s officialscancreateorrecognizeplansforitssubjects.Tothe extentthereremainsanissue,however,itisnotclearthatthe notionofplanningitselfoffersanydeeperexplanation.Tobegin with,planning,whetherbyanindividualoragroup,involvessetting ruleswiththeaimofachievingcertainends.Sotheontologyofplans foldsintoandbecomespartofthemoregeneralontologyofruleson whichHartwasrightlyfocused.Second,itisunclearwhetherthe mechanicsoflawareaccuratelycapturedunderthelabelofplanning (isthelawagainsttheft,forexample,tobethoughtofasaplan thatpeoplenotdepriveothersoftheirproperty?—asomewhat implausiblereadingoftherelevantinjunction—oristhe planningelementexhaustedbythedecisiontocreatetheprohibition, inwhichcasethelawisnottheplan).Nonetheless,Shapiro’s accounthelpfullyremindsusthatthetheoreticalcomplexityoflawas asocialkinddoesnotrenderimplausibleanunderstandingofits foundationbasedintheeverydayactionsofitsagents.Inthishe joinsHart. ItisanimportantfeatureofHart’saccountthattheruleof recognitionisanofficialcustom,andnotastandard necessarilysharedbythebroadercommunity.Ifthe imperativalists’pictureofthepoliticalsystemwaspyramidal power,Hart’sismorelikeWeber’srationalbureaucracy. Lawisnormallyatechnicalenterprise,characterizedbyadivisionof labor.Ordinarysubjects’contributiontotheexistenceoflaw maythereforeamounttonomorethanpassivecompliance,andinan extremecaseperhapslessthanthis.Thus,Hart’snecessaryand sufficientconditionsfortheexistenceofalegalsystemarethat thoserulesofbehaviorwhicharevalidaccordingtothe system’sultimatecriteriaofvaliditymustbegenerallyobeyed, and…itsrulesofrecognitionspecifyingthecriteriaoflegal validityanditsrulesofchangeandadjudicationmustbeeffectively acceptedascommonpublicstandardsofofficialbehaviorbyits officials.(1961[2012:116]) Andthisdivisionoflaborisnotanormativelyneutralfactabout law;itispoliticallycharged,foritsetsupthepossibilityoflaw becomingremotefromthelifeofasociety,ahazardtowhichHartis acutelyalert(1961[2012:117];cf.Waldron1999andGreen2008). AlthoughHartintroducestheruleofrecognitionthroughaspeculative anthropologyofhowitmightemergeinresponsetodeficienciesina customarysocialorder,heisnotcommittedtotheviewthatlawisa culturalachievement.Tothecontrary,theideathatlegalorderis alwaysagoodthing,andthatsocietieswithoutitaredeficient,isa familiarelementofmanyanti-positivistviews,beginning withHenryMaine’scriticismofAustinonthegroundthathis theorywouldnotapplytocertainIndianvillages.Theobjection embracestheerroritseekstoavoid.Itimperialisticallyassumes thatitisalwaysabadthingtolacklaw,andthenmakesadazzling inferencefromoughttois:ifitisgoodtohavelaw,theneach societymusthaveit,andtheconceptoflawmustbeadjustedtoshow thatitdoes.Ifonethinksthatlawisamanysplendoredthing,one willbetemptedbyaverywideunderstandingoflaw,foritwouldseem impropertochargeotherswithmissingout.Positivismreleasesthe harness.Lawisadistinctiveformofpoliticalorder,notamoral achievement,andwhetheritisnecessaryorevenusefuldepends entirelyonitscontentandcontext.Societieswithoutlawmaybe perfectlyadaptedtotheirenvironments,missingnothing. Apositivistaccountoftheexistenceandcontentoflaw,alonganyof theabovelines,offersatheoryofthevalidityoflawin oneofthetwomainsensesofthatterm(seeHarris1979: 107–111).Kelsensaysthatvalidityisthespecificmodeof existenceofanorm.Inthissenseavalidlawisonethatis systemicallyvalidinthejurisdiction—itispartof thelegalsystem,andidentifiedassuchbyvirtueofitsdependence onthesystem’ssocialsources.Theideaisdistinctfromthat ofvalidityasmoralpropriety,i.e.,asoundjustificationfor respectingthenorm.Forthelegalpositivist,thisdependsonthe norm’smerits.Oneindicationthatthesesensesdifferisthat onemayknowthatasocietyhasalegalsystem,andknowwhatitslaws are,withouthavinganyideawhethertheyaremorallyjustified.For example,onemayknowthatthelawofancientAthensincludedthe punishmentofostracismwithoutknowingwhetheritwasjustified, becauseonedoesnotknowenoughaboutitseffects,aboutthesocial context,andsoforth. Nolegalpositivistarguesthatthesystemicvalidityoflaw establishesitsmoralvalidity,i.e.,thatitshouldbe obeyedbysubjectsorappliedbyjudges.EvenHobbes,towhomthis viewissometimesascribed,requiredthatlawactuallybeabletokeep thepeace,failingwhichweoweitnothing.BenthamandAustin,as utilitarians,holdthatsuchquestionsalwaysturnonthe consequences,andbothacknowledgethatdisobedienceistherefore sometimesfullyjustified.Kelseninsiststhat“Thescienceof lawdoesnotprescribethatoneoughttoobeythecommandsofthe creatoroftheconstitution”(1960[1967:204]).Hartbelieves thatlawmaygenerateaprimafaciedutytoobey,groundedin butalsolimitedbyfairness—sothereisnoobligationtounfair orpointlesslaws(Hart1955:185–186).Razgoesfurtherstill, arguingthatthereisn’tevenaprimafaciedutyto obeythelaw,noteveninajuststate(Raz1979[2009: 233–249]).Thepeculiaraccusationthatpositivistsbelievethe lawisalwaystobeobeyediswithoutfoundation.Indeed,Hart’s ownviewisthatanoverweeningdeferencetolawconsortsmoreeasily withtheoriesthatimbueitwithmoralideals,permitting anenormousovervaluationoftheimportanceofthebarefactthata rulemaybesaidtobeavalidruleoflaw,asifthis,oncedeclared, wasconclusiveofthefinalmoralquestion:“Oughtthislawto beobeyed?”(Hart1958:75) 3.MoralPrinciplesandtheBoundariesofLaw Themostinfluentialcriticismsoflegalpositivismallflow,inone wayoranother,fromthesuspicionthatitfailstogivemoralityits due.Atheorythatinsistsonthefacticityoflawseemstocontribute littletoourunderstandingthatlawhasimportantfunctionsinmaking humanlifegowell,thattheruleoflawisaprizedideal,andthat thelanguageandpracticeoflawishighlymoralized.Accordingly, positivism’scriticsmaintainthatthemostimportantfeatures oflawarenottobefoundinitssource-basedcharacter,butin law’scapacitytoadvancethecommongood,tosecurehuman rights,ortogovernwithintegrity. Itisbeyonddoubtthatmoralandpoliticalconsiderationsbearon legalphilosophy.AsFinnissays,thereasonswehavefor establishing,maintainingorreforminglawincludemoralreasons,and thesereasonsthereforeshapeourlegalconcepts(1980[2011: 266–273]and1996:204).Butwhichconcepts?Ifone accepts,asFinnisdoes,thattheexistenceandcontentoflawcanbe identifiedwithoutrecoursetomoralargument,andthat“human lawisartefactandartifice;andnotaconclusionfrommoral premises”(1996:205),itbecomeshardtoseehowthenatural lawtheoryhedevelopsrivalsratherthanaccommodatesthetruthof legalpositivism(seeGardner2001,225–227).This vitiatesalsoLonFuller’scriticismsofHart(Fuller1958and 1964).Fullerhastwomainpoints.First,hethinksthatit isn’tenoughforalegalsystemtorestoncustomarysocial rules,sincelawcouldnotguidebehaviorwithoutalsobeingatleast minimallyclear,consistent,public,prospectiveandsoon—that is,withoutexhibitingtosomedegreethosevirtuescollectively called“theruleoflaw”.Itsufficestonotethatthisis consistentwithlawbeingsource-based.Evenifmoralpropertieswere identicalwith,orsupervenedupon,theserule-of-lawproperties,they dosoinvirtueoftheirrule-likecharacter.Whatevervirtuesinhere inorfollowfromclear,consistent,prospective,andopenpractices canbefoundnotonlyinlawbutinallothersocialpracticeswith thosefeatures,includingcustomandpositivemorality.Andsuch virtues,iftheyexist,areminor:thereislittle,ifanything,tobe saidinfavorofaclear,consistent,prospective,publicand impartiallyadministeredsystemofracialsegregation,for example.Fuller’ssecondworryisthatiflawisamatterof fact,thenwearewithoutanexplanationofthedutytoobey.Heasks how“anamoraldatumcalledlawcouldhavethepeculiarquality ofcreatinganobligationtoobeyit”(Fuller1958:656).One possibilityheneglectsisthatitdoesn’t.ButevenifFuller isrightinhisunarguedassumption,the“peculiar quality”whoseexistencehedoubtsisafamiliarfeatureofmany practices.Comparepromises:whetherasocietyhasapracticeof promising,andwhatsomeonehaspromisedtodo,aremattersofsocial fact.Yetpromisingcreatesmoralobligationsofperformanceor compensation.An“amoraldatum”mayindeedfigure, togetherwithotherpremises,inasoundargumenttomoral conclusions. WhileFinnisandFuller’sviewsarethuscompatiblewiththe positivistthesis,thesamecannotbesaidofRonaldDworkin’s importantworks(Dworkin1978,1986and2011).Positivism’smost influentialcriticrejectsthetheoryoneveryconceivablelevel.He deniesthattherecanbeanygeneraltheoryoftheexistence andcontentoflaw;hedeniesthatlocaltheoriesofparticularlegal systemscanidentifylawwithoutrecoursetoitsmerits,andhe rejectsthewholeinstitutionalfocusofpositivism.Atheoryoflaw isforDworkinatheoryofhowcasesoughttobedecidedandit begins,notwithanaccountofpoliticalorganization,butwithan abstractidealregulatingtheconditionsunderwhichgovernmentsmay usecoerciveforceovertheirsubjects.Coercionmustnotbedeployed, heclaims, exceptaslicensedorrequiredbyindividualrightsand responsibilitiesflowingfrompastpoliticaldecisionsaboutwhen collectiveforceisjustified.(Dworkin1986:93) Asocietyhasalegalsystemonlywhen,andtotheextentthat,it honorsthisideal,anditslawisthesetofallconsiderationsthat thecourtsofsuchasocietywouldbemorallyjustifiedinapplying, whetherornotthoseconsiderationsaredeterminedbyanysource.To identifythelawofagivensocietywemustalwaysengageinmoraland politicalargument,forthelawiswhateverrequirementsare consistentwithaninterpretationofitslegalpracticesthatshows themtobebestjustifiedinlightofthisanimatingideal.In additiontothesephilosophicalconsiderations,Dworkininvokestwo featuresofthephenomenologyofjudging,asheseesit.Hefindsdeep controversyamonglawyersandjudgesabouthowimportant casesshouldbedecided,andhefindsdiversityinthe considerationsthattheyholdrelevanttodecidingthem.The controversysuggeststohimthatlawcannotrestonanofficial consensus,andthediversitysuggeststhatthereisnosinglesocial rulethatvalidatesallrelevantreasons,moralandnon-moral,for judicialdecisions. Dworkin’srichandcomplexargumentsattractedvariouslinesof replyfrompositivists.Oneresponsedeniestherelevanceofthe phenomenologicalclaims.Controversyisamatterofdegree,anda consensus-defeatingamountofitisnotprovedbytheexistenceof adversarialargumentinthehighcourts,orindeedinanycourts.As importantisthebroadrangeofsettledlawthatgivesrisetofew doubtsandwhichguidessociallifeoutsidethecourtroom (seeLeiter2009).Asforthediversityargument,sofarfrombeinga refutationofpositivism,thisisanentailmentofit.Positivism identifieslaw,notwithallvalidreasonsfordecision,butonlywith thesource-basedsubsetofthem.Itisnopartofthepositivistclaim thattheruleofrecognitiontellsushowtodecidecases,oreven identifiesallrelevantreasonsforadecision.Positivistsaccept thatmoral,politicaloreconomicconsiderationsareproperly operativeinlegaldecisions,justaslinguisticorlogicalonesare. Modusponensholdsincourtasmuchasoutside,butnot becauseitwasenactedbythelegislatureordecidedbythejudges, andthefactthatthereisnosocialrulethatvalidatesboth modusponensandalsotheMunicipalitiesActistruebut irrelevant.Theauthorityofprinciplesoflogic(ormorality)isnot somethingtobeexplainedbylegalphilosophy;theauthorityofacts ofParliamentmustbe;andaccountingforthedifferenceisacentral taskofthephilosophyoflaw. OtherpositivistsresponddifferentlytoDworkin’s phenomenologicalpoints,acceptingtheirrelevancebutmodifyingthe theorytoaccommodatethem.So-called“inclusive positivists”(e.g.,Soper,Lyons,Coleman,Waluchow(towhomthe termisdue),KramerandHimma)arguethatthemerit-based considerationsmayindeedbepartofthelaw,iftheyareexplicitly orimplicitlymadesobysource-basedconsiderations.Forexample, Canada’sconstitutionexplicitlyauthorizesforbreachof Charterrights,“suchremedyasthecourtconsidersappropriate andjustinthecircumstances”.Indeterminingwhichremedies mightbelegallyvalid,judgesarethusexpresslytoldtotakeinto accounttheirmorality.Andjudgesmaydevelopasettledpracticeof doingthiswhetherornotitisrequiredbyanyenactment;itmay becomecustomarypracticeincertaintypesofcases.Referenceto moralprinciplesmaybeimplicitinthewebofjudge-madelaw,for instanceinthecommonlawprinciplethatnooneshouldprofitfrom hisownwrongdoing.Suchmoralconsiderations,inclusivistsclaim,are partofthelawbecausethesourcesmakethemso,andthus Dworkinisrightthattheexistenceandcontentoflawmightturnon itsmerits,andwrongonlyinhisexplanationofthisfact.Legal validitydependsonmorality,notbecauseoftheinterpretative consequencesofsomeidealabouthowthegovernmentmayuseforce,but becausethatisoneofthethingsthatmaybecustomarilyrecognized asanultimatedeterminantoflegalvalidity.Itisthesourcesthat makethemeritsrelevant. Tounderstandandassessthisresponsesomeclarificationsareneeded. First,itisnotplausibletoholdthatthemeritsarerelevanttoa judicialdecisiononlywhenthesourcesmakethemso.It wouldbeoddtothinkthatjusticeisareasonfordecisiononly becausesomesourcedirectsanofficialtodecidejustly.It isofthenatureofjusticethatitproperlybearsoncertain controversies.Inlegaldecisions,especiallyimportantones,moral andpoliticalconsiderationsarepresentoftheirownauthority;they donotneedsourcestopropelthemintoaction.Onthecontrary,we expecttoseeasource—astatute,adecision,ora convention—whenjudgesareconstrainednottoappeal directlytothemerits(seeRaz2004a).Second,thefactthatthereis morallanguageinjudicialdecisionsdoesnotestablishthepresence ofmoraltestsforlaw,forsourcescomeinvariousguises.What soundslikemoralreasoninginthecourtsissometimesreally source-basedreasoning.Forexample,whentheSupremeCourtofCanada saysthatapublicationiscriminally“obscene”onlyifit isharmful,itisnotapplyingJ.S.Mill’sharmprinciple,for whatthatcourtmeansby“harmful”isthatwhichis regardedbythecommunityasdegradingorintolerable.That isasource-basedtest,notamoralone.Thisisjustoneofmany appealstopositivemorality,i.e.,tothemoralcustomsactually practicedbyagivensociety,andnopositivistdeniesthatpositive moralitymaybeasourceoflaw.Moreover,itisimportanttoremember thatlawisdynamicandthatevenadecisionthatdoesapplymorality itselfbecomesasourceoflaw,inthefirstinstanceforthe partiesandpossiblyforothersaswell.Overtime,bythedoctrineof precedentwhereitexistsorthroughthegradualemergenceofan interpretativeconventionwhereitdoesnot,thisgivesafactualedge tonormativeterms.Thus,ifacourtdecidesthatmoneydamagesarein someinstancesnota“justremedy”thenthisfact willjoinwithothersinfixingwhat“justice”meansfor thesepurposes.Thisprocessmayultimatelydetachlegalconceptsfrom theirmoralanalogs(thus,legal“murder”mayrequireno intentiontokill,legal“fault”nomoralblameworthiness, an“equitable”remedymaybemanifestlyunfair,etc.). Bearinginmindthesecomplications,however,thereundeniablyremains agreatdealofmoralreasoninginadjudication.Courtsareoften calledontodecidewhatwouldreasonable,fair,just,cruel,etc.by explicitorimplicitrequirementofstatuteorcommonlaw,orbecause thisistheonlyproperorintelligiblewaytodecide.Whenthelaw itselflicensessuchreasoningshouldweunderstandit,withthe inclusivepositivist,toincorporatemoralstandards,or,asperthe viewsoftheirrival,theexclusivepositivist,onlytomakereference tomoralprinciples? Exclusivepositivistsoffertwomainargumentsforstoppingatsocial sources.ThefirstisduetoRaz(1994:201–37)andhastodo withlaw’sroleinpracticalreasoning(forcriticismseePerry 1989,Waluchow1994,Coleman2001,Dworkin2002,Kramer2004and Himma2019).Althoughlawdoesnotnecessarilyhavelegitimateauthority, Razsuggestsitlaysclaimtoit,andcanintelligiblydosoonlyif itisthekindofthingthatcouldhavelegitimateauthority. Itmayfail,therefore,incertainwaysonly,forexample,bybeing unjust,pointless,orineffective.Butlawcannotfailtobea candidateauthority,foritisconstitutedinthatroleby ourpoliticalpractices.AccordingtoRaz,practicalauthorities mediatebetweensubjectsandtheultimatereasonsforwhichthey shouldact.Authorities’directivesshouldbebasedonsuch reasons,andtheyarejustifiedonlywhencompliancewiththe directivesmakesitmorelikelythatpeoplewillcomplywiththe underlyingreasonsthatapplytothem.Buttheycandothat, hesuggests,onlyifispossibletoknowwhatthedirectivesrequire independentofappealtothoseunderlyingreasons.Iflawwereto incorporatethemoralstandardstowhichitrefersitwouldnolonger beabletoplaythismediatingrole;identifyingthelawwouldrequire identifyingthereasonsunderlyingit.Becausethenatureoflawis partlydeterminedbyitsroleingivingpracticalguidance,Raz concludes,thereistheoreticalreasonforstoppingatsource-based considerations. Thesecondargumentchallengesanunderlyingideaofinclusive positivism,whatwemightcalltheMidasPrinciple.“Justas everythingKingMidastouchedturnedintogold,everythingtowhich lawrefersbecomeslaw…”(Kelsen1945[1961:161]). Kelsenthoughtthatitfollowedfromthisprinciplethat Itis…possibleforthelegalorder,byobligingthe law-creatingorganstorespectorapplycertainmoralnormsor politicalprinciplesoropinionsofexpertstotransformthesenorms, principles,oropinionsintolegalnorms,andthusintosourcesof law.(Kelsen1945[1961:132]) (Thoughheregardedthistransformationaseffectedbyasortoftacit legislation.)Ifsound,theMidasPrincipleholdsingeneralandnot onlywithrespecttomorality,asKelsenmakesclear.Supposethen thattheIncomeTaxActpenalizesoverdueaccountsat8%perannum.In arelevantcase,anofficialcandeterminethecontentofalegal obligationonlybycalculatingcompoundinterest.Doesthismake mathematicspartofthelaw?Acontraryindicationisthatitisnot subjecttotherulesofchangeinalegalsystem—neithercourts norlegislatorscanrepealoramendthelawofcommutativity.Thesame holdsofothersocialnorms,includingthenormsofforeignlegal systems.Aconflict-of-lawsrulemaydirectaCanadianjudgetoapply MexicanlawinaCanadiancase.Theconflictsruleis obviouslypartoftheCanadianlegalsystem.ButtheruleofMexican lawisnot,foralthoughCanadianofficialscandecidewhetherornot toapplyit,theycanneitherchangeitnorrepealit,andthebest explanationforitsexistenceandcontentmakesnoreferenceto Canadiansocietyoritspoliticalsystem.Inlikemanner,moral standards,logic,mathematics,principlesofstatisticalinference,or Englishgrammar,thoughallproperlyappliedincases,arenot themselvesthelaw,forlegalorganshaveapplicativebutnotcreative poweroverthem.Theinclusivistthesisisactuallygropingtowardsan important,butdifferent,truth.Lawisanopennormative system(Raz1975[1990:152–154]):itadoptsandenforcesmany otherstandards,includingmoralnormsandtherulesofsocialgroups. ThereisnowarrantforadoptingtheMidasPrincipletoexplainhowor whyitdoesthis. Asnotedabove,Dworkin’sargumentsagainstpositivismdepend uponclaimsaboutthephenomenologyofadjudicationandaboutthe constraintsimposedonjurisprudencebylegaldisagreement.Mark Greenberg’srecentworktakesasitsstartingpointmanyof Dworkin’sclaims,buthisconclusionsareinseveralwaysmore radical(seeGreenberg2004and2014).Greenberg’scentral argumentagainstpositivismismethodological:noone,hesuggests, woulddenythatthecontentofthelawdependsatleastinpartupon socialfacts.However,thequestionofwhichfacts—the semanticcontentorintendedeffectoflegislation,for example—cannotbeansweredbyreferencetofurtherofthesame: “lawpractices…cannotdeterminetheirown relevance”(2004:185).Appealmustthereforebemadetoother kindsofconsiderations—forGreenberg,considerationsaboutthe moralimportofoursocialpractices.Itispositivism’serror tosuggestthatlawcouldbepractice-basedallthewaydown.Thatthe contentoflawdependsuponsocialsources,however,isatruthborne outbylawingeneral,asopposedtobeingestablishedwithinlocal legalpractices.Thereisacategoricaldifferencebetweenthe validityofthesourcesthesis—atruthaboutlawasakindof socialpractice—andtheclaimthatintheUK,forexample, statuterendersitisillegaltodriveabove70milesanhouronthe motorway.Inthiswaytheformerexplainsthelatterwithout circularity,andwithouttheneedforappealtomorality. 4.LawandItsMerits Itmayclarifythephilosophicalstakesinlegalpositivismby comparingittoanumberofothertheseswithwhichitissometimes wronglyidentified,andnotonlybyitsopponents(seealsoHart1958, Füßer1996,andSchauer1996). 4.1TheFallibilityThesis Lawdoesnotnecessarilysatisfytheconditionsbywhichitis appropriatelyassessed(Lyons1984:63;Hart1961[2012: 185–186)].Lawshouldbejust,butitmaynotbe;itshould promotethecommongood,butsometimesitdoesn’t;itshould protectmoralrights,butitmayfailmiserably.Thiswemaycallthe moralfallibilitythesis.Thethesisiscorrect,butitisnotthe exclusivepropertyofpositivism.Aquinasacceptsit,Fulleraccepts it,Finnisacceptsit,andDworkinacceptsit.Onlyacrude misunderstandingofideaslikeAquinas’sclaimthat“an unjustlawseemstobenolawatall”mightsuggestthe contrary.Lawmayhaveanessentiallymoralcharacterandyetbe morallydeficient.Evenifeverylawalwaysdoesonekindofjustice (formaljustice;justiceaccordingtolaw),thisdoesnotentailthat itdoeseverykindofjustice.Evenifeverylawhasaprima facieclaimtobeappliedorobeyed,itdoesnotfollowthatit hassuchaclaimallthingsconsidered.Thegapbetweenthesepartial andconclusivejudgmentsisallanaturallawtheoryneedsto accommodatethefallibilitythesis.Itissometimessaidthat positivismgivesamoresecuregrasponthefallibilityof law,foronceweseethatitisasocialconstructionwewillbeless likelytoaccorditinappropriatedeferenceandbetterpreparedto engageinaclear-headedmoralappraisalofthelaw.Thisclaim appealedtoseveralpositivists,includingBenthamandHart.Butwhile thismightfollowfromthetruthofpositivism,itcannotprovidean independentargumentforit.Iflawhasanessentiallymoralcharacter thenitisobfuscating,notclarifying,todescribeitasa source-basedstructureofgovernance. 4.2TheSeparabilityThesis Atonepoint,Hartidentifieslegalpositivismwith thesimplecontentionthatitisnosenseanecessarytruththatlaws reproduceorsatisfycertaindemandsofmorality,thoughinfactthey haveoftendoneso.(1961[2012:185–186]) Manyotherphilosophers,encouragedalsobythetitleofHart’s famousessay,“PositivismandtheSeparationofLawand Morals”,(1958)treatthetheoryasthedenialthatthereisa necessaryconnectionbetweenlawandmorality—theymustbein somesense“separable”evenifnotinfactseparate (Coleman1982).Theseparabilitythesisisgenerallyconstruedsoas totolerateanycontingentconnectionbetweenmoralityand law,providedonlythatitisconceivablethattheconnection mightfail.Thus,theseparabilitythesisisconsistentwithallof thefollowing:(i)moralprinciplesmaybepartofthelaw;(ii)law isusually,orevenalwaysinfact,valuable;(iii)thebest explanationforthecontentofasociety’slawsincludes referencetothemoralidealscurrentinthatsociety;and(iv)a legalsystemcannotsurviveunlessitisseentobe,andthusinsome measureactuallyis,just.Allfourclaimsarecountedbythe separabilitythesisascontingentconnectionsonly;theydonothold ofallpossiblelegalsystems—theyprobablydon’t evenholdofallhistoricallegalsystems.Asmerelycontingent truths,itissaidthattheydonotaffecttheconceptoflawitself. Ifwethinkofthepositivistthesisthisway,wemightinterpretthe differencebetweenexclusiveandinclusivepositivismintermsofthe scopeofthemodaloperator: (EP)Itisnecessarily thecasethatthereisnoconnectionbetweenlawand morality. (IP)Itisnot necessarilythecasethatthereisaconnectionbetweenlawand morality. Inreality,however,legalpositivismisnottobeidentifiedwith eitherthesis:botharefalse.Therearemanynecessary “connections”,trivialandnon-trivial,betweenlawand morality.AsJohnGardnernotes,legalpositivismtakesapositionon onlyoneofthem;itrejectsanydependenceoftheexistence oflawonitsmerits(Gardner2001).Andwithrespecttothis dependencyrelation,legalpositivistsareconcernedwithmuchmore thantherelationshipbetweenlawandmorality,forinthe onlysenseinwhichtheyinsistonaseparationoflawandmoralsthey mustinsistalso—andforthesamereasons—onaseparation oflawandeconomics. Toexcludethisdependencyrelation,however,istoleaveintactmany otherinterestingpossibilities.Forinstance,itispossiblethat moralvaluederivesfromtheexistenceoflaw(Raz1975 [1990:165–170]).IfHobbesisright,anyorderisbetterthan chaosandinsomecircumstancesordermaybeachievableonlythrough positivelaw.OrperhapsinaHegelianwayeveryexistinglegalsystem expressesdeliberategovernanceinaworldotherwisedominatedby chance;lawisthespiritofthecommunitycometoself-consciousness. Noticethattheseclaimsareconsistentwiththefallibilitythesis, fortheydonotdenythatthesesupposedlygoodthingsmightalso bringevils,suchastoomuchorderorthewilltopower.Perhapssuch derivativeconnectionsbetweenlawandmoralityarethoughtinnocuous onthegroundthattheyshowmoreabouthumannaturethantheydo aboutthenatureoflaw.Thesamecannotbesaidofthefollowing necessaryconnectionsbetweenlawandmorality,eachofwhichgoesto theheartofourconceptoflaw(onwhichseefurtherGreen2008): (1)Necessarily,law dealswithmoralmatters. Kelsenwrites, Justasnaturalandpositivelawgovernthesamesubject-matter,and relate,therefore,tothesamenorm-object,namelythemutual relationshipsofmen—sobothalsohaveincommontheuniversal formofthisgovernance,namelyobligation.(Kelsen1928 [1973:34]) Thisisamatterofthecontentofalllegalsystems.Wherethereis lawthereisalsomorality,andtheyregulatethesamemattersby analogoustechniques.Ofcoursetosaythatlawdealswith morality’ssubjectmatterisnottosaythatitdoessowell, andtosaythatalllegalsystemscreateobligationsisnottoendorse thedutiessocreated.ThisnotionisdistinctfromHart’s “minimumcontent”thesisaccordingtowhichthereare basicrulesgoverningviolence,property,fidelity,andkinshipthat anylegalsystemmustencompassifitaimsatthesurvivalofsocial creatureslikeourselves(Hart1961[2012:193–200]).Hart regardsthisasamatterof“naturalnecessity”andin thatmeasureiswillingtoqualifyhisendorsementoftheseparability thesis.Butevenasocietythatprefersnationalgloryortheworship ofgodstosurvivalwillchargeitslegalsystemwiththesametasks itsmoralitypursues.Unliketherulesofahealthclub,lawhasbroad scopeandreachestothemostimportantthingsinanysociety, whatevertheymaybe.Indeed,ourmosturgentpoliticalworriesabout lawanditsclaimsflowfromjustthiscapacitytoregulateourmost vitalinterests,andlaw’swidereachmustfigureinany argumentaboutitslegitimacy.(Adistinctargument,developedmost fullybyRaz(1994)andGardner(2012a),isthatlawnotonlyoccupies itselfwithmoralmattersbutmakesmoralclaims overus.ForcriticismseeKramer1999:83–9;Duarte d’AlmeidaandEdwards2014.) (2)Necessarily,lawis justice-apt. Inviewofthenormativefunctionoflawincreatingandenforcing obligationsandrights,italwaysmakessensetoaskwhether lawisjust,andwhereitisfounddeficienttodemandreform.Legal systemsarethereforethekindofthingthatisaptfor appraisalasjustorunjust.Thisisasignificantfeatureoflaw.Not allhumanpracticesarejustice-apt.Itmakesnosensetoaskwhether acertainfugueisjustortodemandthatitbecomeso.Themusical standardsoffugalexcellencearepre-eminentlyinternal—agood fugueisagoodexampleofitsgenre;itshouldbemelodic, interesting,inventiveetc.—andthefurtherwegetfromthese internalstandardsofexcellencethemorediverseevaluativejudgments aboutitbecome.Whilesomeformalistsflirtwithsimilarideasabout law,thisseemsinconsistentwithlaw’splaceamongsthuman practices.Eveniflawhasinternalstandardsofmerit—virtues uniquelyitsownthatinhereinitslaw-likecharacter—these cannotprecludeordisplaceitsassessmentonindependentcriteriaof justice.Afuguemaybeatitsbestwhenithasallthevirtuesof fugacity;butlawisnotbestwhenitexcelsinlegality;law mustalsobejust.Asocietymaythereforesuffernotonlyfromtoo littleoftheruleoflaw,butalsofromtoomuchofit.Thisdoesnot presupposethatjusticeistheonly,oreventhefirst,virtueofa legalsystem.Itmeansthatourconcernforitsjusticeasoneofits virtuescannotbesidelinedbyanyclaimofthesortthatlaw’s purposeistobelaw,toitsmostexcellentdegree.Lawstands continuouslyexposedtodemandsforjustification,andthattooshapes itsnatureandroleinourlivesandculture. (3)Necessarily,lawis morallyrisky. Itisacuriousfactthatalmostalltheoriesthatinsistonthe essentiallymoralcharacteroflawtakelaw’scharactertobe essentiallygood.ThegravamenofFuller’sphilosophyisthat lawisessentiallyamoralenterprise,madepossibleonlybyarobust adherencetoitsowninnermorality.Thethoughtthatthelawmight haveaninnerimmoralityneveroccurredtohim.But,asHart recognized,wherethereis“aunionofprimaryandsecondary rules”—thatistosay,whereverthereislaw—moral risksemergeasamatterofnecessity.Therearenotonlynewly efficientformsofoppression,unavailableincommunitieswithmore diffuseformsofsocialorganization,therearealsonewvices:the possiblealienationofcommunityandvalue,thelossoftransparency, theriseofanewhierarchy,andthepossibilitythatsomewhoshould resistinjusticemaybeboughtoffbythegoodsthatlegalorder brings.Althoughlawhasitsvirtues,italsonecessarilyrisks certainvices,andthismarksaconnectionbetweenlawandmoralityof areversekind. Thesethreethesesestablishconnectionsbetweenlawandmoralitythat arebothnecessaryandhighlysignificant.Eachofthemisconsistent withthepositivistthesisthattheexistenceandcontentoflaw dependsonsocialfacts,notonthelaw’smerits.Eachofthem contributestoanunderstandingofthenatureoflaw.Theonce-popular ideathatlegalpositivisminsistsontheseparabilityoflawand moralityisthereforesignificantlymistaken. 4.3TheNeutralityThesis Theprecedingthesestogetherestablishthatlawisnot value-neutral.Althoughsomelawyersregardthisideaasarevelation (andothersasprovocation)itisinfactbanal.Thethoughtthatlaw couldbevalueneutraldoesnotevenrisetofalsity—itis incoherent.Lawisanormativesystem,promotingcertainvaluesand repressingothers.Lawisnotneutralbetweenvictimandmurdereror betweenownerandthief.Whenpeoplecomplainofthelaw’slack ofneutrality,theyareinfactvoicingverydifferentaspirations, suchasthedemandthatitbefair,just,impartial,andsoforth.A conditionoflaw’sachievinganyoftheseidealsisthatitis notneutralineitheritsaimsoritseffects. Positivismishoweversometimesmorecrediblyassociatedwiththeidea thatlegalphilosophyisorshouldbevalue-neutral.Kelsen, forexample,says,“thefunctionofthescienceoflawisnot theevaluationofitssubject,butitsvalue-freedescription” (1960[1967:68])andHartatonepointdescribedhisworkas “descriptivesociology”(1961[2012:v]).Buta descriptionofwhat?“Law”isananthropocentricsubject, dependentnotmerelyonoursensoryembodimentbutalso,asits necessaryconnectionstomoralityshow,onourmoralsenseand capacities.Legalkindssuchascourts,decisions,andruleswillnot appearinapurelyphysicaldescriptionoftheuniverseandmaynot evenappearineverysocialdescription.(Thismaylimittheprospects fora“naturalized”jurisprudence;thoughforadefenseof thecontraryview,seeLeiter1997).Legalpositivism,tobesure,is notan“evaluationofitssubject”,i.e.,anevaluationof thelaw.Andtosaythattheexistenceoflawdependson socialfactsdoesnotcommitonetothinkingthatitisagoodthing thatthisisso(nordoesitprecludeit:seeMacCormick1985and Campbell1996).Butitdoesnotfollowthatlegalphilosophytherefore offersa“value-freedescription”ofitssubject.Thereis asense,ofcourse,inwhicheverydescriptionisvalue-laden.It selectsandsystematizesonlyasubsetoftheinfinitenumberoffacts aboutitssubject.Todescribelawasrestingoncustomarysocial rulesistoomitmanyothertruthsaboutitincluding,forexample, truthsaboutitsconnectiontothedemandforpaperorsilk.What formsthewarrantforourprioritizingtheformeroverthelatter? Finnis(1980[2011:3–19])thinksthattheonlypossibilityhere hastodowiththemoralreasonswemighthaveforwantinglaw(that weanswer“what?”byanswering“why?”)and thatthefailureofmethodologicalpositivism,thefailuretoachieve avalue-freedescriptionofthesubject,resultsinthefailureof legalpositivism.Butthequestionofsocialsignificanceisnot exhaustedbyourmoralregister,andespeciallynotonlybyits positivevalence(onwhichseeDickson2001).Otherspointtothe notionofconceptualormetaphysicaltruthassettingtheboundsof thequestionthatpositivismseekstoanswer(fordiscussionseeRaz 2004b).Buthoweverthesedifficultissuesaretoberesolved,we shouldnotexpectlegalpositivismitselftocontributemuch.Athesis aboutthenatureoflawisnotatthesametimeathesisabouthowto understandthenatureoflaw. Itmayseem,however,thatlegalpositivismatleastrequiresastand ontheso-called“fact-value”problem.Thereisnodoubt thatcertainpositivists,especiallyKelsen,believethistobeso.In reality,positivismmaycohabitwitharangeofviewshere—value statementsmaybeentailedbyfactualstatements;valuesmaysupervene onfacts;valuesmaybekindsoffact.Legalpositivismrequiresonly thatitbeinvirtueofitsfacticityratherthanitsmeritoriousness thatsomethingislaw,andthatwecandescribethatfacticitywithout assessingitsmerits. Evaluativeargumentis,ofcourse,centraltothephilosophyoflaw moregenerally.Nolegalphilosophercanbeonlyalegal positivist.Acompleteunderstandingoflawrequiresalsoanaccount ofwhatkindsofthingscouldpossiblycountasthemeritsoflaw (mustlawbeefficientorelegantaswellasjust?);ofwhatrolelaw shouldplayinadjudication(shouldvalidlawalwaysbeapplied?);of whatclaimlawhasonourobedience(isthereadutytoobey?);and alsothemorepracticalquestionsofwhatlawsweshouldhaveand whetherweshouldhavelawatall.Legalpositivismdoesnotaspireto answerthesequestions(althoughcf.Murphy2014:88–108forthe argumentthatthetheoryhasimportantfirst-orderimplicationsfor legalpractice).Nonetheless,positivism’sclaimthatthe existenceandcontentoflawdependsonlyonsocialfactsdoesgive themshape. 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