What Is Epistemology? – Keith DeRose - Yale University

Epistemology, then, is the branch of philosophy that deals with questions concerning the nature, scope, and sources of knowledge. In what follows, I'll briefly ... Skiptocontent YaleUniversity DepartmentofPhilosophy YaleUniversity P.O.Box208306 NewHaven,CT06520-8306 E-mail:[email protected] Dept.phone:432-1686 Search WhatIsEpistemology? ABriefIntroductiontotheTopic KeithDeRose, YaleUniversity Dept.ofPhilosophy Isupposemanyareinthepositionofknowingthatepistemologyisabranchofphilosophy,butnotknowinganythingbeyondthat.(Well,notknowinganythingfurtheraboutwhatepistemologyis—let’snotgetintogeneralskepticismjustyet!) Thestandardveryshortanswertoourtitlequestionisthatepistemologyisthetheoryofknowledge. Infact,sofarasIcantell,“epistemology”and“theoryofknowledge”areusedinterchangeablyin,forinstance,collegecoursecatalogues. Epistemology,then,isthebranchofphilosophythatdealswithquestionsconcerningthenature,scope,andsourcesofknowledge. Inwhatfollows,I’llbrieflydescribeafewoftheissuesepistemologistsdealwith. Thatshouldgiveyouabitbetterideaofwhatepistemologyis,and,forthoseconsideringtakinganepistemologyclass,whattoexpectfromsuchaclass. Forthoseinterestedinfurtherreading,therearelinksatthebottomofthispagetoarticlesthatareintroductoryinnature(mostlyfromthe StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,agreaton-lineresource)onparticulartopicsinepistemology.   1.UnderwhatConditionsDoesOneKnow?:TheAnalysisofKnowledge. Sinceepistemologyisthetheoryofknowledge,acentralquestionoftheareais:Underwhatconditionsdoesasubjectknowsomethingtobethecase? Mostgeneralepistemologyclasses(asopposedtospecializedadvancedcoursesthatzeroinonaparticularepistemologicaltopic)spendatleastsometimeonthisquestion,andmanybeginwithit. Averyimportantpaperonthistopic—perhapsthemostcommonlyassignedpaperinepistemologyclasses—isEdmundGettier’sshortclassic,“IsJustifiedTrueBeliefKnowledge?”(Analysis23(1963):121-123[inthejournalAnalysis,volume23,publishedintheyear1963,onpages121-123]),availableon-linehere. Gettier’stargetisaninitiallytemptingaccountofknowledge:the“JTB”account,asit’softencalled,whichanalyzesknowledgeasjustifiedtruebelief. Accordingtosuchanaccount,asubjectSknowsthatPifandonlyif(GettierusesthecommonphilosophicalabbreviationofIFFfor“ifandonlyif”): 1.Pistrue, 2.SbelievesthatP,and 3.SisjustifiedinbelievingthatP. Accordingtothisaccount,then,youknowthatit’srainingoutside,forexample,ifandonlyifitistruethatit’srainingoutside,andyoubelievethatit’srainingoutside,andyouarejustifiedinsobelieving. Torefutesuchaccounts,Gettieradvancedtwoexamples,eachofwhichinvolve(oratleastintuitivelyseemtoinvolve)instancesofjustifiedtruebeliefthatnonethelessfailtobeinstancesofknowledge. OnecouldtrytomaintaintheJTBaccountinthefaceofGettier’scaseseitherbyarguing(againstappearances)thatthethetruebeliefsinquestionintheseexamplesarenotreallyjustified,orbymaintaining(againagainstinitialappearances)thatthesubjectsintheexamplesreallydoknowthepropositionsinquestion. ButmostepistemologistshaveacceptedthatGettier’scasesaregenuinecounter-examplestotheJTBtheory—theyaregenuineexamplesofsituationsinwhichthequestions“DoesSknowthatP?”and“DoesShaveajustifiedtruebeliefthatP?”getdifferentanswers,andthusrefutetheJTBaccountofknowledge. Gettier’spaperspawnedanexplosionofphilosophicalliteratureaimedatproducinganacceptableaccountofknowledge,eitherbymodifyingtheJTBaccountbyaddingfurtherconditionstoit,orbyreplacingthethird,justification,conditionwithoneormoreotherconditions. Manynewaccountswereproposed,onlytobesubjectedtonewcounter-examples—exampleswhichrefutetheaccountinquestioneitherbyshowinghowasubjectcanknowsomethingdespitefailingtomeettheconditionstheaccountproposes,orbyshowinghowasubjectcanfailtoknowsomethingeventhoughshedoesmeettheconditionsproposed. Often,stillmoresophisticatedaccountswereproposedtohandlethenewexamples,onlytocrashontherocksofstillmoresophisticatedcounter-examples. (Fordiscussionofmanyexamplesoftheanalysesinquestion,andofsomeofthetroublestheyruninto,seeRobertShope’sbook,TheAnalysisofKnowledge(PrincetonUniversityPress,1983).) Manyepistemologistsgrewtiredofthegame,anddespairedofcomingupwithanaccountofknowledgethatcouldsurvivethisprocess. Awidelydiscussedtopichasbeenwhetherandhowthemethodologyoftestingphilosophicalaccountsagainstexamples(amethodologythatispracticedinmanyareasofphilosophybesidesepistemology)canbeprofitablypursued,andthe“post-Gettier”literatureontheanalysisofknowledgehasbeenusedasexhibitAofthismethodologyinaction. [Formoreintroductorymaterialonthistopic,seeMatthiasSteup’sStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle,“TheAnalysisofKnowledge”.] 2.JustificationandOtherEpistemicConcepts. Astheabovediscussionshows,oneissuethatarisesindiscussionsofwhetherandwhensubjectsknowsomethingiswhetherandwhentheyarejustifiedinbelievingthings,andthejustificationofbeliefsisastandardtopicinepistemology. Epistemologyalsoconcernsitselfwithother,closelyrelatedconcepts. Someexamples:Whenisasubjectrationalinbelievingsomething? Whenareyoucertainofsomething? Whendoyouknowforcertainthatsomethingisthecase? Whenissomethingdoubtful,forasubject,ornot? Whenissomethingpossible(inanepistemicsenseof“possible”)—underwhatconditionsisabeliefpossiblyfalsefromitssubject’spointofview? Whenisabeliefadequatelysupportedbyone’sevidence? (Andwhatconstitutesourevidenceforourbeliefs,andwhendoesabeliefneedtobesupportedbyevidenceinordertoberational?) Alloftheseareepistemologicaltopicsintheirownright,ofinterestbeyondwhatcontributionanunderstandingoftheseconceptsmightmakeinasuccessfulaccountofknowledge. 3.WhatDoWeKnow?:Skepticism. Asonewouldexpect,anothercentralquestioninthetheoryofknowledgeis:Whatdoweknow? Whatisthescopeorextentofourknowledge? Thisquestion,ofcourse,iscloselyrelatedtothequestion,addressedaboveinsection1,ofwhatittakestoknowsomething. Pessimisticaccountsofthescopeofourknowledgehaveitthatweknowlessthanwethinkweknow;radicallypessimisticaccountshaveitthatweknowverylittle,orperhapsevennothing! Thoughradical,suchskepticalaccountsofthescopeofourknowledgehavebeenthecenterofmuchphilosophicalattention,bothhistoricallyandinrecentepistemologicalwork. Usually,skepticismissomethingphilosophersattackandtrytoovercome;occasionally,itisdefended. Theattentionpaidhereisinpartduetothepresenceofpowerfulskepticalargumentsthatthreatentoshowthatskepticalassessmentsofthescopeofourknowledgeareactuallycorrect. Acentralepistemologicalobsessionhasbeenshowingwhatiswrongwiththeseskepticalarguments—or,occasionally,arguingthatthere’snothingwrongwiththem. Askepticalthesisistypicallyaclaimthatthebeliefsinacertainrangelackacertainstatus.Inaddition,then,tovaryingintheirscope—whichspecifiestherangeofbeliefsbeingtargeted—skepticaltheses,andtheargumentsusedtoestablishthem,alsodifferintheirforce—whichspecifiespreciselywhatlacktheskepticallegesbefallsthetargetedbeliefs.Skepticism,then,isn’tlimitedtopessimisticaccountsoftheextentofourknowledge;theycanbeviewsonwhichanyofthedesignationsdiscussedaboveinsection2surprisinglyfailtoapplytoawiderangeofourbeliefs. Theoriesaccordingtowhichsurprisinglyfew,orperhapsnone,ofourbeliefsarejustified,orrational,oradequatelysupportedbyourevidence,orknownwithcompletecertainty,etc.,arealsoexamplesofskepticism. [Formoreintroductorymaterialonskepticism,includingadescriptionofsomecommonskepticalarguments,andmanyofthemostinfluentialtypesofresponsetoskepticalproblems,seemy“RespondingtoSkepticism,”availableon-linehere.] 4.InternalismandExternalism. Aswe’vealreadynoted,epistemologistsareinterestedinthemattersofwhen(underwhatconditions)beliefsarejustifiedandwhensubjectsknowwhattheybelieve. Thereisanimportantdivisionbetweentwomaintypesofaccountsofthesematters—thatbetweeninternalismandexternalism. Accordingtotheepistemicinternalist,thesemattersdependprimarilyonfactorsinternaltothebeliever’spointofviewand/orfactorstowhichthebelieverhasspecialaccess.Mostinternalistsacceptthattheexternalmatterofwhetherabeliefistrueisrelevanttotheissueofwhetheritconstitutesknowledge,soontheissueofknowledge,internalismisusuallythepositionthatonlyorprimarilyinternalfactorsarerelevanttowhethertruebeliefsconstituteknowledge.Theepistemicexternalist,ontheotherhand,claimsthatissuesofknowledgeand/orjustificationdependexclusivelyorprimarilyonsuchfactorsashowthebeliefwascausedorhowreliableisthefacultyormechanismbywhichthesubjectcametoholdthebelief—matterswhicharenotintherequisiteway“internal”tothesubject’spointofview,ascanbeseenbythefactthatyoucanimaginetwosubjectswhosementallivesareidenticalwithrespecttohowthingsseemtothemfromtheirownpointofview,butwhosebeliefsdivergewithrespecttothemattersinquestion.Theinternalistaboutjustificationwillhavetoholdthatthebeliefsofsuchsubjectshavethesamejustificatorystatus(they’reeitherbothjustifiedorbothunjustified,andtothesamedegree),andtheinternalistaboutknowledgewillhavetoholdthat,solongasthebeliefsofsuch“twins”aretrueinbothcases,theycan’tdivergeonthematterofwhethertheyconstituteknowledge. So,consideran“internaltwin”ofme. Thistwin’slifewasidenticaltomineuptomidnightlastnight. Atthattime,ourlifehistoriesdrasticallydiverge,butnotinanywaycausesadifferenceinwhatourexperiencesseemlikefromtheinside:Our“internal”livesarestillidentical. Atmidnight,super-advancedalienssnatchedmytwin’sbrainfromhisbody,placeditina(human)-brain-sustainingvat,andhookedituptoasuper-advancedcomputer,that,takingintoaccounttheoutputofthebrainthatismytwin,givesitappropriatesensoryinput. Meanwhile,wemaysuppose,Iremainanormallyembodiedhuman,withnoaliensanywherearoundme. Thealienswhosnatchedmytwin’sbrainfromhisbodyaresoadvancedthattheywereabletodosoinsuchawaythatdidnotimpactatallonhisexperience. Nowitismorning,andIhaveaconversationwithmywife. Mytwinishavingidenticalexperiences,andsothinksheishavingaconversationwithhiswife,butinfactheisnot. (Hiswifeisinfactnow,unbeknownsttohim,inshockandmourningoverthediscoveryofhisde-brained,deadbody.) TheinternalistaboutjustificationwillholdthatmybeliefthatIamhavingaconversationwithmywifehasthesamejustificatorystatusasdoesmytwin’sanalogousbelief:eitherwearebothjustifiedinourbelieforbothunjustified,andtothesamedegree. Forwhatit’sworth,theinternalisthasalwaysseemedtometoberightaboutthis:Itseemstomethatsuchtwinscan’tdifferfromoneanotheronthejustificatorystatusoftheirbeliefs:Ifmybeliefisjustified,soismytwin’s;ifhisisunjustified,soismine. Inthecaseunderdiscussion,Ithinkbothmeandmytwinarejustifiedinholdingthebeliefinquestion—eventhoughmytwin’sbeliefisfalse. Whataboutknowledge? Sincemybelief(thatI’mhavingaconversationwithmywife)istrue,whilemytwin’sbeliefisfalse,eveninternalists,atleastasIconstruethem,canholdthatoneofus(presumably,me)knowstheiteminquestion,whiletheother(presumably,mytwin)doesn’t. Foragoodtestcase,weneedanexamplewherethebeliefsinquestionarebothtrue. So:Iamholdingacupofcoffee. Mytwinalsobelievesheisholdingacupofcoffee,butinfactheisn’t. BecauseI(correctly)believeIamholdingacupofcoffee,Ibelievethatthereisacupofcoffeewithin10feetofmybrain. (Ifyouarenotafanof“implicit”beliefs,youmaysupposethatIhavejustbeenaskedwhetherthereisacupofcoffeewithin10feetofmybrain,andsohaveconsideredthematterandhavecometoapositiveconclusion,and,ofcourse,then,thatmytwinhashadexperiencesthatmakehimthinkthathehasjustbeenaskedwhetherthereisacupofcoffeewithin10feetofhisbrain,andhascometoapositiveconclusion.) Somytwinalsobelievesthereisacupofcoffeewithin10feetofhisbrain. Hebelievesthisbecausehe(incorrectly)believesthatheisholdingacupofcoffee. Butwhileheiswrongaboutthematterofwhatheisholding,letussupposethatheturnsouttoberightaboutthefactthatthereisacupofcoffeewithin10feetofhisbrain:Thealienswhohavesnatchedhisbrainhavetakenupthehumanpracticeofdrinkingcupsofcoffee,andoneofthealienshascarelesslyleftacupofcoffeerestingrightnexttothevatthatholdsthebrainofmyinternaltwin. So,asithappens,mytwin’sbeliefthatthereisacupofcoffeewithin10feetofhisbrainistrue. Soherewehaveapairof“twins”whoshareacertainbeliefthatistrueinbothoftheircases. Theinternalistwillsaythateitherbothmeandmytwinknowthatthereisacupofcoffeewithin10feetofhisbrain,orthatneitherofusknowsthat. SinceitseemstomethatIdoknowknowthatthereisacupofcoffeewithin10feetofmybrain,butthatmytwindoesn’tknowthatofhimself,theexternalistseemstometoberightaboutknowledge. Knowledgeseemstometocruciallyinvolvemattersthatgobeyondtruebeliefpluspurely“internal”issues:thereare“external”mattersbeyondthetruthofthebeliefinquestionthatmattertowhetherabeliefisapieceofknowledge. (SinceIthinkmytwinis,likeme,justifiedinbelievingthereisacupofcoffeewithin10feetofhisbrain,butdoesnotknowthatthisistrue,eventhoughitinfactistrue,Ithinkthecaseofmytwin’sbeliefthatthereisacupofcoffeewithin10feetofhisbrainisa“Gettiercase,”inonecommonuseofthatterm:Itisacaseofajustified,truebeliefthatisneverthelessnotapieceofknowledge.) 5.TheStructureofKnowledge:FoundationalismandCoherentism. Animportantissueforepistemologistsisoverthestructureofknowledge(orofjustification). Themainpositionsonthisissue,foundationalismandcoherentism,areperhapsbestintroducedasreactionstotheproblemoftheregressofreasons. Atleastsometimes,abelief,A,constitutesapieceofknowledgeorisjustifiedbecauseitisbasedonanotherbelief,B,thatoneholdsandthatconstitutesevidenceforA. ButitseemsthiscanonlyworkifbeliefBisitselfapieceofknowledgeorisajustifiedbelief. ButhowdidBgettobejustified? Perhapsitwasbasedonstillanotherofone’sbeliefs,C. But,again,itseemsthiscanonlyworkifCisalreadyjustifiedorknown. Whereandhowcantheprocessofbasingbeliefsonotherbeliefscometoanend? Ifwedemandofallofourbeliefsthattheybeproperlybasedonevidenceintheformofotherbeliefsweholdinordertobejustified,andifwedemandthatthelinesofevidencecontainno“circles”ofjustification(thatitcanneverhappenthatAisjustifiedbecauseitisbasedonB,whichisjustifiedbecauseitisbasedonC,andsoon,untilwereachabeliefthatisjustifiedbecauseitisbasedonA),andifweadmitthattheselinesofevidencecannotbeinfinitelylong,wewillbeledtotheskepticalconclusionthatnoneofourbeliefsarejustified(orareknowledge,ifwerunthisproblemonknowledgeratherthanjustification). Foundationalistsavoidthisskepticismbydenyingthatallofourbeliefsneedtobebasedonotherofourbeliefsinordertobejustified. Accordingtothefoundationalist,someofourbeliefsareproperlybasic(touseatermthat,asfarasIknow,originatedwithAlvinPlantinga):theyarejustified(orareknowledge)independentoftheirbeingbasedonanyotherbeliefs. Theseproperlybasicbeliefsthenserveasthe“foundation”uponwhichalloftherestofourjustifiedbeliefsare“built”:Allofourjustifiedbeliefsthatarenotproperlybasicarebased,directlyorindirectly,uponthisfoundationofproperlybasicbeliefs. Foundationalismitselfisjustacommitmenttothisbasicstructuralpicture. Versionsoffoundationalismwilldifferwithoneanotheroverthematterofwhichofourbeliefscanbeproperlybasic(canbejustifiedwithoutbeingbasedonotherofourbeliefs),andoverwhatconstitutesasuccessfulbasingofonebeliefuponanother. Coherentistsholdthatonlyevidence-likerelationsamongone’sbeliefscanrenderanyofourbeliefsjustified,andtheythusrejectthefoundationalist’sproperlybasicbeliefs. Thecoherentistinsteadavoidstheregressargumentbyacceptingthattherecanbe“circles”ofjustification:sometimesAcanbejustifiedbybeingbasedonB,whichis(perhapsindirectly,throughalongseriesofbasings)basedonA. Whatrendersourbeliefsjustifiedonthecoherentistpictureishowwellourbeliefscoherewithoneanother,ratherthanonhowwelltheyarebasedonsomefoundationof“properlybasic”beliefs. Again,coherentismitselfisjustacommitmenttothisbasicpictureofthestructureofourjustifiedbeliefs,andthisbasicpicturegetsworkedoutinamyriadofsignificantlydifferentways. Ishouldstressthatalthoughit’shandytointroducethesebasicstructuraloptionsasresponsestotheregressargument,advocatesofthesepositionsdon’tnecessarilycometothesepositionsjustinordertoavoidtheregressargument. While,asIhavestressedabove,therearemanysignificantlydifferentversionsofbothfoundationalismandcoherentism,therearealsoviewsthatfallintothegapbetweenthesetwocamps,andrepresentsomethingofacompromisebetweenthem. (Onthis,youcanseemypaper,“DirectWarrantRealism”[pdf,word],where,insections2-4,Idefendthesuchastructuralcompromiseposition,and,insection1,Iexplain,andinsections5-7Idefendaparticularaccountofthejustificationofperceptualbeliefs—“DirectWarrantRealism”—thatexemplifiesthiscompromisestructure.) OtherTopics Theaboveisjustasampleofthekindsoftopicstreatedbyepistemologists. Otherepistemologistsnodoubtwouldhavechosendifferentsetsoftopicstoexplain. Still,theabovequickdiscussionshouldservetogiveyousomeideaofthetypeofissuestreatedinepistemology—andtherearesomelinkstosomeencyclopediaarticlesonvariousothertopicsbelow. Ifyouwanttodigmoredeeply,onegoodplacetogonextisoneoftheanthologieslistedtowardthebottomofsection2ofTheEpistemologyPage. Seethedifferenttopicsintowhichessaysareorganized,in,forinstance,theSosa&Kim,ed.anthology,Epistemology,andthenyouwillalsohaveathandsomeofthemoreimportantessaysonthetopicsthatinterestyou. Ifothersinformmeofgoodbriefintroductoryexplanationsofimportanttopicsinepistemologythatareavailableon-line,Iwillpostlinkstothemhere. SeeAlsoTheseIntroductoryOn-LineArticles: OnEpistemologyingeneral: JosephCruz’sNatureEncyclopediaofCognitiveSciencearticle,“Epistemology”(pdfdocument) PeterKlein’sRoutledgeEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle,“Epistemology”. OnParticulartopicsinepistemology: ElizabethAnderson’sStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle,“FeministEpistemologyandPhilosophyofScience”. TimBlack’sInternetEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle,“ContextualisminEpistemology”. MichaelBradyandWilliamHarms’sStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle,“EvolutionaryEpistemology”. KeithDeRose’seditor’sintroductiontoSkepticism:AContemporaryReader,“RespondingtoSkepticism”. RichardFeldman’sStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle,“NaturalizedEpistemology”. PeterForrest’sStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle,“TheEpistemologyofReligion”. RichardFumerton’sStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle,“FoundationalistTheoriesofEpistemicJustification”. AlvinGoldman’sStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle,“SocialEpistemology”. JohnGreco’sStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle,“VirtueEpistemology”. JonathanKvanvig’sStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle,“CoherentistTheoriesofJustification”. GeorgePappas’sStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle,“Internalistvs.ExternalistConceptionsofEpistemicJustification”. MatthiasSteup’sStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle,“TheAnalysisofKnowledge”. Foradefenseofwhathecalls“veritisticepistemology”[“Veristicepistemology(whetherindividualorsocial)isconcernedwiththeproductionofknowledge,whereknowledgeishereunderstoodinthe‘weak’senseoftruebelief. Moreprecisely,itisconcernedwithbothknowledgeanditscontraries:error(falsebelief)andignorance(theabsenceoftruebelief). Themainquestionforveritisticepistemologyis:Whichpracticeshaveacomparativelyfavorableimpactonknowledgeascontrastedwitherrorandignorance?”(p.5)]against“suchviewsassocialconstructivism,postmodernism,pragmatism,culturalstudies,andcriticallegalstudies”(p.7),see: -AlvinGoldman’s“EpistemologyandPostmodernResistance”(pdfdocument;notethatthereareacoupleofblankpagesatthebeginningofthedocument),whichisthefirstchapterofGoldman’sKnowledgeinaSocialWorld(OxfordUniversityPress,1999). Formybestattempttosaywhatpostmodernismis,andwhyItendnottolikeit,withlotsoflinkstomaterialI’vefoundhelpful,seemyblogpost,“CharacterizingaFogbankWhatIsPostmodernismandWhyDoITakeSuchaDimViewofIt?”.   KeithDeRose Lastmodified23November2005   Skiptotoolbar LogInSearch