Myths and Realities: Understanding Recent Trends in Violent ...

Crime rates changed dramatically across the United States in 2020. Most significantly, the murder rate — that is, the number of murders per ... SkipNavigation Home OurWork Research&Reports MythsandRealities:UnderstandingRecentTrendsinViolentCrime Explore OurWork Close Sections WhatHappenedin2020–2021 MythsAboutCrimein2020 ContributingFactors:WhatWeKnowSoFar BuildingaNewVisionofPublicSafety Conclusion Viewing Preface BacktoTop Afteryearsofdecline,crimeroseduringtheCovid-19pandemic,partic­u­larlyviol­entcrime.Usingavail­ablebutincom­pletedata,thisanalysisseekstosetoutaclearandaccur­atesummaryofwhatisknownsofaraboutrecenttrendsincrimeandviol­ence. Whileresearch­ershavebeguntoidentifysomeofthefactorsthatmayhavecontrib­utedtothisupwardtrend,itisfartoosoontosaywithcertaintywhycrimeroseoverthelasttwoyears.Thisuncer­taintyitselfshouldguideourunder­stand­ingofcrimetrendstoday.Itunder­scoresthedangerofjump­ingtoconclu­sions—suchasblam­ingspecific,oftennewlyimple­men­ted,policies.Lastly,theanalysispointstoprom­isingnewsolu­tionsthatmayaddresssomeofthefactorsbehindrecentcrimetrends. Attheoutset,it’simport­anttonotethatthisanalysisfocusesonthemostseri­ousoffensesknowntolawenforce­ment.Othervisiblesocialprob­lemslikehome­less­ness,andlessseri­ousoffensessuchasshoplift­ing,alsoaffectpercep­tionsofpublicsafetyandmaybethesubjectoffutureanalyses. Amidaseriesofinter­lock­ingcrises,viol­entcrimeandsometypesofprop­ertycrimeroseacrossthecoun­tryin2020incommunit­iesofalltypes.Itistoosoontotalkwithpreci­sionaboutnationalcrimetrendsin2021,astheFBIhasyettopublishnationaldata.However,prelim­in­aryinform­a­tionsuggeststhatincreasesinmurderratesmayhavebeguntoslow. Crimein2020 Crimerateschangeddramat­ic­allyacrosstheUnitedStatesin2020.Mostsigni­fic­antly,themurderrate—thatis,thenumberofmurdersper100,000people—rosesharply,bynearly30percent.Assaultsincreasedaswell,withtherateofoffensesrisingbymorethan10percent.Bothincreasesarepartofabroadersurgeingunviol­ence.Morethan 75percentofmurdersin2020 werecommit­tedwithafire­arm,reach­inganewhighpoint,andcitiesthatreportdataonshoot­ingincid­ents,likeNewYork,sawsigni­fic­antincreasesinthisformofviol­enceaswell. Murdersroseincitiesnation­wideandjuris­dic­tionsofalltypes.Relat­iveto2019,thenumberofmurdersjumpedbymorethan30percentinthelargestcitiesandby20percentinplacesdesig­natedbytheFBIas“suburban”—citieswithfewerthan50,000inhab­it­antsthatarewithinaMetro­pol­itanStat­ist­icalArea.Murdersrosebycompar­ablelevels inruralareas too—animport­antfactthatisonlynowbegin­ningtoreceivepressatten­tion. Despitepoliti­cizedclaimsthatthisrisewastheresultofcrim­inaljusticereforminliberal-lean­ingjuris­dic­tions,murdersrose roughlyequally incitiesrunbyRepub­lic­ansandcitiesrunbyDemo­crats.So-called“red”statesactu­allysaw someofthehighestmurderratesofall.Thisdatamakesitdiffi­culttopinrecenttrendsonlocalpolicyshiftsandrevealsthebasicinac­cur­acyofattemptstopoliti­cizeaprob­lemascomplexascrime.Instead,theevid­encepointstobroadnationalcausesdriv­ingrisingcrime. Wecandrawafewaddi­tionalconclu­sionsabouttrendsinviol­entcrimein2020.Forone,poorandhistor­ic­allydisad­vant­agedcommunit­iesborethebruntoftheriseinviol­encein2020.Injustoneexample,accord­ingtotheNewYorkCityMayor’sOfficeofCrim­inalJustice,the numberofshoot­ings doubledintheneigh­bor­hoodofEastNewYork(from51to102)andnearlytripledinBrowns­ville(from34to96).Bothcommunit­ieshavebeenhotspotsofviol­encefor morethanaquartercentury. Viol­encealsoremainedconcen­tratedamongyoungerpeople.Around40percentofpeoplearres­tedformurderin2020werebetweentheagesof20and29,match­inghistor­icaltrends.Murdervictimsweremorevariedintermsofage,witharound30percentintheir20sandanother30percentovertheageof40.Unfor­tu­nately,FBIdataistoospottytoallowustodrawconclu­sionsaboutthecircum­stanceslead­inguptoamurder.Innearlyhalfofallcases—amarkedincreaseoverrecentyears, accord­ingtotheCoun­cilonCrim­inalJustice —thecircum­stancessurround­ingakillingwere“undeter­mined.”Lastly,viol­encemayalsohavebecomeconcen­tratedinanotherway. Onestudy indic­atesthatwithviol­encerisingandfewerpeopleoutsideduringthepandemic,theriskofexper­i­en­cingaviol­entcrimeonthestreet(meas­uredincrimesperhourspentinpublic)climbeddramat­ic­ally,evenwhiletheactualnumberofcrimescommit­teddropped—poten­tiallycontrib­ut­ingtoapercep­tionoflawless­nessnotappar­entfromtherawnumbers. Import­antly,though,notalltypesofcrimerosein2020.Infact,trendsinviol­entandprop­ertycrimedivergedsharplyfromeachother(asillus­tratedinTable1above),withthenationalrateofprop­ertycrimesreach­ingarecord low in2020.Whilethisisuncom­mon,itisnotunpre­ced­en­ted;asimilardynamicunfol­ded between2015and2016,thoughonamuchlessdramaticscale.Therearemanypossibleexplan­a­tionsforwhyprop­ertyandviol­entcrimetrendsdecoupledin2020.Lock­downorders,forexample,mayhavesigni­fic­antlyreducedoppor­tun­it­iesforlarcenyormadepeoplelesslikelytoreportcrimestopolice(thougha govern­mentsurvey focus­ingonreportsofcrim­inalvictim­iz­a­tionsuggeststhelatterexplan­a­tionisunlikely). Theincreaseinmotorvehicletheftsisalsonotable,andnotjustbecauseitistheonlyprop­ertyoffensethatrosein2020.Forone,motorvehiclethefttendstohavea relat­ivelyhigh rateofreport­ingcomparedtootherprop­ertyoffenses,suggest­ingthatitmaybeamoreaccur­atebaro­meterofprop­ertyoffensesthan,forexample,larceny.Addi­tion­ally,motorvehiclethefthasalsobeenlinkedtomoreseri­ouscrimes, likemurder,makingitsincreaseacauseforconcern. Crimein2021 Morethansixmonthsinto2022,national-leveldataoncrimein2021remainsunavail­able.Thisisdueinparttoatrans­itionin thewaythegovern­mentcollectscrimedata.Indeed,becauseofthistrans­ition,reli­ablegovern­mentdataoncrimetrendsin2021may neverbeavail­able forsomestatesandevenmanylargecities. Someorgan­iz­a­tionshavesteppeduptofillthegap.One report,publishedbytheCoun­cilonCrim­inalJusticeandfocus­ingonmajor-citypolicedepart­ments,paintsamixedpicture.Ontheonehand,itappearsthatmurderratesinmajorcitiescontin­uedtoincrease,but atamuchslowerrate thanthe2019–2020increase.Thetrendisespe­ciallypronouncedinthefivelargestAmer­icancities.  Butthecoun­cil’sreportfoundsigni­fic­antvari­ationinotheroffenses.Forexample,drugand most prop­ertyoffensesfellintheirlimitedsampleofcities.Butgunassaultsroseby8percent,andmotorvehicletheftscontin­uedtheirprecip­it­ousrise.Takentogether,thisinform­a­tionsuggeststhatthediver­gencebetweenprop­ertyandviol­entcrimesobservedin2020—withviol­encerisingevenasothertypesofcrimestabil­izedordeclined—contin­uedinto2021.Itisdiffi­culttoknowforsurewhetherandhowsigni­fic­antlythesetrendshavecontin­uedtodivergewithoutthebene­fitofnationalFBIdata. PlacingCurrentTrendsintoHistor­icalContext  Theseincreasesincrimeratesareseri­ousontheirowntermsandshouldnotbetrivi­al­ized.Nation­ally,though,theydonotreturnustothehighcrimeratesoftheearly1990s.Between1991and2014,thenationalmurderrateplummetedbymorethan50percent,from9.8to4.4killingsper100,000people.Bycompar­ison,themurderratefor2020stoodataround6.5—aratelastseeninthelate1990sbutstillwellbelowthehighpointofthelastquartercentury.Therateofviol­entcrimesper100,000peoplein2020hasbeenrelat­ivelyflat,compar­abletotheratelastseenadecadepriorin2010. Thishistor­icalcontextandthesteepincreaseinmurdersrelat­ivetootherviol­entcrimesarebothimport­antforunder­stand­ingtheprob­lemsposedbyrecenttrendsinviol­enceaswellasforeval­u­at­ingpoten­tialsolu­tions.Butevenwithviol­encewellbelowhistorichighs,membersofthepublicarerighttobeconcerned,anditisincum­bentuponpoli­cy­makerstodevelopsmart,innov­at­iveanswerstothesenewpublicsafetychal­lenges. It’stempt­ingtojumptoconclu­sionsaboutrisingcrimeortolookforasimplediagnosisthatexplainstheviol­enceofthelasttwoyears.Poli­cy­makersshouldavoidbothtempta­tions.Infact,newevid­enceallowsustorejectsomepopu­larmythsandmiscon­cep­tionsaboutrisingcrimeandbegintoidentifyeffect­ivemeas­urestoimprovepublicsafetywithoutrepeat­ingoldmistakes. TheImpactofCrim­inalJusticeReform Broadly,itdoesnotappearthatpoliciesasso­ci­atedwithcrim­inaljusticereformwereasigni­fic­antcontrib­utortorecenttrendsincrimeandviol­ence. Somepoli­cy­makersandpolicelead­ershavebeenquicktoblamerisingcrimeonreformstopretrialdeten­tionlawsandprac­tices,arguingthatpeoplereleasedfromjailundertheseiniti­at­iveswererespons­iblefor,oratleastcontrib­utedto,theincreaseinviol­entcrime.Theseargu­mentsgainedtrac­tionacrossthecoun­tryoverthelasttwoyears,butnoevid­encehasemergedtosupportthem.  InNewYorkState,forexample, policelead­ers arguedearlyin2020thatthestate’s bail reform law—which aimedto reduceunne­ces­sarypretrialincar­cer­a­tionandensurethatmorepeoplecouldawaittrialintheircommunit­ies—causedanincreaseinshoot­ingsinNewYorkCitybyforcingjudgestoreleasepeoplewhoposedadangertothecommunity.Thisclaimdidnotholdupto initialscru­tiny,however.Today,thebestavail­ableinform­a­tion,includ­ingdatareleasedbythestateandalocalnonprofitagency,suggeststhatbailreform didnotdriveincreasesincrime.Ulti­mately,thestate’sbaillawswerefurther revised inApril2022to(amongotherthings)limitpretrialreleaseforcertainpeoplewithprevi­ousarrestsandallowjudgestoconsiderabroaderrangeoffactorswhensettingreleasecondi­tionsinsomecases.Buttheimpactofthesenewchangesonpublicsafetyandpretrialincar­cer­a­tion remainsunclear.  ConcernsabouttheeffectsofpretrialreleaseoncrimehavenotbeenlimitedtoNewYork.InHous­ton,a federallawsuit largelyendedmisde­meanorcashbailin2017inHarrisCounty,Texas.Thecounty’sdistrictattor­ney,KimOgg,whosejuris­dic­tionincludesHous­tonanditsimme­di­atesuburbs,blamedthesechangesforrisingcrimeinthecityandreleaseda report purport­ingtoshowasmuch.Butthatreport contrasts sharply with find­ings byaninde­pend­entmonitor. Morebroadly, somecrit­ics haveasser­tedthatpoliciesadop­tedbyprogress­iveprosec­utorsand“blue-state”mayors—suchas declin­ingtoprosec­ute certainnonvi­ol­entoffensesor toseekbail insomecases—contrib­utedtorisingcrime.Butthereisnoevid­encetosupporttheseclaims.Infact,research­ershave shown thattheelec­tionofprogress­iveprosec­utorshasnotcausedcrimetoincreaseintheircities.In onework­ingpaper,ateamofsocialscient­istsanalyzedcrimedatafrom35citieswheremoreprogress­ivelawenforce­mentoffi­cialsenteredoffice,find­ingnochangeinseri­ouscrimeratesrelat­ivetootherjuris­dic­tions.Insomecases,so-called“progress­ive”policiesmayinfactenhancepublicsafety.Accord­ingto onerecentstudy ofSuffolkCounty,Massachu­setts,“peoplewhoare not prosec­utedformisde­mean­orsaremuchlesslikelytofindthem­selvesinacourtroomagainwithintwoyears.”Thatspeakswellof apolicy imple­men­tedbyformerSuffolkCountyDistrictAttor­neyRachaelRollins,underwhichherofficedeclinedtoprosec­utemany(butnotall)nonvi­ol­entmisde­mean­ors,likedisorderlyconductandminordrugposses­sion. Somecrit­icshaveattemp­tedtoassertarelatedtheory:thatliberal,reform­ist,or“progress­ive”urbangovernancemayitselfbetoblame.Butthe2020riseinmurderratesdidnotvarybasedonacity’spolit­icalinclin­a­tion.A review byJeffAsher,ananalystwhostud­iescrimetrends,indic­atedthatmurdersincreasedin2020byapprox­im­ately29percentincitieswithaDemo­craticmayorand26percentincitiesledbyaRepub­lican.Another recentpolicybrief byThirdWay,acenter-leftthinktank,pointstorelat­ivelyhighratesofviol­encein“red”states—under­scor­ingthetrulynationalnatureofthe2020crimeincreaseandthelackofaclearrela­tion­shipwithspecificpolicies. ChangesinPoli­cingPrac­tices Research­ershavelongstud­iedwhetherasuddendecreaseinpoliceactiv­itycanleadtoaspikeincrimeorviol­ence,espe­ciallyifthepull­backistriggeredbycitizenprotests.Somecitiesdidindeedseeadropinarrestsin2020,partic­u­larlyinthe spring and earlysummer.Butattemptstolinkpolicepull­backstorisingcrimehave notwith­stood closescru­tiny inpastyears. Lead­ing stud­ies rejectadirectlink,withsome suggest­ing onlythat,atmost,changesinarrestpatternsmaybejustonefactoramongmanyothersaffect­ingcrimetrends.Anyattempttolink“de-poli­cing”tocrimein2020wouldalsofailtoexplainthediver­gencebetweentrendsinviol­entcrime(whichrose)andprop­ertycrime(whichdidnot). Research­ersshouldcontinuetostudythisissuebutmayalsoconsiderotherwaysthatpoli­cinginter­actswithcrimetrends.Forone,murderclear­ancerates—thatis,thepropor­tionofoffensesinwhichpolicemakeanarrest—droppedto historiclowsin2020,mean­ingmanymurderswentunsolved.Thesefail­uresmayerodecommunitytrustinpolice,encour­agingfurtherviol­ence.Addi­tion­ally,someresearch­ershavepoin­tedtothe corros­iveeffect ofpoliceviol­enceonrela­tion­shipsbetweenlawenforce­mentandthecommunit­iestheyserve,adynamicthatmayunder­minetheabil­ityofpoliceofficerstosolveandevendetercrime.Takentogether,thesepossib­il­it­iesunder­scoretheimport­anceofrebuild­ingtrustbetweenpoliceofficersandcommunit­iesandensur­ingthatlawenforce­mentmeetstheneedsofthosewhoselivesandhomesarethreatenedbyviol­ence. Disprov­ingpopu­larmythsaboutrisingcrimeisonething.Identi­fy­ingthefactorsthat have drivencrimeoverthelastfewyearsismuchmorediffi­cult.Crimeiscomplic­ated,andattempt­ingtoisol­ateasinglefactortoexplaincrimetrends,espe­ciallyduringaonce-in-a-centuryglobalpandemic,wouldbeamistake.However,someinform­a­tionhasemergedpoint­ingtofactorsthatmaypartiallyexplainwhathappenedin2020and2021.Under­stand­ingthesefactorsmayalsoinformpoten­tialsolu­tions. TheRoleofGuns Approx­im­ately77percentofmurdersin2020werecommit­tedwithafire­arm—the highestshareeverrepor­ted inFBIdatagoingbackto1960—indic­at­ingthatsurginggunviol­encemayhavehelpeddrivethatyear’sincreaseinviol­ence.Severalotherpiecesofevid­encehaveemergedtostrengthenthistheory. Forone,gunsaleshitarecordhighin2020. Onestudy docu­mented“4.3millionexcessfire­armpurchasesnation­allyfromMarchthroughJuly2020.”Peoplewerealsomorelikelytocarrygunsin2020. Research conduc­tedbytheUniver­sityofChicagoCrimeLabdrewondatafrompolicestopstofindthatfire­armcarry­inginChicagodoubledfrom2019to2020.What’smore,thetimebetweenagun’slegalpurchaseanditsappear­anceatacrimescene—ametricthatlawenforce­mentoffi­cialscallaweapon’s“time-to-crime”—wasmuchshorterin2020thaninprevi­ousyears.Between2015and2019, 13percentoffire­arms tracedbylawenforce­mentwereusedinacrimewithinsixmonthsoftheirpurchase.Thisnumberincreasedto23percentin2020.Indeed,in2020,policerecovered 87,000guns nation­widewithatime-to-crimeoflessthanayear. Moreresearchisneededtofullyunder­standtheroleoffire­armsin2020’smurderincrease.InaJanu­ary2022 article,crimeanalystJeffAsherandfreel­anceauthoranddatascient­istRobArthurarguethatfiner-graindatafromtheBureauofAlco­hol,Tobacco,Fire­arms,andExplos­iveswouldhelpestab­lishadirectlinkbetweendeclin­ingtime-to-crimeandincreas­ingmurderrates.Inthemean­time,increasesinweaponpurchas­ing,carry­ing,andusearetroub­lingtrendsforacoun­trythatishometo almosthalf oftheworld’scivil­ian-ownedfire­arms. Socioeco­nomicInstabil­ityandDisrup­tionstoCommunityLife TheCovid-19pandemicledtoaseverereces­sion,onecategor­ic­allydiffer­entfromthoseofthepast.Whilemanywhite-collarwork­erswereabletoshifttoremotework,peopleintheserviceindustry,gigeconomy,andothersectorsfacedexten­dedunem­ploy­ment,makingtheCovid-19reces­sion “themostunequalinU.S.history.” Thosechal­lengeswerelikelycompoun­dedforpeoplewithacrim­inalrecord,whofaceadiffi­cultlabormarket evenatthebestoftimes. Addi­tion­ally,peopleandcommunit­iesfacedchal­lengesinmeet­ingbasicneeds,espe­ciallyduringthefirstyearofthepandemic.Manyenduredtraumacausedbysick­nessanddeath.Famil­iesfaceddisin­teg­ra­tionasparentsorcare­giverscaughtorsuccumbedtothedisease.Theresponsebypoli­cy­makerswasnotimme­di­atelyadequate,breed­inglegalcynicism—thatis,abeliefthatthegovern­mentisille­git­im­ateorunabletoprovideforitscitizens.Communitylead­ersstruggledtoprovidefoodandprotect­iveequip­menttopeoplewhocouldaffordneither. Thesesuddenandunpre­ced­en­tedhard­shipsjeop­ard­izedthestabil­ityoffamil­iesandcommunit­iesalike.Combinedwithotherdisrup­tionscausedbylock­downsandsocialdistan­cingmeas­ures,theymayhaveupsetthe informalsocialprocesses —suchasconnec­tionstoneigh­bors,familymembers,andemploy­ers—thatsomeresearch­ersbelievehelpkeepneigh­bor­hoodssafe. Forexample,thepandemicforcedlocalnonprofits—whichsoci­olo­gistPatrickShar­keyarguesplaya keyroleinpublicsafety —tolimittheirservicesorrepur­posethem­selvesentirelytomeetnewneeds.Amongthoseimpactedwerecommunityviol­enceinter­ven­tionprograms(CVIs),whichidentifypeoplelikelytobecomeinvolvedinviol­enceandworkwiththemtopreventconflictsbeforetheystart.CVIsfacefund­inguncer­taintyinthebestoftimes.Duringthepandemic,thesechal­lengesincreaseddramat­ic­ally. InMarchof2020,forexample,Phil­adelphia froze$1million previ­ouslyallot­tedforsmallgrantsto52anti-viol­enceorgan­iz­a­tions.Evenwhereprogramsdidnotlosefund­ing,socialdistan­cingmadetheirworkharder,ifnotimpossible.Manywereforcedtoturntovirtualmeet­ings,whichexpertswhospokewiththeauthorssaidmaynotsupportthetypeofdirectcommu­nic­a­tiononwhichtheirstrategiesdepend.Virtualmeet­ingsalsorequireastableinter­netconnec­tion,whichnotallparti­cipantsmayhave.Moreover,nonprofitorgan­iz­a­tionsacrossthecoun­trywereoftentaskedwithcombattingthepandemicand expan­dedtheirduties todistrib­ut­ingfood,protect­iveequip­ment,andsupplies. Othercommunityresourceswereaffectedtoo.Manyneigh­bor­hoodslackadequatephys­icalinfra­struc­turesuchasside­walksandgreenspace,whichare linkedto publichealthandsafety.Thepandemicaccen­tu­atedthesedispar­it­iesinaccesstopublicspacebyhalt­ingordelay­ingvalu­ableinfra­struc­tureprojects. Clos­uresofcommunityspaces,fromschoolsandsummerprogramsto publicpools andlibrar­ies,alsoleftyoungpeoplewithfewoptionsforsafeplacestospendtimeoutsideofhomeandwork.Such“thirdplaces”are acorner­stoneofcommunity andgroupsocial­iz­a­tionandcan helpbuildasenseofcommunalsafety.Thesuddenlossofthesespacescouldhaveleftpeopleofallageswithfewerplacestogo,poten­tiallycontrib­ut­ingtoconflictinandoutofthehome. Researchshowsthepandemicalsoexacer­bated mentalhealthprob­lems amongmillionsofAmer­ic­ansandworsenedpreex­ist­inginequal­it­iesinthe deliv­eryofmentalhealthservices.Crit­ic­ally,mentalillnessitselfdoesnotpredictcrimeorviol­ence.Butseri­ousanduntreatedmentalillnesscan combinewithotherriskfactors andhard­shipstoleadtoviol­ence.Relatedly,thetraumaandisol­a­tioncreatedbythepandemicappeartohavecontrib­utedtoanincreaseinanti­so­cialbeha­viorat alllevelsofsoci­ety,from aggress­ivedriv­ing to heavyalco­holanddruguse. Preciselyidenti­fy­ingtheimpactofpandemic-erasocioeco­nomicinstabil­ityoncrimewillbeadiffi­cult(ifnotimpossible)taskforfutureresearch­ers.Buttheevid­encehasbeguntolineup.Qual­it­at­ively,accountsoflifeinplaceslike Clev­e­land,Ohio,showhowthepandemicfrayedcommunityties.Andquant­it­at­ively,researchshowsthatareaschar­ac­ter­izedby otherformsofdisad­vant­age,suchasracialandeconomicsegreg­a­tion,werethemostimpactedbyrisingcrimein2020.Gunviol­encealsotendstobeextremelyconcen­tratedinhigh-povertyareas,andthatdynamic contin­uedtounfoldin2020 incitiesasfarafieldasBaltimore,Chicago,andKansasCity,Missouri. Theseaccountsarewhatwewouldexpectifthepandemicjeop­ard­izedthestabil­ityofcommunit­iesthatwerealreadystrug­glingtomeetimport­antneeds.Sadly,thesetrendsmirroranolderdynamic—“whenviol­enceroseintheUnitedStatesfromthe1960stothe1990s,” writePatrickShar­keyandAlisa­bethMarsteller,“itwasfeltmostacutelyinareasmarkedbyconcen­tratedpovertyandracialsegreg­a­tion”—andunder­scorethefragil­ityofAmer­icanlifeinfartoomanyofourcommunit­ies. Lead­ersatalllevelsofgovern­mentmustavoidrespond­ingtotheriseincrimewithpoliciesthathavebeentriedinthepastandfailed,like expand­ingtheuseofpretrialdeten­tion orfollow­ing unne­ces­sar­ilypunit­ivesenten­cingprac­tices.Thereisscantevid­encethattheseiniti­at­iveswouldsucceed.Andresearchhasconsist­entlyshownthatlongprisonsentences,forexample,may becoun­ter­pro­duct­ive andthatthecollat­eralconsequencesofincar­cer­a­tioncanbe disastrous. Thatmakesitespe­ciallyimport­antforpoli­cy­makerstounder­standtheavail­ab­il­ityof,andstrongsupportfor,altern­at­ivestrategiesforredu­cingcrimeandviol­enceinboththeshortandlongterm.Thissectionconcludesouranalysisbyreview­ingtheevid­enceforsomeprom­isingsolu­tions.Itisnotanexhaust­ivelist.Rather,itfocusesontwooftheseri­ouspublicsafetychal­lengesofourtime. ReduceGunViol­ence Amer­ica’s uniquelydestruct­ive rela­tion­shipwithgunsaccel­er­atesviol­enceofalltypes,fromgangkillingsto—aspain­fullyillus­tratedbyrecentevents— schoolshoot­ings andracialterror­ismagainst Black and Asian people.Adecades-longcampaignofdereg­u­la­tionhasmadeguncarry­ing farmorecommon,whilemakingit hardertostudy,muchlessinter­dictor deter,theflowoffire­arms. Unfor­tu­nately,ina recentdecision,theSupremeCourt further under­mined theabil­ityofstatestoregu­latethecarry­ingofgunswithintheirborders, jeop­ard­iz­ing publicsafety andunder­scor­ingtheneedforlocalsolu­tionsinaddi­tiontostateandfederalregu­la­tion. Despitethisruling,poli­cy­makersmustlookforwaystobothstemtheillegaltradeofgunsandlimitthelegaltrans­ferofgunstopeoplewhoposeadangertothem­selvesandothers.Forexample,somestateshaveenactedlawslimit­inggunpurchasestoonepermonth.Whenimple­men­tedinVirginia,thepolicy appearedtoreduce guntraf­fick­ingoutofthestate.Statescouldalsoconsiderbanningthesaleofassaultweaponstoyoungpeopleorenact­ing “redflag”laws,whichprovideacivilproced­ureforconfis­cat­ingdanger­ousweaponsfromsomeonebelievedtoposeapublicsafetythreat. Localeffortswillmakeadiffer­ence,butidenti­fy­ingsmart,scal­ablesolu­tionsmayprovechal­len­ging.Somejuris­dic­tionshavepursuedgunbuybackprograms.InNewYork,forexample,prosec­utorscollab­or­atewithpoliceand localinsti­tu­tions,includ­ing churches,totradeprepaidgiftcardsforfire­arms,noques­tionsasked.YettheseprogramsonlyserveasabrakeonthemillionsofgunssoldintheUnitedStatesinanygivenyear.Theireffectsongunviol­enceappeartobe minimal (althoughtheymaypromote othercommunitygoals).Asaresult,theyarenosubsti­tuteforbroader,moreconcer­tedaction. Poli­cy­makersshouldalsoconsidertheprom­iseofcommunityviol­enceinter­ven­tioniniti­at­ives— programs thatoper­ateattheneigh­bor­hoodlevel,arerunbypeoplewithexper­i­enceinthosecommunit­ies,andworkdirectlywithhigh-riskindi­vidu­alstosteerthemawayfromviol­ence.Theseprogramshavebeguntoattractatten­tionfrompoli­cy­makersandneedsustainedsupportfrompart­nersingovern­menttosucceed. CVIscantakemanyformsandworkbestwhentailoredtotheneedsoftheircommunit­ies.Somefollowthe CureViol­ence model,inwhichoutreachwork­ersdrawnfromthecommunity“inter­rupt”andde-escal­atepoten­tiallyviol­entencoun­ters.Othersfocusonprovid­ingtraumacoun­sel­ingoreconomicsupport. READIChicago,forexample,addressesthespecificneedsofneigh­bor­hoodsimpactedbyviol­enceinChicagobyidenti­fy­ingpeopleatahighriskofviol­enceandoffer­ingthempaidemploy­mentoppor­tun­it­ies,supportservices,andcognit­ivebeha­vi­oralther­apy. Agrow­ingbodyofevid­encesupportsthiswork.NewYork’sCureViol­enceprograms,forinstance,have reduced gunviol­enceinjur­iesintwohigh-riskneigh­bor­hoods.AndREADI,whichworkswiththepeopleat greatestrisk ofbecom­inginvolvedinviol­ence, mayhave reducedshoot­ingandhomicidearrests—thoughresearch­erscouldnotstatethatconclu­sionwiththepreferreddegreeofstat­ist­icalconfid­enceand,there­fore,recom­men­dedcautionwheninter­pret­ingtheirfind­ings.Follow-upstud­iesmayhelpidentifywaystoimprovetheprogram. Tobesure,CVIscanbediffi­culttoimple­mentandevenhardertoreplic­ate.Lead­ersinthefieldemphas­izethatthereisnoone-size-fits-allsolu­tion.ACVIthatsuccess­fullyreducesviol­enceinonejuris­dic­tionmayfailinanotherforanynumberofreas­ons,includ­ingasimplemismatchbetweenitsprogram­mingandthecommunity’sneeds.Buy-infromlocalgovern­mentandothercrim­inaljusticestake­hold­ersisalsovital,asisstablelong-termfund­ing.Asidefromimple­ment­a­tionchal­lenges,thishighvari­ab­il­itymakesCVIs vulner­abletocriti­cism. Suchcriti­cismshouldnotdeterinnov­a­tionatatimewhencreat­ivesolu­tionsaredesper­atelyneeded.Thank­fully,supportforCVIsappearstobegrow­ingat all levels ofgovern­ment.Poli­cy­makersshouldaimtoprovide stableratherthanone-offfund­ing soorgan­iz­a­tionscanplantheirbudgetsaroundit.Localgovern­mentsshouldalsoexplorehowthey canbeaneffect­ivepart­ner toCVIs. Rein­vestinCommunit­iesandSocialServices Savinglivesnowmustbetheprior­ity,butitwouldbeamistakeforpoli­cy­makerstoover­looksolu­tionsthataddressthebroader,ongo­ingsocialandeconomicneedsofpoorcommunit­iesandcommunit­iesofcolor—espe­ciallyasthesearethesamecommunit­iesthatborethebruntof recentincreasesinviol­ence andhave struggledwithsafetyforyears.Rein­vest­menteffortsaimedatbuild­inghealthy,resi­li­entcommunit­iesmaynotyieldimme­di­ateresults.Buttheyarecrit­icaltobuild­ingsafetyinthelongterm. Atthestateandnationalpolicylevel,socialprogramsdesignedtocutpovertycanbepartofthissolu­tion,astheyhavebeenproventoreducecrimeandincar­cer­a­tion.Stud­iesshowthatMedi­caidexpan­sionthroughtheAfford­ableCareAct,whichincreasedaccesstohealthinsur­anceforlower-incomepeople, reducedarrestrates,aswellas recidiv­ism amongpeoplewhohadbeentoprisonmultipletimes.(Bycontrast,restrict­ingbene­fitssuchasdisab­il­ityincomeappearstohave increasedcrimeandincar­cer­a­tion.)Andpandemic-erasocialpolicies,like theChildTaxCreditexpan­sion,haveonlyservedtounder­scorethe harm­ful consequences ofpovertyandtheabil­ityofsocialspend­ing toreduceit.Poli­cy­makerscanbuildonthisstrongfound­a­tionofresearch—andmay,intheprocess,helpundosomeofthe socioeco­nomicdamagedonebymassincar­cer­a­tion. Address­ingthedeepstruc­turalprob­lemsthatmakesomecommunit­iesmoresuscept­ibletoviol­enceisagener­a­tionalproject.Noonesolu­tionwillrollbackdecadesofdisin­vest­ment.However,someiniti­at­ivesmaybeunder­takennowtostarttheprocess.Forexample,summeryouthemploy­mentprograms(SYEPs)have beenshown to reducecrime,whetherbyprovid­ingmuch-neededincomeorcreat­ingstruc­tureandment­or­shipforyouthduringtheirtimeawayfromschool.Gener­allyfundedbycitygovern­mentsinpart­ner­shipwithlocalbusi­nesses,SYEPsprovideyoungpeoplewithpaidjobsinthepublic,private,andnonprofitsectors. Versionsoftheseprogramscanbefoundin atleast27 ofthe30largestcities.However,SYEPsrarelyserveallthosewhocouldbene­fitfromthem.Theprogramshavealsofaceddiffi­cultiesduringthepandemic.InBoston,forexample,alimitednumberofavail­ablejobswereofferedthroughalottery; only28percent oftheover4,200youngpeoplelook­ingtosecureaposi­tiondidso. Increasedfund­ingfortheseandsimilarprogramsshouldbeapartofanyelec­tedoffi­cial’sagenda.SomecitieshavealreadytakenstepstoshoreuplocalSYEPs.NewYorkCity announced earlierthisyearthatitwasexpand­ingthecity’sprogramfrom75,000to90,000parti­cipants.SYEPscanprovideyoungpeoplejobs,struc­ture,andfinan­cialsupportatadiffi­culttimewhilebuild­ingsafercommunit­ies. Lastly,researchalsoshowsthatafford­ablehealthcarereduces thelike­li­hood thatpeoplewillenterthecrim­inaljusticesystem.Italsoreducesrecidiv­ism.Recentstud­ieshavefoundthataccesstotreat­mentforsubstanceabuseandmentalhealthissuesappearsto decrease theratesofbothviol­entandprop­ertycrimes.Ofcourse,treat­mentservices—andespe­ciallymentalhealthcare—mustalsobeafford­abletobeeffect­ive.Costbarri­ers maybepartofthereason forthepersist­entgapbetweenmentalhealthneedsandcare.Theprob­lemisespe­ciallyacuteforpeoplereturn­ingtotheircommunit­iesfromincar­cer­a­tion,astheyarelikelytoleaveprisonwithatleastonechronichealth condi­tion.Theseinequit­iesmustbeaddressed,ataminimumthroughprogramsandpoliciesthatlinkpeopleleav­ingprisonwithhealthcarebene­fits. Whilewedon’tyethaveacompleteunder­stand­ingofrecentcrimetrends,wecanstatetwothingswithconfid­ence.First,recentcrimeincreasesdonotfitconveni­entlyintoanypolit­icalnarrat­ive.Second,itisvitalthatwelookforcreat­ivesolu­tionstonationalprob­lems.Risingcrimepresentsachal­lengetocommunit­iesacrossthecoun­tryofallsizesandtypes.Nowmorethanever,poli­cy­makersmustresistthetempta­tiontoover­sim­plifythemanyfactorsthatshapepublicsafetyandinsteadprior­it­izesolu­tionsthatbuildanendur­ingandholisticformofpublicsafety. Acknow­ledg­ments TheauthorsthankLauren-BrookeEisenandRamSubramanianfortheirstra­tegicguid­anceofthereportaswellastheircare­fulrevi­sionsandinsight­fulcomments,Gabri­ellaSanc­hezforheredit­or­ialassist­ance,MarisMapol­skiforherdetailedreviewandsugges­tions,MichaelWald­manandJohnKowalfortheirsupportforthispolicyanalysisandthought­fulfeed­back,CameronKimbleandAntaraNaderfortheirextens­iveresearchandanalyt­icalsupport,andStephanieWylieforherpolicyanddraft­ingsupport.Lastly,theauthorswouldliketothankThomasAbt,JeffAsher,AdamGelb,AnnaHarvey,JohnPfaff,RichardRosen­feld,EricRuben,AlexVitale,andseveralotherexpertswhospokewiththeauthorsonback­groundforshar­ingtheirexpert­ise. Image Analysis OversightofPrisonsandJailsMustGetBetter,Faster AnewBrennanCenterresourcetracksprogressonprisonandjailoversightreform. Lauren-BrookeEisen,AliaNahra March15,2022 Image Analysis CrimeIsDown.DoesPresidentTrumpDeserveCredit? Inclaimingresponsibilityforlowercrimerates,PresidentTrumplatchesontodangerousmisconceptionsaboutviolenceandpolicing. AmesGrawert, October29,2019 Analysis CrimeRatesinLargestU.S.CitiesContinuetoDrop June12,2019 Analysis TrumpRepeatsFalseCrimeClaimsinElPaso February12,2019 BrennanCenterforJustice Analysis SexualAssaultRemainsDramaticallyUnderreported October5,2018 InimaiM.Chettiar Analysis CommunityOrganizationsHaveImportantRoleinLoweringCrimeRates April20,2018 NoahAtchison Analysis CreditforFallingCrime February12,2018 Lauren-BrookeEisen,AmesGrawert Stayuptodate Informedcitizensareourdemocracy’sbestdefense