Egoism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

In philosophy, egoism is the theory that one's self is, or should be, the motivation and the goal of one's own action. Egoism has two variants, ... Egoism Inphilosophy,egoismisthetheorythatone’sselfis,orshouldbe,themotivationandthegoalofone’sownaction.Egoismhastwovariants,descriptiveornormative.Thedescriptive(orpositive)variantconceivesegoismasafactualdescriptionofhumanaffairs.Thatis,peoplearemotivatedbytheirowninterestsanddesires,andtheycannotbedescribedotherwise.Thenormativevariantproposesthatpeopleshouldbesomotivated,regardlessofwhatpresentlymotivatestheirbehavior.Altruismistheoppositeofegoism.Theterm“egoism”derivesfrom“ego,”theLatintermfor“I”inEnglish.Egoismshouldbedistinguishedfromegotism,whichmeansapsychologicalovervaluationofone’sownimportance,orofone’sownactivities. Peopleactformanyreasons;butforwhom,orwhat,doorshouldtheyact—forthemselves,forGod,orforthegoodoftheplanet?Cananindividualeveractonlyaccordingtoherowninterestswithoutregardforothers’interests.Conversely,cananindividualevertrulyactforothersincompletedisregardforherowninterests?Theanswerswilldependonanaccountoffreewill.Somephilosophersarguethatanindividualhasnochoiceinthesematters,claimingthataperson’sactsaredeterminedbyprioreventswhichmakeillusoryanybeliefinchoice.Nevertheless,ifanelementofchoiceispermittedagainstthegreatcausalimpetusfromnature,orGod,itfollowsthatapersonpossessessomecontroloverhernextaction,and,that,therefore,onemayinquireastowhethertheindividualdoes,or,shouldchooseaself-or-other-orientedaction.Morallyspeaking,onecanaskwhethertheindividualshouldpursueherowninterests,or,whethersheshouldrejectself-interestandpursueothers’interestinstead:towhatextentareother-regardingactsmorallypraiseworthycomparedtoself-regardingacts? TableofContents DescriptiveandPsychologicalEgoism NormativeEgoism RationalEgoism EthicalEgoism ConditionalEgoism Conclusion ReferencesandFurtherReading 1.DescriptiveandPsychologicalEgoism Thedescriptiveegoist’stheoryiscalled“psychologicalegoism.”Psychologicalegoismdescribeshumannatureasbeingwhollyself-centeredandself-motivated.Examplesofthisexplanationofhumannaturepredatetheformationofthetheory,and,arefoundinwritingssuchasthatofBritishVictorianhistorian,Macaulay,and,inthatofBritishReformationpoliticalphilosopher,ThomasHobbes.Tothequestion,“Whatpropositionisthererespectinghumannaturewhichisabsolutelyanduniversallytrue?”,Macaulay,replies,“Weknowofonlyone...thatmenalwaysactfromself-interest.”(QuotedinGarvin.)InLeviathan,Hobbesmaintainsthat,“Nomangivethbutwithintentionofgoodtohimself;becausegiftisvoluntary;andofallvoluntaryactstheobjecttoeverymanishisownpleasure.”Initsstrongform,psychologicalegoismassertsthatpeoplealwaysactintheirowninterests,and,cannotbutactintheirowninterests,eventhoughtheymaydisguisetheirmotivationwithreferencestohelpingothersordoingtheirduty. Opponentsclaimthatpsychologicalegoismrendersethicsuseless.However,thisaccusationassumesthatethicalbehaviorisnecessarilyother-regarding,whichopponentswouldfirsthavetoestablish.Opponentsmayalsoexploitcounterfactualevidencetocriticizepsychologicalegoism—surely,theyclaim,thereisahostofevidencesupportingaltruisticordutyboundactionsthatcannotbesaidtoengagetheself-interestoftheagent.However,whatqualifiestobecountedasapparentcounterfactualevidencebyopponentsbecomesanintricateanddebatableissue.Thisisbecause,inresponsetotheiropponents,psychologicalegoistsmayattempttoshiftthequestionawayfromoutwardappearancestoultimatemotivesofactingbenevolentlytowardsothers;forexample,theymayclaimthatseeminglyaltruisticbehavior(givingastrangersomemoney)necessarilydoeshaveaself-interestedcomponent.Forexample,iftheindividualwerenottoofferaidtoastranger,heorshemayfeelguiltyormaylookbadinfrontofapeergroup. Onthispoint,psychologicalegoism’svalidityturnsonexaminingandanalyzingmoralmotivation.Butsincemotivationisinherentlyprivateandinaccessibletoothers(anagentcouldbelyingtoherselfortoothersabouttheoriginalmotive),thetheoryshiftsfromatheoreticaldescriptionofhumannature–onethatcanbeputtoobservationaltesting–toanassumptionabouttheinnerworkingsofhumannature:psychologicalegoismmovesbeyondthepossibilityofempiricalverificationandthepossibilityofempiricalnegation(sincemotivesareprivate),andthereforeitbecomeswhatistermeda“closedtheory.” Aclosedtheoryisatheorythatrejectscompetingtheoriesonitsowntermsandisnon-verifiableandnon-falsifiable.Ifpsychologicalegoismisreducedtoanassumptionconcerninghumannatureanditshiddenmotives,thenitfollowsthatitisjustasvalidtoholdacompetingtheoryofhumanmotivationsuchaspsychologicalaltruism. Psychologicalaltruismholdsthatallhumanactionisnecessarilyother-centered,andother-motivated.One’sbecomingahermit(anapparentlyselfishact)canbereinterpretedthroughpsychologicalaltruismasanactofpurenobleselflessness:ahermitisnotselfishlyhidingherselfaway,rather,whatsheisdoingisnotinflictingherpotentiallyungracefulactionsordispleasinglooksuponothers.Aparallelanalysisofpsychologicalaltruismthusresultsinopposingconclusionstopsychologicalegoism.However,psychologicalaltruismisarguablyjustasclosedaspsychologicalegoism:withitoneassumesthatanagent’sinherentlyprivateandconsequentlyunverifiablemotivesarealtruistic.Ifboththeoriescanbevalidlymaintained,andifthechoicebetweenthembecomestheflipofacoin,thentheirsoundnessmustbequestioned. Aweakversionofpsychologicalegoismacceptsthepossibilityofaltruisticorbenevolentbehavior,butmaintainsthat,wheneverachoiceismadebyanagenttoact,theactionisbydefinitiononethattheagentwantstodoatthatpoint.Theactionisself-serving,andisthereforesufficientlyexplainedbythetheoryofpsychologicalegoism.LetoneassumethatpersonAwantstohelpthepoor;therefore,Aisactingegoisticallybyactuallywantingtohelp;again,ifAranintoaburningbuildingtosaveakitten,itmustbethecasethatAwantedordesiredtosavethekitten.However,definingallmotivationsaswhatanagentdesirestodoremainsproblematic:logically,thetheorybecomestautologousandthereforeunabletoprovideauseful,descriptivemeaningofmotivationbecauseoneisessentiallymakinganarguablyphilosophicallyuninterestingclaimthatanagentismotivatedtodowhatsheismotivatedtodo.Besideswhich,ifhelpingothersiswhatAdesirestodo,thentowhatextentcanAbecontinuedtobecalledanegoist?AactsbecausethatiswhatAdoes,andconsiderationoftheethical“ought”becomesimmediatelyredundant.Consequently,opponentsarguethatpsychologicalegoismisphilosophicallyinadequatebecauseitsidestepsthegreatnuancesofmotive.Forexample,onecanarguethatthepsychologicalegoist’snotionofmotivesidestepstheclashesthathertheoryhaswiththenotionofduty,and,relatedsocialvirtuessuchashonor,respect,andreputation,whichfillthetomesofhistoryandliterature. DavidHume,inhisEnquiryConcerningthePrinciplesofMorals(AppendixII—OfSelfLove),offerssixrebuttalsofwhathecallsthe“selfishhypothesis,”anarguablyarchaicrelativeofpsychologicalegoism.First,Humearguesthatself-interestopposesmoralsentimentsthatmayengageoneinconcernforothers,and,maymotivateone’sactionsforothers.Thesemoralsentimentsincludelove,friendship,compassion,andgratitude.Second,psychologicalegoismattemptstoreducehumanmotivationtoasinglecause,whichisa‘fruitless’task—the“loveofsimplicity…hasbeenthesourceofmuchfalsereasoninginphilosophy.”Third,itisevidentthatanimalsactbenevolentlytowardsoneanother,and,ifitisadmittedthatanimalscanactaltruistically,thenhowcanitbedeniedinhumans?Fourth,theconceptsweusetodescribebenevolentbehaviorcannotbemeaningless;sometimesanagentobviouslydoesnothaveapersonalinterestinthefortuneofanother,yetwillwishherwell.Anyattempttocreateanimaginaryvestedinterest,asthepsychologicalegoistwillattempt,provesfutile.Fifth,Humeassertsthatwehavepriormotivationstoself-interest;wemayhave,forexample,apredispositiontowardsvanity,fame,orvengeancethattranscendsanybenefittotheagent.Finally,Humeclaimsthateveniftheselfishhypothesisweretrue,thereareasufficientnumberofdispositionstogenerateawidepossibilityofmoralactions,allowingonepersontobecalledviciousandanotherhumane;andheclaimsthatthelatteristobepreferredovertheformer. 2.NormativeEgoism Thesecondvariantofegoismisnormativeinthatitstipulatestheagentoughttopromotetheselfaboveothervalues.HerbertSpencersaid,“Ethicshastorecognizethetruth,recognizedinunethicalthought,thategoismcomesbeforealtruism.Theactsrequiredforcontinuedself-preservation,includingtheenjoymentsofbenefitsachievedbysucharts,arethefirstrequisitestouniversalwelfare.Unlesseachdulycaresforhimself,hiscareforallothersisendedindeath,andifeachthusdiesthereremainnootherstobecaredfor.”Hewasechoingalonghistoryoftheimportanceofself-regardingbehaviorthatcanbetracedbacktoAristotle’stheoryoffriendshipintheNichomachaeanEthics.Inhistheory,Aristotlearguesthatamanmustbefriendhimselfbeforehecanbefriendothers.Thegeneraltheoryofnormativeegoismdoesnotattempttodescribehumannaturedirectly,butassertshowpeopleoughttobehave.Itcomesintwogeneralforms:rationalegoismandethicalegoism. a.RationalEgoism Rationalegoismclaimsthatthepromotionofone’sowninterestsisalwaysinaccordancewithreason.ThegreatestandmostprovocativeproponentofrationalegoismisAynRand,whoseTheVirtueofSelfishnessoutlinesthelogicandappealofthetheory.Randarguesthat:first,properlydefined,selfishnessrejectsthesacrificialethicsoftheWest’sJudaic-Christianheritageonthegroundsthatitisrightformantolivehisownlife;and,Randarguesthat,second,selfishnessisapropervirtuetopursue.Thatbeingsaid,sherejectsthe“selflessselfishness”ofirrationallyactingindividuals:“theactormustalwaysbethebeneficiaryofhisactionandthatmanmustactforhisownrationalself-interest.”Tobeethicallyselfishthusentailsacommitmenttoreasonratherthantoemotionallydrivenwhimsandinstincts. InthestrongversionofrationalegoismdefendedbyRand,notonlyisitrationaltopursueone’sowninterests,itisirrationalnottopursuethem.Inaweakerversion,onemaynotethatwhileitisrationaltopursueone’sowninterests,theremaybeoccasionswhennotpursuingthemisnotnecessarilyirrational. Criticsofrationalegoismmayclaimthatreasonmaydictatethatone’sinterestsshouldnotgovernone’sactions.Thepossibilityofconflictingreasonsinasocietyneednotbeevokedinthismatter;oneneedonlyclaimthatreasonmayinvokeanimpartialityclause,inotherwords,aclausethatdemandsthatinacertainsituationone’sinterestsshouldnotbefurthered.Forexample,considerafree-ridersituation.Inmarkingstudents’papers,ateachermayarguethattoofferinflatedgradesistomakeherlifeeasier,and,therefore,isinherself-interest:markingotherwisewouldincurnegativefeedbackfromstudentsandhavingtospendtimecounselingonwritingskills,andsoon.Itisevenarguablyforeseeablethatinflatinggradesmayneverhavenegativeconsequencesforanyone.Theteachercouldconceivablyfree-rideonthetoughermarkingoftherestofthedepartmentoruniversityandnotworryaboutthenegativeconsequencesofadiminishedreputationtoeither.However,impartialityconsiderationsdemandanalternativecourse—itisnotrighttochangegradestomakelifeeasier.Hereself-interestconflictswithreason.Nonetheless,aRandianwouldrejecttheteacher’sfree-ridingbeingrational:sincetheteacherisemployedtomarkobjectivelyandimpartiallyinthefirstplace,todootherwiseistocommitafraudbothagainsttheemployinginstitutionandthestudent.(ThisisindeedananalogoussituationexploredinRand’sTheFountainhead,inwhichtheheroarchitectregretshavingproppedupafriend’sinabilities). Asimplerscenariomayalsobeconsidered.Supposethattwomenseekthehandofonewoman,andtheydeducethattheyshouldfightforherlove.Acriticmayreasonthatthetwomenrationallyclaimthatifoneofthemwerevanquished,theothermayenjoythebeloved.However,thesolutionignoresthewoman’srighttochoosebetweenhersuitors,andthusthemen’sreasoningisflawed. Inadifferentscenario,gametheory(emanatingfromJohnvonNeumann’sandOskarMorgenstern’sTheoryofGamesandEconomicBehaviour,1944)pointstoanotherpossiblelogicalerrorinrationalegoismbyofferinganexampleinwhichthepursuitofself-interestresultsinbothagentsbeingmadeworseoff. ThisisfamouslydescribedinthePrisoner’sDilemma. PrisonerB Confess Don’tconfess _  PrisonerA Confess 5,5 ½,10 Don’tConfess 10,½ 2,2 Fromthetable,twocriminals,AandB,facedifferentsentencesdependingonwhethertheyconfesstheirguiltornot.Eachprisonerdoesnotknowwhathispartnerwillchooseandcommunicationbetweenthetwoprisonersisnotpermitted.Therearenolawyersandpresumablynohumaneinteractionbetweentheprisonersandtheircaptors. Rationally(i.e.,fromthepointofviewofthenumbersinvolved),wecanassumethatbothwillwanttominimizetheirsentences.Hereinliestherub–ifbothavoidconfessing,theywillserve2yearseach–atotalof4yearsbetweenthem.Iftheybothhappentoconfess,theyeachserve5yearseach,or10yearsbetweenthem. Howevertheybothfaceatantalizingoption:ifAconfesseswhilehispartnerdoesn’tconfess,Acangetawayin6monthsleavingBtolanguishfor10years(andthesameistrueforB):thiswouldresultinacollectivetotalof10.5yearsserved. Forthegame,theoptimalsolutionisassumedtobethelowesttotalyearsserved,whichwouldbebothrefusingtoconfessandeachthereforeserving2yearseach. Theprobableoutcomeofthedilemmathoughisthatbothwillconfessinthedesiretogetoffin6months,butthereforetheywillendupserving10yearsintotal. Thisisseentobenon-rationalorsub-optimalforbothprisonersasthetotalyearsservedisnotthebestcollectivesolution. ThePrisoner’sDilemmaoffersamathematicalmodelastowhyself-interestedactioncouldleadtoasociallynon-optimalequilibrium(inwhichtheparticipantsallendupinaworsescenario).Togametheorists,manysituationscanbemodeledinasimilarwaytotheclassicPrisoner’sDilemmaincludingissuesofnucleardeterrence,environmentalpollution,corporateadvertisingcampaignsandevenromanticdates. Supportersidentifyagame“asanyinteractionbetweenagentsthatisgovernedbyasetofrulesspecifyingthepossiblemovesforeachparticipantandasetofoutcomesforeachpossiblecombinationofmoves.”Theyadd:“Oneishardputtofindanexampleofsocialphenomenonthatcannotbesodescribed.”(Hargreaves-HeapandVaroufakis,p.1). Nonetheless,itcanbecounteredthatthenatureofthegameartificiallypre-emptsotherpossibilities:thesentencesarefixednotbytheparticipantsbutbyexternalforce(thegamemasters),sothechoicesfacingtheagentsareoutsideoftheircontrol.Althoughthismaycertainlybeappliedtotherestrictedchoicesfacingthetwoprisonersorcontestantsinagame,itisnotobviousthatevery-daylifegeneratessuchlimitedandlimitingchoices.Theprisoner’sdilemmaisnottoberepeated:sotherearenofurthernegotiationsbasedonwhattheothersidechose. Moreimportantly,gameswithsuchrestrictingoptionsandresultsareenteredintovoluntarilyandcanbeavoided(wecanarguethattheprisonerschosetoengageinthegameinthattheychosetocommitacrimeandhenceranthepossibilityofbeingcaught!).Outsideofgames,agentsaffecteachotherandtheoutcomesinmanydifferentwaysandcanhencevarytheoutcomesastheyinteract–inreallife,communicationinvolvesalteringtheperceptionofhowtheworldworks,thevaluesattachedtodifferentdecisions,andhencewhatoughttobedoneandwhatpotentialconsequencesmayarise. Insummary,evenwithintheconfinesofthePrisoner’sDilemmatheassumptionsthatdifferingoptionsbeofferedtoeachsuchthattheirself-interestworksagainsttheothercanbechallengedlogically,ethicallyandjudicially.Firstly,thecollectiveoutcomesofthegamecanbechangedbythegamemastertoproduceasociallyandindividuallyoptimalsolution–thenumberscanbealtered.Secondly,presentingsuchadilemmatotheprisonerscanbeconsideredethicallyandjudiciallyquestionableasthefinalsentencethateachgetsisdependentonwhatanotherpartysays,ratherthanontheguiltanddeservedpunishedoftheindividual. Interestingly,repeatedgamestestedbypsychologistsandeconomiststendtopresentarangeofsolutionsdependingonthestakesandotherrules,withAxelrod’sfindings(TheEvolutionofCooperation,1984)indicatingthategotisticactioncanworkformutualharmonyundertheprincipleof“titfortat”–i.e.,anunderstandingthatgivingsomethingeachcreatesabetteroutcomeforboth. Atadeeperlevel,someegoistsmayrejectthepossibilityoffixedorabsolutevaluesthatindividualsactingselfishlyandcaughtupintheirownpursuitscannotsee.Nietzsche,forinstance,wouldcounterthatvaluesarecreatedbytheindividualandtherebydonotstandindependentlyofhisorherselftobeexplainedbyanother“authority”;similarly,St.Augustinewouldsay“love,anddoasyouwill”;neitherofwhichmaybehelpfultotheprisonersabovebutwhichmaybeofgreaterguidanceforindividualsinnormallife. Randexhortstheapplicationofreasontoethicalsituations,butacriticmayreplythatwhatisrationalisnotalwaysthesameaswhatisreasonable.Thecriticmayemphasizethehistoricityofchoice,thatis,shemayemphasizethatone’sapparentchoiceisdemarcatedby,anddependenton,theparticularlanguage,cultureofrightandconsequenceandenvironmentalcircumstanceinwhichanindividualfindsherselfliving:aVictorianEnglishgentlemanperceivedadifferentmoralsphereandconsequentlyhorizonofgoalsthananAmericanfrontiersman.Thiscriticismmay,however,turnonsemanticorcontextualnuances.TheRandianmaycounterthatwhatisrationalisreasonable:foronecanarguethatrationalityisgovernedasmuchbyunderstandingthecontext(Sartre’sfacticityisahighlyusefulterm)asadheringtothelawsoflogicandofnon-contradiction. b.EthicalEgoism Ethicalegoismisthenormativetheorythatthepromotionofone’sowngoodisinaccordancewithmorality.Inthestrongversion,itisheldthatitisalwaysmoraltopromoteone’sowngood,anditisnevermoralnottopromoteit.Intheweakversion,itissaidthatalthoughitisalwaysmoraltopromoteone’sowngood,itisnotnecessarilynevermoraltonot.Thatis,theremaybeconditionsinwhichtheavoidanceofpersonalinterestmaybeamoralaction. Inanimaginaryconstructionofaworldinhabitedbyasinglebeing,itispossiblethatthepursuitofmoralityisthesameasthepursuitofself-interestinthatwhatisgoodfortheagentisthesameaswhatisintheagent’sinterests.Arguably,therecouldneverariseanoccasionwhentheagentoughtnottopursueself-interestinfavorofanothermorality,unlessheproducesanalternativeethicalsysteminwhichheoughttorenouncehisvaluesinfavorofanimaginaryself,or,otherentitysuchastheuniverse,ortheagent’sGod.Opponentsofethicalegoismmayclaim,however,thatalthoughitispossibleforthisRobinsonCrusoetypecreaturetolamentpreviouschoicesasnotconducivetoself-interest(enjoyingthepleasuresofswimmingallday,andnotspendingnecessarytimeproducingfood),themistakeisnotamoralmistakebutamistakeofidentifyingself-interest.Presumablythislonelycreaturewillbegintocomprehendthedistinctionsbetweenshort,andlong-terminterests,and,thatshort-termpainscanbecounteredbylong-termgains. Inaddition,opponentsarguethateveninaworldinhabitedbyasinglebeing,dutieswouldstillapply;(Kantian)dutiesarethoseactionsthatreasondictatesoughttobepursuedregardlessofanygain,orlosstoselforothers.Further,thedeontologistassertstheapplicationofyetanothermoralspherewhichoughttobepursued,namely,thatofimpartialduties.Theproblemwithcomplicatingthecreature’sworldwithimpartialduties,however,isindefininganimpartialtaskinapurelysubjectiveworld.Impartiality,theethicalegoistmayretort,couldonlyexistwheretherearecompetingselves:otherwise,theattempttobeimpartialinjudgingone’sactionsisaredundantexercise.(However,theCartesianrationalistcouldretortthatneednotbeso,thatasentientbeingshouldactrationally,andreasonwilldisclosewhataretheproperactionsheshouldfollow.) Ifwemoveawayfromtheimaginaryconstructofasinglebeing’sworld,ethicalegoismcomesunderfirefrommorepertinentarguments.Incomplyingwithethicalegoism,theindividualaimsatherowngreatestgood.Ignoringadefinitionofthegoodforthepresent,itmayjustlybearguedthatpursuingone’sowngreatestgoodcanconflictwithanother’spursuit,thuscreatingasituationofconflict.Inatypicalexample,ayoungpersonmayseehisgreatestgoodinmurderinghisrichuncletoinherithismillions.Itistherichuncle’sgreatestgoodtocontinueenjoyinghismoney,asheseesfit.Accordingtodetractors,conflictisaninherentproblemofethicalegoism,andthemodelseeminglydoesnotpossessaconflictresolutionsystem.Withtheadditionalpremiseoflivinginsociety,ethicalegoismhasmuchtorespondto:obviouslytherearesituationswhentwopeople’sgreatestgoods–thesubjectivelyperceivedworkingoftheirownself-interest–willconflict,and,asolutiontosuchdilemmasisanecessaryelementofanytheoryattemptingtoprovideanethicalsystem. Theethicalegoistcontendsthathertheory,infact,hasresolutionstotheconflict.Thefirstresolutionproceedsfromastateofnatureexamination.If,inthewilderness,twopeoplesimultaneouslycomeacrosstheonlysourceofdrinkablewaterapotentialdilemmaarisesifbothmakeasimultaneousclaimtoit.Withnorecoursetoarbitrationtheymusteitheracceptanequalshareofthewater,whichwouldcomplywithrationalegoism.(Inotherwords,itisintheinterestofbothtoshare,forbothmayenjoythewaterandeachother’scompany,and,ifthewaterisinexhaustible,neithercangainfrommonopolizingthesource.)Butacriticmaymaintainthatthissolutionisnotnecessarilyincompliancewithethicalegoism.Arguably,thecriticcontinues,thetwohavenopossibleresolution,andmust,therefore,fightforthewater.Thisisoftenthelinetakenagainstegoismgenerally:thatitresultsininsolubleconflictthatimplies,ornecessitatesaresorttoforcebyoneorbothofthepartiesconcerned.Forthecritic,theprofferedresolutionis,therefore,anacceptanceoftheethicaltheorythat“mightisright;”thatis,thecriticmaintainsthattheresolutionacceptsthatthestrongerwilltakepossessionandtherebygainproprietaryrights. However,ethicalegoismdoesnothavetologicallyresultinaDarwinianstrugglebetweenthestrongandtheweakinwhichstrengthdeterminesmoralrectitudetoresourcesorvalues.Indeed,the“realist”positionmaystrikeoneasphilosophicallyinadequateasthatofpsychologicalegoism,althoughpopularlyattractive.Forexample,insteadofsuccumbingtoinsolubleconflict,thetwopeoplecouldcooperate(asrationalegoismwouldrequire).Throughcooperation,bothagentswould,thereby,mutuallybenefitfromsecuringandsharingtheresource.Againstthecritic’spessimisticpresumptionthatconflictisinsolublewithoutrecoursetovictory,theethicalegoistcanretortthatreasoningpeoplecanrecognizethattheirgreatestinterestsareservedmorethroughcooperationthanconflict.Warisinherentlycostly,and,eventhefightingbeastsofthewildinstinctivelyrecognizeitspotentialcosts,and,haveevolvedconflict-avoidingstrategies. Ontheotherhand,theethicalegoistcanarguelessbenevolently,thatincaseonemanreachesthedesiredresourcefirst,hewouldthenbeabletotakerightfulcontrolandpossessionofit–thesecondpersoncannotpossessanyrighttoit,exceptinsofarashemaytradewithitspresentowner.Ofcourse,charitableconsiderationsmaymotivatetheownertosecureashareforthesecondcomer,andeconomicconsiderationsmaypromptbothtotradeinthoseproductsthateachcanbetterproduceoracquire:theonemayguardthewatersupplyfromanimalswhiletheotherhunts.Suchwouldbeaclassicalliberalreadingofthissituation,whichconsiderstheadvanceofpropertyrightstobetheobvioussolutiontoapparentlyintractableconflictsoverresources. Asecondconflict-resolutionstemsfromcritics’fearsthatethicalegoistscouldlogicallypursuetheirinterestsatthecostofothers.Specifically,acriticmaycontendthatpersonalgainlogicallycannotbeinone’sbestinterestifitentailsdoingharmtoanother:doingharmtoanotherwouldbetoaccepttheprinciplethatdoingharmtoanotherisethical(thatis,onewouldbeequating“doingharm”with“one’sownbestinterests”),whereas,reflectionshowsthatprincipletobeillogicalonuniversalisticcriteria.However,anethicalegoistmayrespondthatinthecaseoftherichuncleandgreedynephew,forexample,itisnotthecasethatthenephewwouldbeactingethicallybykillinghisuncle,andthatforacritictocontendotherwiseistocriticizepersonalgainfromtheseparateethicalstandpointthatcondemnsmurder.Inaddition,theethicalegoistmayrespondbysayingthattheseparticularfearsarebasedonaconfusionresultingfromconflatingethics(thatis,self-interest)withpersonalgain;Theethicalegoistmaycontendthatifthenephewweretoattempttodoharmforpersonalgain,thathewouldfindthathisuncleorotherswouldormaybepermittedtodoharminreturn.Theargumentthat“Ihavearighttoharmthosewhogetinmyway”isfoiledbytheargumentthat“othershavearighttoharmmeshouldIgetintheway.”Thatis,intheend,thenephewvariouslycouldseehowharminganotherforpersonalgainwouldnotbeinhisself-interestatall. Thecritics’fearisbasedonamisreadingofethicalegoism,andisanattempttosubtlyreinsertthe“mightisright”premise.Consequently,theethicalegoistisunfairlychastisedonthebasisofastraw-manargument.Ultimately,however,onecomestotheconclusionreachedinthediscussionofthefirstresolution;thatis,onemusteitheraccepttheprinciplethatmightisright(whichinmostcaseswouldbeevidentiallycontrarytoone’sbestinterest),oracceptthatcooperationwithothersisamoresuccessfulapproachtoimprovingone’sinterests.Thoughinteractioncaneitherbeviolentorpeaceful,anethicalegoistrejectsviolenceasunderminingthepursuitofself-interest. Athirdconflict-resolutionentailstheinsertionofrightsasastandard.Thisresolutionincorporatestheconclusionsofthefirsttworesolutionsbystatingthatthereisanethicalframeworkthatcanlogicallybeextrapolatedfromethicalegoism.However,thelogicalextrapolationisphilosophicallydifficult(and,hence,intriguing)becauseethicalegoismisthetheorythatthepromotionofone’sownself-interestisinaccordancewithmoralitywhereasrightsincorporateboundariestobehaviorthatreasonorexperiencehasshowntobecontrarytothepursuitofself-interest.Althoughitisfaciletoarguethatthegreedynephewdoesnothavearighttoclaimhisuncle’smoneybecauseitisnothisbuthisuncle’s,andtoclaimthatitiswrongtoactaggressivelyagainstthepersonofanotherbecausethatpersonhasalegitimaterighttoliveinpeace(thusprovidingthesubstanceofconflict-resolutionforethicalegoism),theproblemofexpoundingthistheoryfortheethicalegoistliesintheintellectualargumentsrequiredtosubstantiatetheclaimsfortheexistenceofrightsandthen,oncesubstantiated,connectingthemtothepursuitofanindividual’sgreatestgood. i.ConditionalEgoism Afinaltypeofethicalegoismisconditionalegoism.Thisisthetheorythategoismismorallyacceptableorrightifitleadstomorallyacceptableends.Forexample,self-interestedbehaviorcanbeacceptedandapplaudedifitleadstothebettermentofsocietyasawhole;theultimatetestrestsnotonactingself-interestedlybutonwhethersocietyisimprovedasaresult.AfamousexampleofthiskindofthinkingisfromAdamSmith’sTheWealthofNations,inwhichSmithoutlinesthepublicbenefitsresultingfromself-interestedbehavior(borrowingatheoryfromtheearlierwriterBernardMandevilleandhisFableoftheBees).Smithwrites:“Itisnotfromthebenevolenceofthebutcher,thebrewer,orthebaker,thatweexpectourdinner,butfromtheirregardtotheirowninterest.Weaddressourselves,nottotheirhumanitybuttotheirself-love,andnevertalktothemofourownnecessitiesbutoftheiradvantages”(WealthofNations,I.ii.2). AsSmithhimselfadmits,ifegoisticbehaviorlendsitselftosociety’sdetriment,thenitoughttobestopped.Thetheoryofconditionalegoismisthusdependentonasuperiormoralgoalsuchasanactionbeinginthecommoninterest,thatis,thepublicgood.Thegraveproblemfacingconditionalegoistsisaccordingtowhatstandardoughtthelimitsonegoismbeplaced?Inotherwords,whoorwhatistodefinethenatureofthepublicgood?Ifitisapersonwhoissetupasthegreatarbitratorofthepublic,thenitisuncertainiftherecanbeaguaranteethatheorsheisembodyingorarguingforanimpartialstandardofthegoodandnotforhisorherownparticularinterest.Ifitisanimpartialstandardthatsetsthelimit,onethatcanbeindicatedbyanyreasonableperson,thenitbehoovesthephilosophertoexplainthenatureofthatstandard. Inmost“publicgood”theories,theassumptionismadethatthereexistsacollectiveentityoverandabovetheindividualsthatcompriseit:race,nation,religion,andstatebeingcommonexamples.Collectiviststhenattempttoexplainwhatinparticularshouldbeheldastheinterestofthegroup.Inevitably,however,conflictarises,andresolutionshavetobeproduced.Someseekrefugeinclaimingtheneedforperpetualdialogue(ratherthanexchange),butothersreturntotheneedforforcetosettleapparentlyinsolubleconflicts;nonetheless,thevariousshadesofegoismposeavalidandappealingcriticismofcollectivism:thatindividualsact;groupsdon’t.KarlPopper’sworksonmethodologicalindividualismareausefulsourceincriticizingcollectivistthinking(forexample,Popper’sThePovertyofHistoricism). 3.Conclusion Psychologicalegoismisfraughtwiththelogicalproblemofcollapsingintoaclosedtheory,andhencebeingamereassumptionthatcouldvalidlybeacceptedasdescribinghumanmotivationandmorality,orberejectedinfavorofapsychologicalaltruism(orevenapsychologicalecologisminwhichallactionsnecessarilybenefittheagent’senvironment). Normativeegoism,however,engagesinaphilosophicallymoreintriguingdialoguewithprotractors.Normativeegoistsarguefromvariouspositionsthatanindividualoughttopursuehisorherowninterest.Thesemaybesummarizedasfollows:theindividualisbestplacedtoknowwhatdefinesthatinterest,oritisthoroughlytheindividual’srighttopursuethatinterest.Thelatterisdividedintotwosub-arguments:eitherbecauseitisthereasonable/rationalcourseofaction,orbecauseitisthebestguaranteeofmaximizingsocialwelfare. Egoistsalsostressthattheimplicationofcritics’condemnationofself-servingorself-motivatingactionisthecalltorenouncefreedominfavorofcontrolbyothers,whothenareempoweredtochooseontheirbehalf.ThisentailsanacceptanceofAristotle’spoliticalmaximthat“someareborntoruleandothersareborntoberuled,”alsoreadas“individualsaregenerallytoostupidtoacteitherintheirownbestinterestsorintheinterestsofthosewhowouldwishtocommandthem.”Rejectingbothdescriptions(thefirstasbeingarrogantandempiricallyquestionableandthesecondasunmaskingthetrulyimmoralambitionlurkingbehindattacksonselfishness),egoistsironicallycanbereadasmoralandpoliticalegalitariansglorifyingthedignityofeachandeverypersontopursuelifeastheyseefit.Mistakesinsecuringthepropermeansandappropriateendswillbemadebyindividuals,butiftheyaremorallyresponsiblefortheiractionstheynotonlywillbeartheconsequencesbutalsotheopportunityforadaptingandlearning.Whenthatresponsibilityisremovedandindividualsareexhortedtoliveforanalternativecause,theirincentiveandjoyinimprovingtheirownwelfareisconcomitantlydiminished,whichwill,formanyegoists,ultimatelyfosteranuncritical,unthinkingmassofobedientbodiesvulnerabletopoliticalmanipulation:whentheegoistrammeled,sotooisfreedomensnared,andwithoutfreedomethicsisremovedfromindividualtocollectiveorgovernmentresponsibility. Egoistsalsorejecttheinsightintopersonalmotivationthatothers–whethertheyarepsychologicalorsociological“experts”–declaretheypossess,andwhichtheymayaccordinglyfine-tuneorencourageto“betterends.”Whyanindividualactsremainsanintrinsicallypersonalandprivateactthatisthestuffofmemoirsandliterature,buthowtheyshouldactreleasesourinvestigationsintoethicsofwhatshalldefinethegoodfortheself-regardingagent. 4.ReferencesandFurtherReading Aristotle.NichomachaeanEthics.Varioustranslationsavailable.BookIXbeingmostpertinent. Baier,Kurt.“Egoisim”inACompaniontoEthics.Ed.PeterSinger.Blackwell:Oxford.1990. Feinberg,Joel.“PsychologicalEgoism”inEthics:History,Theory,andContemporaryIssues.OxfordUniversityPress:Oxford.1998. Garvin,Lucius.AModernIntroductiontoEthics.HoughtonMifflin:Cambrirdge,MA,1953. Hargreaves-Heap,ShaunP.andYanisVaroufakis.GameTheory:ACriticalIntroduction.Routledge:London,1995. Holmes,S.J.LifeandMorals.MacMillan:London,1948. Hospers,John.“EthicalEgoism,”inAnIntroductiontoPhilosophicalAnalysis.2ndEdition.Routledge,KeganPaul:London,1967. Hume,David.EnquiryConcerningthePrinciplesofMorals. Peikoff,Leonard.Objectivism:ThePhilosophyofAynRand.Meridian:London,1993. Popper,Karl.PovertyofHistoricism.Routledge&KeganPaul:London,1976. Rachels,James.ElementsofMoralPhilosophy.Mcgraw-Hill:London,1995. Rand,Ayn.VirtueofSelfishness.Signet:NewYork,1964. Rand,Ayn.TheFountainhead.HarperCollins:NewYork.1961. Sidgwick,Henry.TheMethodsofEthics.MacMillan:London,1901. Smith,Adam.WealthofNations. Smith,Adam.TheoryofMoralSentiments. AuthorInformation AlexanderMoseley Email:[email protected] UnitedKingdom Anencyclopediaofphilosophyarticleswrittenbyprofessionalphilosophers. 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