Egoism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Egoism can be a descriptive or a normative position. Psychological egoism, the most famous descriptive position, claims that each person has ... StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy Menu Browse TableofContents What'sNew RandomEntry Chronological Archives About EditorialInformation AbouttheSEP EditorialBoard HowtoCitetheSEP SpecialCharacters AdvancedTools Contact SupportSEP SupporttheSEP PDFsforSEPFriends MakeaDonation SEPIAforLibraries EntryNavigation EntryContents Bibliography AcademicTools FriendsPDFPreview AuthorandCitationInfo BacktoTop EgoismFirstpublishedMonNov4,2002;substantiverevisionTueJan15,2019 Egoismcanbeadescriptiveoranormativeposition.Psychological egoism,themostfamousdescriptiveposition,claimsthateachperson hasbutoneultimateaim:herownwelfare.Normativeformsofegoism makeclaimsaboutwhatoneoughttodo,ratherthandescribewhatone doesdo.EthicalegoismclaimsImorallyoughttoperformsomeaction ifandonlyif,andbecause,performingthatactionmaximizesmy self-interest.RationalegoismclaimsthatIoughttoperformsome actionifandonlyif,andbecause,performingthatactionmaximizes myself-interest.(Herethe“ought”isnotrestrictedto themoral“ought”.) 1.PsychologicalEgoism 2.EthicalEgoism 3.RationalEgoism 4.Conclusion Bibliography AcademicTools OtherInternetResources RelatedEntries 1.PsychologicalEgoism Allformsofegoismrequireexplicationof“self-interest” (or“welfare”or“well-being”).Therearethree maintheories.Preferenceordesireaccountsidentifyself-interest withthesatisfactionofone’sdesires.Often,andmostplausibly, thesedesiresarerestrictedtoself-regardingdesires.Whatmakesa desireself-regardingiscontroversial,butthereareclearcasesand counter-cases:adesireformyownpleasureisself-regarding;adesire forthewelfareofothersisnot.Objectiveaccountsidentify self-interestwiththepossessionofstates(suchasvirtueor knowledge)thatarevaluableindependentlyofwhethertheyaredesired.Hybridaccountsgivearoletobothdesires(orpleasure)andstatesthatarevaluableindependentlyofwhethertheyaredesired.Forexample,perhapstheincreasetomywell-beingbroughtaboutbyasatisfieddesire(orapleasure)itselfincreasesinsofarasitisadesirefor(orpleasurein)knowledge.Orperhapstheincreasetomywell-beingbroughtaboutbyapieceofknowledgeitselfincreasesinsofarasIdesire(ortakepleasurein)it. Hedonism,whichidentifiesself-interestwithpleasure,iseithera preferenceoranobjectiveaccount,accordingtowhetherwhatcountsas pleasureisdeterminedbyone’sdesires. Psychologicalegoismclaimsthateachpersonhasbutoneultimate aim:herownwelfare.Thisallowsforactionthatfailstomaximize perceivedself-interest,butrulesoutthesortofbehavior psychologicalegoistsliketotarget—suchasaltruisticbehavioror motivationbythoughtsofdutyalone.Itallowsforweaknessofwill, sinceinweaknessofwillcasesIamstillaimingatmyownwelfare;I amweakinthatIdonotactasIaim.Anditallowsforaimingat thingsotherthanone’swelfare,suchashelpingothers,wherethese thingsareameanstoone’swelfare. Psychologicalegoismissupportedbyourfrequentobservationof self-interestedbehavior.Apparentlyaltruisticactionisoften revealedtobeself-interested.Andwetypicallymotivatepeopleby appealingtotheirself-interest(through,forexample,punishmentsand rewards). Acommonobjectiontopsychologicalegoism,madefamouslybyJoseph Butler,isthatImustdesirethingsotherthanmyownwelfareinorder togetwelfare.SayIderivewelfarefromplayinghockey.UnlessI desired,foritsownsake,toplayhockey,Iwouldnotderivewelfare fromplaying.OrsayIderivewelfarefromhelpingothers.UnlessI desired,foritsownsake,thatothersdowell,Iwouldnotderive welfarefromhelpingthem.Welfareresultsfrommyaction,butcannot betheonlyaimofmyaction. ThepsychologicalegoistcanconcedethatImusthavedesiresfor particularthings,suchasplayinghockey.Butthereisnoneedto concedethatthesatisfactionofthesedesiresisnotpartofmy welfare.Mywelfaremightconsistsimplyinthesatisfactionof self-regardingdesires.Inthecaseofderivingwelfarefromhelping others,thepsychologicalegoistcanagainconcedethatIwouldnot derivewelfarewithoutdesiringsomeparticularthing,butneednot agreethatwhatIdesireforitsownsakeisthatothersdowell.That Iamtheonewhohelpsthemmay,forexample,satisfymyself-regarding desireforpower. Abiggerproblemforpsychologicalegoismisthatsomebehaviordoes notseemtobeexplainedbyself-regardingdesires.Sayasoldier throwshimselfonagrenadetopreventothersfrombeingkilled.It doesnotseemthatthesoldierispursuinghisperceivedself-interest. Itisplausiblethat,ifasked,thesoldierwouldhavesaidthathe threwhimselfonthegrenadebecausehewantedtosavethelivesof othersorbecauseitwashisduty.Hewoulddenyasridiculousthe claimthatheactedinhisself-interest. Thepsychologicalegoistmightreplythatthesoldierislyingor self-deceived.Perhapshethrewhimselfonthegrenadebecausehebelievedthathecould notbeartolivewithhimselfafterwardsifhedidnotdoso.Hehasa betterlife,intermsofwelfare,byavoidingyearsofguilt.Themain problemhereisthatwhilethisisapossibleaccountofsomecases, thereisnoreasontothinkitcoversallcases.Anotherproblemis thatguiltmaypresupposethatthesoldierhasanon-self-regarding desirefordoingwhathetakestoberight. Thepsychologicalegoistmightreplythatsomesuchaccountmustbe right.Afterall,thesoldierdidwhathemostwantedtodo,andso musthavebeenpursuinghisperceivedself-interest.Inonesense,this istrue.Ifself-interestisidentifiedwiththesatisfactionofallof one’spreferences,thenallintentionalactionisself-interested(at leastifintentionalactionsarealwaysexplainedbyciting preferences,asmostbelieve).Psychologicalegoismturnsouttobe triviallytrue.Thiswouldnotcontentdefendersofpsychological egoism,however.Theyintendanempiricaltheorythat,likeothersuch theories,itisatleastpossibletorefutebyobservation. Thereisanotherwaytoshowthatthetrivialversionof psychologicalegoismisunsatisfactory.Weordinarilythinkthereisa significantdifferenceinselfishnessbetweenthesoldier’sactionand thatofanothersoldierwho,say,pushessomeoneontothegrenadeto avoidbeingblownuphimself.Wethinktheformerisactingunselfishly whilethelatterisactingselfishly.Accordingtothetrivialversion ofpsychologicalegoism,bothsoldiersareequallyselfish,sinceboth aredoingwhattheymostdesire. Thepsychologicalegoistmighthandleapparentcasesof self-sacrifice,notbyadoptingthetrivialversion,butratherby claimingthatfactsabouttheself-interestoftheagentexplainall behavior.Perhapsasinfantswehaveonlyself-regardingdesires;we cometodesireotherthings,suchasdoingourduty,bylearningthat theseotherthingssatisfyourself-regardingdesires;intime,we pursuetheotherthingsfortheirownsakes. Evenifthispictureofdevelopmentistrue,however,itdoesnot defendpsychologicalegoism,sinceitadmitsthatwesometimes ultimatelyaimatthingsotherthanourwelfare.Anaccountofthe originsofournon-self-regardingdesiresdoesnotshowthattheyare reallyself-regarding.Thesoldier’sdesireistosaveothers,not increasehisownwelfare,evenifhewouldnothavedesiredtosave othersunlesssavingotherswas,inthepast,connectedtoincreasing hiswelfare. Thepsychologicalegoistmustarguethatwedonotcometopursue thingsotherthanourwelfarefortheirownsakes.Inprinciple,it seemspossibletoshowthisbyshowingthatnon-self-regardingdesires donotcontinueforlongoncetheirconnectiontoourwelfareis broken.However,evidenceforthisdependenceclaimhasnotbeen forthcoming. Indeed,whenexaminingtheempiricalevidence,twosortsofapproach havebeenusedtoargueagainstpsychologicalegoism. First,DanielBatsonandcolleaguesfoundthatincreasedempathyleads toincreasedhelpingbehaviour.Onehypothesisisaltruistic:empathy causesanon-instrumentaldesiretohelp.Therearemanycompeting egoistichypotheses.Empathymightcauseanunpleasantexperience thatsubjectsbelievetheycanstopbyhelping;orsubjectsmight thinkfailingtohelpincasesofhighempathyismorelikelytolead topunishmentbyothers,orthathelpinghereismorelikelytobe rewardedbyothers;orsubjectsmightthinkthisabout self-administeredpunishmentorreward.Inaningeniousseriesof experiments,Batsoncomparedtheegoistichypotheses,onebyone, againstthealtruistichypothesis.Hefoundthatthealtruistic hypothesisalwaysmadesuperiorpredictions.Againsttheunpleasant experiencehypothesis,Batsonfoundthatgivinghigh-empathysubjects easywaysofstoppingtheexperienceotherthanbyhelpingdidnot reducehelping.Againstthepunishmentbyothershypothesis,Batson foundthatlettinghigh-empathysubjectsbelievethattheirbehaviour wouldbesecretdidnotreducehelping.Againsttheself-administered rewardhypothesis,Batsonfoundthatthemoodofhigh-empathysubjects dependedonwhethertheybelievedthathelpwasneeded,whetherornot theycoulddothehelping,ratherthanonwhethertheyhelped(andso couldself-reward).Againsttheself-administeredpunishment hypothesis,Batsonfoundthatmakinghigh-empathysubjectsbelieve theywouldfeellessguiltfromnothelping(bylettingthembelieve thatfewothershadvolunteeredtohelp)didnotreducehelping. Onemightquibblewithsomeofthedetails.Perhapssubjectsdidnot believethattheeasywaysofstoppingthepainfulexperienceBatson provided,suchasleavingtheviewingroom,wouldstopit.(Foran accountofanexperimentdoneinreply,favouringBatson,seeStich, DorisandRoedder2010,aswellasBatson2011135–145.) PerhapsaBatson-proofegoistichypothesiscouldbeoffered:saythat subjectsbelievethattheonlywayofstoppingthepain(or avoidingself-punishment)isbyhelping(thoughwhethersubjectshave thisbeliefmightbetestedforonitsown).Butonthewhole, Batson’sexperimentsareverybadnewsforpsychologicalegoism.(For furtherdiscussionofBatson,seeMay2011aandSlote2013.) Second,ElliotSoberandDavidWilsonarguethatevolutionarytheory supportsaltruism.Parentalcaremightbeexplainedonegoistic grounds:abeliefaboutthechild’sdistresscausestheparentpain thattheparentbelievesshecanalleviatebyhelping,ortheparent believesthatshewillbecausedpainifshedoesnothelp.Parental caremightalsobeexplainedonaltruisticgrounds:theparenthasa non-instrumentaldesirethatthechilddowell.Lastly,parentalcare mightbeexplainedbyacombinationofthesemechanisms.Soberand Wilsonarguethatmorereliablecarewouldbeprovidedbythe altruisticorcombinationmechanisms.Giventheimportanceof parentalcare,thisisareasonforthinkingthatnaturalselection wouldhavefavouredoneofthesemechanisms.Theegoisticmechanism islessreliableforseveralreasons:beliefsaboutthechild’s distressmayfailtocausetheparentpain(evenbodilyinjurydoes notalwayscausepain,sopainisunlikelytobealwayscausedby beliefsaboutdistress);theparentmayfailtobelievethathelping willbestreduceherpain;theremaynotbeenoughpainproduced;the combinationviewhastheadvantageofanextramechanism. Thisargumenthasdrawbacks.Naturalselectiondoesnotalways provideback-upmechanisms(Ihavebutoneliver).Naturalselection sometimeshasmydesirescausedbyaffectthatisproducedbyabelief ratherthandirectlybythebelief(mydesiretorunawayfromdanger isoftencausedbymyfear,ratherthanbythemerebeliefthatthere isdanger).Andinthesecases,asinthecaseoftheimperfectly correlatedpainandbodilyinjury,thereseemsusuallyto beenoughaffect.Thealtruistichypothesisalsohassomeof thesameproblems:forexample,justastheremightnotbeenough pain,thenon-instrumentaldesirethatthechilddowellmightnotbe strongenoughtodefeatotherdesires.Indeed,withoutanestimateof howstrongthisdesireis,thereisnoreasontothinktheegoistic hypothesisislessreliable.Itmayhavemorepointsatwhichitcan gowrong,butproducemorecarethanadirectbutweakaltruistic mechanism.(Formanyoftheseworries,andothers,seeStich,Doris andRoedder2010.) Evenifevolutionaryargumentscanbemet,however,psychological egoismfacestheproblemsnotedearlier.Inresponse,the psychologicalegoistmightmovetowhatGregoryKavka(1986,64–80) calls“predominantegoism:”weactunselfishlyonly rarely,andthentypicallywherethesacrificeissmallandthegain toothersislargeorwherethosebenefitingarefriends,family,or favoritecauses.Predominantegoismisnottroubledbythesoldier counter-example,sinceitallowsexceptions;itisnottrivial;andit seemsempiricallyplausible.(Forotherweakenedpositions,see LaFollette1988andMercer2001.) 2.EthicalEgoism EthicalegoismclaimsthatImorallyoughttoperformsomeactionifandonlyif,andbecause,performingthatactionmaximizesmyself-interest.(There arepossibilitiesotherthanmaximization.Onemight,forexample, claimthatoneoughttoachieveacertainlevelofwelfare,butthat thereisnorequirementtoachievemore.Ethicalegoismmightalso applytothingsotherthanacts,suchasrulesorcharactertraits. Sincethesevariantsareuncommon,andtheargumentsforandagainst themarelargelythesameasthoseconcerningthestandardversion,Isetthemaside.) Oneissueconcernshowmuchethicalegoismdiffersincontentfrom standardmoraltheories.Itmightappearthatitdiffersagreatdeal. Afterall,moraltheoriessuchasKantianism,utilitarianism,and common-sensemoralityrequirethatanagentgiveweighttothe interestsofothers.Theysometimesrequireuncompensatedsacrifices, particularlywhenthelosstotheagentissmallandthegaintoothers islarge.(Saythecosttomeofsavingadrowningpersonisgettingmy shirtsleevewet.)Ethicalegoistscanreply,however,thategoism generatesmanyofthesamedutiestoothers.Theargumentrunsas follows.Eachpersonneedsthecooperationofotherstoobtaingoods suchasdefenseorfriendship.IfIactasifIgivenoweightto others,otherswillnotcooperatewithme.If,say,Ibreakmypromises wheneveritisinmydirectself-interesttodoso,otherswillnot acceptmypromises,andmayevenattackme.Idobest,then,byacting asifothershaveweight(providedtheyactasifIhaveweightin return). Itisunlikelythatthisargumentprovesthatethicalegoism generatesallofthestandarddutiestoothers.Fortheargument dependsontheabilityofotherstocooperatewithmeorattackme shouldIfailtocooperate.Indealingswithotherswholackthese abilities,theegoisthasnoreasontocooperate.Thedutiestoothers foundinstandardmoraltheoriesarenotconditionalinthisway.Ido not,forexample,escapeadutytosaveadrowningperson,whenIcan easilydoso,justbecausethedrowningperson(oranyonewatching) happensnevertobeabletoofferfruitfulcooperationor retaliation. Thedivergencebetweenethicalegoismandstandardmoraltheories appearsinotherways. First,theethicalegoistwillrankasmostimportantdutiesthat bringherthehighestpayoff.Standardmoraltheoriesdetermine importanceatleastinpartbyconsideringthepayofftothosehelped. Whatbringsthehighestpayofftomeisnotnecessarilywhatbringsthe highestpayofftothosehelped.Imight,forexample,profitmorefrom helpingthelocalOperasocietyrefurbishitshallthanIwouldfrom givingtofaminereliefinAfrica,butstandardmoraltheorieswould rankfaminereliefasmoreimportantthanOperahallimprovements. Second,thecooperationargumentcannotbeextendedtojustify extremelylargesacrifices,suchasthesoldierfallingonthegrenade, thatstandardmoraltheoriesrankeitherasmostimportantor supererogatory.Thecooperationargumentdependsonashort-termloss (suchaskeepingapromisethatitisinconvenienttokeep)being recompensedbyalong-termgain(suchasbeingtrustedinfuture promises).Wheretheimmediatelossisone’slife(orirreplaceable featuressuchasone’ssight),thereisnolong-termgain,andsono egoistargumentforthesacrifice. Anethicalegoistmightreplybytakingthecooperationargument further.PerhapsIcannotgetthebenefitsofcooperationwithout convertingtosomenon-egoistmoraltheory.Thatis,itisnotenough thatIactasifothershaveweight;Imustreallygivethemweight.I couldstillcountasanegoist,inthesensethatIhaveadoptedthe non-egoisttheoryonegoistgrounds. OneproblemisthatitseemsunlikelythatIcangetthebenefitsof cooperationonlybyconversion.ProvidedIactasifothershaveweight forlongenough,otherswilltakemeasgivingthemweight,andso cooperate,whetherIreallygivethemweightornot.Inmany situations,otherswillneitherhavetheabilitytoseemytrue motivationnorcareaboutit. Anotherproblemisthatconversioncanbecostly.Imightbe requiredbymynon-egoistmoralitytomakeasacrificeforwhichI cannotbecompensated(orpassupagainsolargethatpassingitup willnotbecompensatedfor).SinceIhaveconvertedfromegoism,Ican nolongerrejectmakingthesacrificeorpassingupthegainonthe groundthatitwillnotpay.Itissafer,andseeminglyfeasible,to remainanegoistwhilecooperatinginmostcases.Ifso,ethicalegoism andstandardmoralitieswilldivergeinsomecases.(Fordiscussionof thecooperationargument,seeFrank1988;Gauthier1986ch.6;Kavka 1984and1986PartII;Sidgwick1907II.V.) Thereisanotherwaytotrytoshowthatethicalegoismandstandard moraltheoriesdonotdiffermuch.Onemightholdoneparticular objectivetheoryofself-interest,accordingtowhichmywelfarelies inpossessingthevirtuesrequiredbystandardmoraltheories.This requiresanargumenttoshowthatthisparticularobjectivetheory givestherightaccountofself-interest.Italsofacesaworryforany objectivetheory:objectivetheoriesseemimplausibleasaccountsof welfare.If,say,allmypreferencesfavormyignoringtheplightof others,andthesepreferencesdonotrestonfalsebeliefsaboutissues suchasthelikelihoodofreceivinghelp,itseemsimplausible(and objectionablypaternalistic)toclaimthat“really”my welfareliesinhelpingothers.Imayhaveadutytohelpothers,and theworldmightbebetterifIhelpedothers,butitdoesnotfollow thatIambetteroffbyhelpingothers.(Foramoreoptimisticverdict onthisstrategy,notingitsrootsinSocrates,Plato,Aristotle,the Stoics,andtheBritishIdealists,seeBrink1997and2003.) Ofcoursethedivergencebetweenethicalegoismandstandardmoral theoriesneednotbotheranethicalegoist.Anethicalegoistsees egoismassuperiortoothermoraltheories.Whetheritissuperior dependsonthestrengthoftheargumentsforit.Twoargumentsare popular. First,onemightargueforamoraltheory,asonearguesfora scientifictheory,byshowingthatitbestfitstheevidence.Inthe caseofmoraltheories,theevidenceisusuallytakentobeourmost confidentcommon-sensemoraljudgments.Egoismfitsmanyofthese,such astherequirementsofcooperationinordinarycases.Itfitssome judgmentsbetterthanutilitarianismdoes.Forexample,itallowsone tokeepsomegood,suchasajob,foroneself,evenifgivingthegood tosomeoneelsewouldhelphimslightlymore,anditcapturesthe intuitionthatIneednotletothersexploitme.Theproblemisthat, asthediscussionofthecooperationargumentshows,italsofailsto fitsomeoftheconfidentmoraljudgmentswemake. Second,onemightargueforamoraltheorybyshowingthatitis dictatedbynon-moralconsiderations--inparticular,byfactsabout motivation.Itiscommonlyheldthatmoraljudgmentsmustbepractical, orcapableofmotivatingthosewhomakethem.Ifpsychologicalegoism weretrue,thiswouldrestrictmoraljudgmentstothosemadebyegoism. Othermoraljudgmentswouldbeexcludedsinceitwouldbeimpossibleto motivateanyonetofollowthem. Oneproblemwiththisargumentisthatpsychologicalegoismseems false.Replacingpsychologicalwithpredominantegoismlosesthekey claimthatitisimpossibletomotivateanyonetomakeanuncompensated sacrifice. Theethicalegoistmightreplythat,ifpredominantegoismistrue, ethicalegoismmayrequirelessdeviationfromourordinaryactions thananystandardmoraltheory.Butfitwithmotivationishardly decisive;anynormativetheory,includingethicalegoism,isintended toguideandcriticizeourchoices,ratherthansimplyendorsewhatever wedo.WhenImakeanimprudentchoice,thisdoesnotcountagainst ethicalegoism,andinfavorofatheoryrecommendingimprudence. Theargumenthasotherproblems.Onecoulddenythatmoralitymust bepracticalintherequiredsense.Perhapsmoralityneednotbe practicalatall:wedonotalwayswithdrawmoraljudgmentswhenwe learnthattheagentcouldnotbemotivatedtofollowthem.Orperhaps moraljudgmentsmustbecapableofmotivatingnotjustanyone,butonly idealizedversionsofourselves,freefrom(say)irrationality.Inthis case,itisinsufficienttodescribehowwearemotivated;whatis relevantisadescriptionofhowwewouldbemotivatedwerewe rational. Finally,ifIdonotbelievethatsomeactionisultimatelyinmy self-interest,itfollowsfrompsychologicalegoismthatIcannotaim todoit.ButsayIamwrong:theactionisinmyself-interest. EthicalegoismthensaysthatitisrightformetodosomethingI cannotaimtodo.Itviolatespracticalityjustasanyothermoral theorydoes. Sofaranumberofargumentsforethicalegoismhavebeen considered.Thereareanumberofstandardargumentsagainstit. G.E.Moorearguedthatethicalegoismisself-contradictory.IfIam anegoist,IholdthatIoughttomaximizemygood.Idenythat othersoughttomaximizemygood(theyshouldmaximizetheirown goods).Buttosaythatxis“mygood”isjust tosaythatmypossessingxisgood.(Icannotpossessthe goodness.)Ifmypossessionofxisgood,thenImusthold thatothersoughttomaximizemypossessionofit.Ibothdenyandam committedtoaffirmingthatothersoughttomaximizemygood. (SometimesMooresuggestsinsteadthat“mygood”be glossedas“xisgoodandxismine.” Thisdoesnotyieldthecontradictionabove,sinceitdoesnotclaim thatmypossessionofxisgood.Butityieldsadifferent contradiction:ifxisgood,everyoneoughttomaximizeit whereveritappears;egoistsholdthatIoughttomaximizex onlywhenitappearsinme.) Inreply,C.D.Broadrightlynotedthatthisdoesnotshowthat egoismisself-contradictory,sinceitisnotpartofegoismto holdthatwhatisgoodoughttobepursuedbyeveryone(Broad1942). Butthatreplydoesnotdefendegoismfromthechargeoffalsity.To doso,onemightunderstand“mygood”notascomposedfrom whatMoorecalls“goodabsolutely,”butasbeingasui generisconcept,good-for-me(Mackie1976,Smith2003),oras analyzedintermsofwhatI,frommypointofview,oughttodesire. Inneitherofthesecasesdoesitfollowfrom“mypossessionof xisgood-for-me”thatothersoughttomaximizewhatis good-for-me.Onemightevenarguethatclaimsabout“good absolutely”donotjustifyclaimsaboutwhatoneoughttodo, withoutinadditiontherebeingaspecialrelationbetweentheagent andtheproposedchange.Ifso,itdoesnotfollowsimplyfrommy possessionofxbeinggoodthatothersoughttodoanything (Prichard2002217). Moorealsosuggeststhatthereasonformetopursuemygoodisthe goodnessofthethingIobtain.IfwhatIobtainisgood,thenthere isreasonforeveryonetopursueit,notjustinme,butanywhere. Again,movingtogood-for-meavoidsthisconsequence.Butsomething closetothisargumentisplausible,especiallyforsomebadthings.One mightarguethatitisthewaymypainfeels—itsbadness—andnot anyconnectionbetweenmeandthepainthatgivesmereasonto alleviateit.Ifso,Ihavereasontoalleviatethepainofothers (Nagel1986,Rachels2002).(Thisargumentcanbedirectedagainst rationalegoismaswell.) Asecondargumentagainstethicalegoismwasmadeby H.A.Prichard.Hearguesthatself-interestisthewrongsortof reason.Idonot,forexample,thinkthereasonIhaveadutytohelp adrowningchildisthathelpingbenefitsme(Prichard20021,9,26, 29,30,122,123,171,188).Similarly,PrichardchastisesSidgwick fortakingseriouslytheviewthatthereis“aduty...to dothoseactswhichwethinkwillleadtoourhappiness” (Prichard2002135). Thisisconvincingwhen“duty”means“moral duty.”Itislessconvincingwhen,asPrichardalsothinks,the issueissimplywhatoneoughttodo.Hetakestheretobeonlyone senseof“ought,”whichhetreatsas“morally ought.”Anyother“ought”istreatedasreally makingthenon-normativeclaimthatacertainmeansisefficientfor attainingacertainend.Butethicalegoismcanbeseenasmaking categoricalought-claims.Andthehistoricalpopularityofethical egoism,whichPrichardsooftennotes,indicatesthatself-interestis notobviouslyirrelevanttowhatoneoughttodo(inanot specificallymoralsense). OnemightalsoobjecttoPrichard-styleargumentsthat(a)theyare question-begging,sinceegoistswillhardlyagreethatmyreasonfor helpingissomethingotherthanthebenefittome,and(b)given disagreementoverthisclaimaboutmyreason,theappropriateresponse istosuspendjudgmentaboutit.AlisonHills,in2010partsIIandIII(directedat rationalegoism),repliesto(a)thatmoralistscanassurethemselves bygivingargumentsthatstartfrompremiseslike“Ihavea reasontohelpregardlessofwhetherdoingsocontributestomy self-interest,”providedthispremissisnotinferredfromthe falsityofrationalegoism—perhapsitisself-evident.In replyto(b),shearguesthatdisagreementoverthepremissdoesnot requiremoraliststosuspendjudgmentaboutit,althoughdisagreement overanegoisticpremisslike“Ihavereasontohelponly becausedoingsobenefitsme”doesrequireegoiststosuspendjudgment.The differenceisthatrationalegoistsaimatknowledge,andforputative knowledge,incasesofdisagreementbetweenepistemicpeers, suspensionofbeliefisrequired.Moralistsaimprimarilynotat knowledgebutattheabilitytodraw,ontheirown,truemoral conclusionsfromtheevidence.Sinceaimingatthisability requiresnotgivingweighttotheconclusionsofothers, suspensionofbeliefincasesofdisagreementisnotrequiredof them. Obviously,muchheredependsontheclaimabouttheaimofmoralists. Onemightobjectthatmoralistscaremuchmoreaboutgettingtrue moralconclusionsthanaboutarrivingatthemontheirown.IfIcould guaranteethatIdotherightactbyrelyingonaMoralAnswers Machine(andnototherwise),Ioughttodoso.Inaddition,since moralistsdowanttruemoralconclusions,andpeerdisagreementis relevanttopursuingtruth,Hills’moralistsbothneedandcannot(by onemeans)pursuetruth. Athirdargument,likeMoore’s,claimsthatethicalegoismis inconsistentinvariousways.Sayethicalegoismrecommends thatAandBbothgotoacertainhockeygame,since goingtothegameisintheself-interestofeach.Unfortunately, onlyoneseatremains.Ethicalegoism,then,recommendsanimpossible stateofaffairs.OrsaythatIamAandanethicalegoist.I bothclaimthatBoughttogotothegame,sincethatisin herself-interest,andIdonotwantBtogotothegame, sinceB’sgoingtothegameisagainstmyself-interest. Againstthefirstinconsistencycharge,theethicalegoistcanreply thatethicalegoismprovidesnoneutralrankingofstatesofaffairs. ItrecommendstoAthatAgotothegame,and toBthatBgotothegame,butissilentonthe valueofAandBbothattendingthegame. Againstthesecondinconsistencycharge,theethicalegoistcanclaim thatshemorallyrecommendsthatBgotothegame,although shedesiresthatBnotgo.Thisisnomoreoddthanclaiming thatmyopponentinagamewouldbewisetoadoptaparticular strategy,whiledesiringthathenotdoso.True,theethicalegoist isunlikelytorecommendethicalegoismtoothers,toblameothersfor violationsofwhatethicalegoismrequires,tojustifyherselfto othersonthebasisofethicalegoism,ortoexpressmoralattitudes suchasforgivenessandresentment.Thesepublicityworriesmay disqualifyethicalegoismasamoraltheory,butdonotshow inconsistency. Afourthargumentagainstethicalegoismisjustthat:ethicalegoism doesnotcountasamoraltheory.Onemightsetvariousconstraintson atheory’sbeingamoraltheory.Manyoftheseconstraintsaremetby ethicalegoism—theformalconstraints,forexample,thatmoral claimsmustbeprescriptiveanduniversalizable.Ethicalegoism issuesprescriptions—“dowhatmaximizesyour self-interest”—anditissuesthesameprescriptionsfor peopleinrelevantlysimilarsituations.Butotherconstraintsare problematicforethicalegoism:perhapsamoraltheorymustsometimes requireuncompensatedsacrifices;orperhapsitmustsupplyasingle, neutralrankingofactionsthateachagentmustfollowincaseswhere interestsconflict;orperhapsitmustrespectprinciplessuchas “thatIoughttodoxisaconsiderationinfavorof othersnotpreventingmefromdoingx;”orperhapsit mustbeabletobemadepublicintheway,justnoted,thatethical egoismcannot.(Forsamplediscussionsofthesetwoobjections,see Baier1958189–191;Campbell1972;Frankena197318–20;Kalin 1970.) Theissueofwhatmakesforamoraltheoryiscontentious.Anethical egoistcouldchallengewhateverconstraintisdeployedagainst her.Butaneaterreplyistomovetorationalegoism,whichmakes claimsaboutwhatonehasreasontodo,ignoringthetopicofwhatis morallyright.Thisgetsatwhatethicalegoistsintend,while skirtingtheissueofconstraintsonmoraltheories.Afterall,fewif anyethicalegoiststhinkofegoismasgivingthecorrectcontentof morality,whilealsothinkingthatwhattheyhavemostreasontodois determinedbysomenon-egoistconsideration.Onecouldthen,ifone wished,argueforethicalegoismfromrationalegoismandthe plausibleclaimthatthebestmoraltheorymusttellmewhatIhave mostreasontodo. 3.RationalEgoism RationalegoismclaimsthatIoughttoperformsomeactionifandonlyif,andbecause,performingthatactionmaximizesmyself-interest.(Aswith ethicalegoism,therearevariantswhichdropmaximizationorevaluate rulesorcharactertraitsratherthanactions.Therearealsovariants whichmakethemaximizationofself-interestnecessarybutnot sufficient,orsufficientbutnotnecessary,foranactiontobetheactionIoughttoperform.Again,Iset theseissuesaside.)RationalegoismmakesclaimsaboutwhatIought,orhavereason,todo,withoutrestrictingthe“ought”or“reason”toamoral“ought”or“reason.” Likeethicalegoism,rationalegoismneedsargumentstosupportit. Onemightciteourmostconfidentjudgmentsaboutrationalactionand claimthatrationalegoismbestfitsthese.Theproblemisthatour mostconfidentjudgmentsaboutrationalactionseemtobecapturedbya different,extremelypopulartheory—theinstrumentaltheoryof rationality.Accordingtotheinstrumentaltheory,Ioughttoperformsomeactionifandonlyif,andbecause,performingthatactionmaximizesthe satisfactionofmypreferences.Sincepsychologicalegoismseems false,itmayberationalformetomakeanuncompensatedsacrificefor thesakeofothers,forthismaybewhat,onbalance,bestsatisfiesmy (strong,non-self-interested)preferences.Thisconflictwiththe instrumentaltheoryisamajorproblemforrationalegoism. Therationalegoistmightreplythattheinstrumentaltheoryis equallyaproblemforanystandardmoraltheorythatclaimstogivean accountofwhatoneoughtrationally,orallthingsconsidered,todo. If,forexample,autilitarianclaimsthatIhavemostreasontogive tocharity,sincethatmaximizesthegeneralhappiness,Icouldobject thatgivingtocharitycannotberationalgivenmyparticular preferences,whichareforthingsotherthanthegeneralhappiness. Adifferentproblemforrationalegoismisthatitappears arbitrary.SupposeIclaimthatIoughttomaximizethewelfareof blue-eyedpeople,butnotofotherpeople.UnlessIcanexplainwhy blue-eyedpeoplearetobepreferred,myclaimlooksarbitrary,inthe sensethatIhavegivennoreasonforthedifferenttreatments.Asa rationalegoist,IclaimthatIoughttomaximizethewelfareofone person(myself).UnlessIcanexplainwhyIshouldbepreferred,my claimlooksequallyarbitrary. Onereplyistoarguethatnon-arbitrarydistinctionscanbemadeby one’spreferences.SayIlikeanchoviesandhatebroccoli.Thismakes mydecisiontobuyanchoviesratherthanbroccolinon-arbitrary. Similarly,mypreferenceformyownwelfaremakesmyconcentrationon myownwelfarenon-arbitrary. Therearetwoproblemsforthisreply. First,wedonotalwaystakepreferencestoestablishnon-arbitrary distinctions.IfIdefendfavoringblue-eyedpeoplesimplybynoting thatIlikeblue-eyedpeople,withoutanyjustificationformyliking, thisseemsunsatisfactory.Therationalegoistmustarguethathersis acasewherepreferencesaredecisive. Second,ifpsychologicalegoismisfalse,Imightlackapreference formyownwelfare.Itwouldfollowthatforme,adistinctionbetween mywelfareandthatofotherswouldbearbitrary,andtherational egoistclaimthateachoughttomaximizehisownwelfarewouldbe unjustifiedwhenappliedtome.Theproposalthatpreferencesestablish non-arbitrarydistinctionssupportstheinstrumentaltheorybetterthan rationalegoism. Anotherreplytothearbitrarinessworryistoclaimthatcertain distinctionsjustarenon-arbitrary.Whichdistinctionstheseareis revealedbylookingatwhetherweaskforjustificationsofthe relevanceofthedistinction.Inthecaseofmymaximizingofthe welfareoftheblue-eyed,wedoaskforajustification;wedonottake “becausethey’reblue-eyed”asanadequatedefenseofa reasontogivetotheblue-eyed.Inthecaseofmymaximizingmyown welfare,however,“becauseitwillmakemebetteroff”may seemareasonablejustification;wedonotquicklyask“whydoes thatmatter?” Inamuch-quotedpassage,Sidgwickclaimedthatrationalegoismisnot arbitrary:“ItwouldbecontrarytoCommonSensetodenythat thedistinctionbetweenanyoneindividualandanyotherisrealand fundamental,andthatconsequently‘I’amconcernedwiththequality ofmyexistenceasanindividualinasense,fundamentallyimportant, inwhichIamnotconcernedwiththequalityoftheexistenceofother individuals:andthisbeingso,Idonotseehowitcanbeprovedthat thisdistinctionisnottobetakenasfundamentalindeterminingthe ultimateendofrationalactionforanindividual”(Sidgwick 1907,498).Thiscanbeinterpretedinvariousways(Shaver1999, 82–98;Phillips2011,ch.5). Onthemostnaturalinterpretation,Sidgwickisnotingvarious non-normativefacts.Ihaveadistincthistory,memories,andperhaps specialaccesstomymentalcontents.Butitisnotclearhowthese factssupportthenormativeconclusionSidgwickdraws.Utilitarians, forexample,agreeaboutthesefacts.(Someofthefactsmayalsonot givethesharpdistinctionSidgwickwants.Imayusuallyknowmore aboutmypainthanyours,butthisdifferenceseemsamatterof degree.) Sidgwickmightinsteadbeclaimingthatattacksonrationalegoism fromcertainviewsofpersonalidentity(asinParfit,discussed below)failbecausetheyrestonafalseviewofpersonalidentity. Butthiswouldonlydefendrationalegoismagainstoneattack.Since thereareotherattacks,itwouldnotfollowthatthedistinction betweenpeoplematters. Finally,Sidgwickmightbeclaimingthatmypointofview,likean impartialpointofview,isnon-arbitrary.Butthereareotherpoints ofview,suchasthatofmyspecies,familyorcountry.Sidgwick findsthemarbitrary.Itishardtoseewhymypointofview,andan impartialpointofview,arenon-arbitrary,whileanythinginbetween isarbitrary.Forexample,infavourofmypointofview,Sidgwick couldnotethatIamanindividualratherthanahive-member. ButIamamemberofvariousgroupsaswell.Andifmybeingan individualisimportant,thiscutsagainsttheimportanceoftakingup animpartialpointofviewjustasitcutsagainsttheimportanceof takingupthepointofviewofvariousgroups.Similarly,ifthe impartialpointofviewisdefendedasnon-arbitrarybecauseitmakes nodistinctions,boththepointofviewofvariousgroupsandmy individualpointofviewaresuspect. DebateoverrationalegoismwasrevitalizedbyParfit1984pts. II-III.Parfitgivestwomainargumentsagainstrationalegoism.Both focusontherationalegoist’sattitudetowardthefuture:therational egoistholdsthatthetimeatwhichsomegoodcomesisbyitself irrelevant,sothat,forexample,Ioughttosacrificeasmallpresent gainforalargerfuturegain. First,onecouldchallengerationalegoism,notonlywiththe instrumentaltheory,butalsowiththe“present-aim” theoryofrationality.Accordingtothepresent-aimtheory,Ihave mostreasontodowhatmaximizesthesatisfactionofmypresent desires.Evenifallofthesedesiresareself-regarding,the present-aimtheoryneednotcoincidewithrationalegoism.SupposeI knowthatinthefutureIwilldesireagoodpension,butIdonotnow desireagoodpensionformyselfinthefuture;Ihavedifferent self-regardingdesires.Supposealsothat,lookingbackfromtheend ofmylife,Iwillhavemaximizedmywelfarebycontributingnowto thepension.RationalegoismrequiresthatIcontributenow.The present-aimtheorydoesnot.Itclaimsthatmyreasonsarerelative notonlytowhohasadesire—meratherthansomeoneelse—but alsotowhenthedesireisheld—nowratherthaninthepastor future.Theobviousjustificationanegoistcouldofferfornot caringabouttime—thatoneshouldcareonlyabouttheamount ofgoodproduced—issuicidal,sincethatshouldleadonenotto careaboutwhoreceivesthegood.Onereasonthepresent-aimtheory isimportantisthatitshowsthereisacoherent,moreminimal alternativetorationalegoism.Therationalegoistcannotarguethat egoismisthemostminimaltheory,andthatstandardmoraltheories, byrequiringmoreofpeople,requirespecial,additional justification.(Foraverydifferentargumenttoshowagainthatan alternativetomoralityislessminimalthanexpected—directedmore attheinstrumentaltheorythanrationalegoism—seeKorsgaard 2005.) Second,rationalegoismmightbechallengedbysomeviewsofpersonal identity.Sayhalfofmybrainwillbetransplantedtoanother bodyA.Myoldbodywillbedestroyed.Awillhave mymemories,traits,andgoals.Itseemsreasonableformetocare speciallyaboutA,andindeedtosaythatAis identicaltome.NowsayhalfofmybrainwillgoinBand halfinC.AgainBandCwillhavemy memories,traits,andgoals.Itseemsreasonableformetocare speciallyaboutBandC.ButB andCcannotbeidenticaltome,sincetheyarenotidentical tooneanother(theygoontolivedifferentlives).Sothegroundof mycareisnotidentity,butratherthepsychologicalconnections throughmemories,etc.EveninthecaseofA,whatgrounds mycarearetheseconnections,notidentity:myrelationtoA isthesameasmyrelationtoB(orC),sowhat groundsmycareaboutAgroundsmycareaboutB (orC)—andthatcannotbeidentity.(Tomakethe pointinadifferentway—Iwouldnottakestepstoensurethat onlyoneofBandCcomeabout.)Ifso,Ineednot carespeciallyaboutsomeofmyfutureselves,sincetheywillnot havetheseconnectionstome.AndIdohavereasontocarespecially aboutotherpeoplewhobeartheseconnectionstomenow. Oneworryisthatpsychologicalcontinuitymightsubstitutefor identity.SayF1andF2are psychologicallyconnectedbecause(for example)F2hasamemory ofF1’sexperiences.Suppose thatF3hasamemoryofF2’s experiencesbutnomemory ofF1.F1 andF3arepsychologicallycontinuous, thoughnotpsychologicallyconnected.(Parfit’sviewisthat psychologicalconnectionandcontinuitybothgroundspecialcare,if specialcareisgroundedatall.)Inthecases above,A,BandCarecontinuouswithme. Anegoistmightclaimthatcontinuityalonemattersforspecialcare; thatfitsthecases.Ifso,Idohavereasontocarespeciallyabout allofthefutureselvesIamcontinuouswith,anddonothavethis reasontocarespeciallyaboutotherswithwhomIamnotcontinuous. (ForthisandotherworriesaboutParfit,seeBrink1992,Johnston1997,Hills2010 111–116.) Parfitcouldreplythatcontinuitymightnotsufficeforspecialcare. ItisnotclearthatF1hasreasontocare speciallyaboutF3—F3 mightseemastranger,perhapsevenanunlikeableone.Whenyoung, someworryaboutbecomingsomeonetheywouldnotnowlike.Theysee noreasonforspecialcareforthisfutureperson.Thisworrymakes sense,butifcontinuityweresufficientforspecialcare,itwould not.Ifso,perhapsbothcontinuityandconnection,orperhaps continuityandadmirability,areneeded.ThiswouldletParfitkeep theconclusionthatIneednotcarespeciallyforsomeofmyfuture selves,butwouldnotjustifytheconclusionthatIhavereasonto carespeciallyaboutotherpeoplewhoaremerelyconnectedtomenow (oraremerelyadmirable). Aworryisthatsomedocarespeciallyabout merelycontinuousfutureselves.Withopposedintuitionsaboutwhen specialcareisdue,thetacticofarguingfromintuitionsabout specialcaretothegroundsofthiscareisindecisive. Thereisanotherrecentargumentagainstrationalegoism(Rachelsand Alter2005,Tersman2008,andespeciallydeLazari-RadekandSinger 2014).(1)Believingthatrationalegoismistrueincreasesmy reproductivefitness,whetherornotrationalegoismistrue.(2) Thereforemybeliefthatrationalegoismistrue(or,better,that rationalegoismappearstometrueuponreflection)doesnothelpto justifyrationalegoism,sinceIwouldhavethatbeliefwhetherornot rationalegoismistrue.(3)Forsomeothernormativebeliefs(suchas beliefinutilitarianism),havingthebeliefdoesnotincrease reproductivefitness.(4)Thereforemybeliefthat(say) utilitarianismistruecanhelpjustifyutilitarianism.(Without(3) and(4),thereisnoargumentagainstrationalegoismin particular.) HereIputasidegeneralobjectionstoevolutionarydebunking arguments(see,forexample,Shafer-Landau2012). Oneworryisthatwhatbestincreasesreproductivefitnessisacting asakinaltruistratherthanasarationalegoist(Crisp2012,Other InternetResources).Presumably,then,itisbelievingthatIought toactasakinaltruist,ratherthanasarationalegoist,thatbest increasesmyreproductivefitness.(Ifthereisatiebetweenwhat increasesreproductivefitnessandbelief,andbelievingthatrational egoismistrueisbestforreproductivefitness,onewouldexpectmany tobelievethatrationalegoismistrue.Butveryfewdo,whilemany endorseBroad’s“self-referentialaltruism”(Broad 1971b).)DeLazari-RadekandSingerreplythattherecommendationsof rationalegoismareveryclosetothoseofkinaltruism,andmuch closertothoseofkinaltruismthanaretherecommendationsof utilitarianism(2014194).Butrationalegoismandkinaltruismdo makeopposedrecommendations.Forexample,kinaltruismmight recommendthatIsacrificemyselfformyfamily,whetherIcareabout themornot,whereasrationalegoismwouldrecommendsacrificeonlyif mywelfareweretobehigherwereItosacrificeanddieratherthan notsacrificeandlive.Itisalsohardtothinkofaplausible argumentwhichhaskinaltruismasapremissandrationalegoismas theconclusion,sodoubtsaboutkinaltruismdonotseemtoundercut argumentsforrationalegoism.Norisitclearhownotinga differenceintheclosenessofrecommendationsjustifiesconcluding thatrationalegoismisdebunkedandutilitarianismnotdebunked. AnotherworryisthatifmybeliefthatIhavereasontocareaboutmy ownwell-beingisunjustified,anargumentthatstartswiththat reasonasapremiss,andthenaddsthatthefocusonmyownwell-being isarbitraryandsoshouldbebroadenedtoincludeeveryone,is undercut.Onemightreply(withdeLazari-RadekandSinger2014191) thatthereareotherwaysofarrivingattheconclusionthatIhave reasontocareaboutthewell-beingofeveryone.Perhapssomething likeutilitarianismisjustifiedasself-evidentratherthaninferred fromsomeotherreasons.Theevolutionaryargumenttargets conclusionsthatcanbereachedonlybyappealtoabelief whosesupportcanbeundercutbynotingthatwewouldhavethebelief whetherornotitistrue.Itisthenopentotherationalegoistto saythatthereissomeotherwayofarrivingatrationalegoism. Perhapsthisisunpromising,sincetheobviouswaytojustifyrational egoism,asself-evident,istobeundercutby(1)and(2).However, (i)ifbelievingthatoneoughttoactasakinaltruistratherthan asarationalegoistiswhatbestincreasesreproductivefitness, rationalegoismis,likeutilitarianism,notundercutby(1)and (2).(ii)Acomponentofutilitarianism(andanyplausibletheory), thebeliefthatpainisbad,seemstobeabeliefthatbestincreases reproductivefitnesswhetherornotitistrue(seeKahane2011and 2014).Evenifnothingisgoodorbad,believingthatpainisbad mightincreasemymotivationtoavoidpainandsoleadmetosurvive longer. Afurtherworryisthatitisnotclearthathavingthebelief bestincreasesreproductivefitness.DeLazari-RadekandSinger argue,inreplytotheobjectionthattheirargumenttakesawaythe justificationforbelievingthatpainisbad,thatthereisno advantagetobelievingthatpainisbad;Iamsufficientlymotivated toavoidpainwithoutanysuchbelief(deLazari-RadekandSinger2014 268–269;forthegeneralpoint,seeParfit2011v.2 527–30).Thesameseemstogoforrationalegoism:Iam sufficientlymotivatedtoactegoisticallywithoutanybeliefinthe truthofrationalegoism. 4.Conclusion Prospectsforpsychologicalegoismaredim.Evenifsomeversion escapesrecentempiricalarguments,thereseemslittlereason,once thetraditionalphilosophicalconfusionshavebeennoted,forthinking itistrue.Atbestitisalogicalpossibility,likesomeformsof scepticism. Ethicalegoistsdobestbydefendingrationalegoisminstead. Rationalegoismfacesobjectionsfromarbitrariness,Nagel,Parfit, andevolutionarydebunking.Theseworriesarenotdecisive.Given this,andgiventhehistoricalpopularityofrationalegoism,one mightconcludethatitmustbetakenseriously.Butthereisatleast reasontodoubtthehistoricalrecord.Somephilosophersstressedthe connectionbetweenmoralactionandself-interestbecausetheywere concernedwithmotivation.Itdoesnotfollowthatself-interestis forthemanormativestandard.Andmanyphilosophersmayhave espousedrationalegoismwhilethinkingthatGodensuredthatacting morallymaximizedone’sself-interest.(Somewerekeentostressthat virtuemustpayinordertogiveGodarole.)Oncethisbelief isdropped,itisnotsoclearwhattheywouldhavesaid(Shaver1999 ch.4). Bibliography PsychologicalEgoism Batson,C.D.,1991,TheAltruismQuestion,Hillsdale, N.J.:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates,partIII. Batson,C.D.,2011,AltruisminHumans,Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,partII. 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May,J.,2011b,“Egoism,Empathy,andSelf-Other Merging,”SouthernJournalofPhilosophy(Spindel Supplement),49:25–39. Mercer,M.,2001,“InDefenseofWeakPsychological Egoism,”Erkenntnis,55:217–37. Rosas,A.,2002,“PsychologicalandEvolutionaryEvidence forAltruism,”BiologyandPhilosophy,17: 93–107. Schulz,A.,2011,“SoberandWilson’sEvolutionaryArguments forPsychologicalAltruism:AReassessment,”Biologyand Philosophy,26:251–60. Sidgwick,H.,1907,TheMethodsofEthics,Indianapolis: Hackett,seventhedition,1981,I.IV. Slote,M.A.,1964,“AnEmpiricalBasisforPsychological Egoism,”JournalofPhilosophy,61:530–537. Slote,M.A.,2013,“Egoismand Emotion,”Philosophia,41:313–35. Sober,E.,andD.S.Wilson,1998,UntoOthers, Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,ch.10. Stich,S.,J.M.Doris,E.Roedder,2010,“Altruism,” inTheMoralPsychologyHandbook,ed.Doris,NewYork: Oxford,147–205. EthicalEgoism Baier,K.,1958,TheMoralPointofView,Ithaca: Cornell. Brink,D.,1997,"Self-loveandAltruism,"SocialPhilosophy andPolicy,14:122–157. Brink,D.,2003,PerfectionismandtheCommonGood:Themesin thePhilosophyofT.H.Green,Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press. Broad,C.D.,1942,“CertainFeaturesofMoore’sEthical Doctrines,”inThePhilosophyofG.E.Moore, ed.P.Schilpp,NewYork:Tudor,41–67. Burgess-Jackson,K.,2013,“TakingEgoism Seriously,”EthicalTheoryandMoralPractice,16: 529–42. Campbell,R.,1972,“AShortRefutationofEthical Egoism,” CanadianJournalofPhilosophy,2:249–54. Frank,R.H.,1988,PassionsWithinReason,NewYork: Norton. Frankena,W.K.,1973,Ethics,EnglewoodCliffs: Prentice-Hall. Gauthier,D.,1986,MoralsByAgreement,Oxford: Clarendon. Hobbes,T.,1968,Leviathan,ed.C.B.Macpherson, Harmondsworth:Penguin,chs.14–15. Hurka,T.,2010,“UnderivativeDuty:PrichardonMoral Obligation,”SocialPhilosophyandPolicy,27(2): 111–134. Kalin,J.,1970,“InDefenseofEgoism,”in D.Gauthier, MoralityandRationalSelf-Interest,EnglewoodCliffs: Prentice-Hall. Kavka,G.,1984,“TheReconciliationProject,”in Morality,Reason,andTruth,ed.D.CoppandD.Zimmerman, Totowa:RowmanandAllanheld. Kavka,G.,1986,HobbesianMoralandPoliticalTheory, PartII,Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. Mackie,J.L.,1976,“Sidgwick’s Pessimism,”PhilosophicalQuarterly,26: 317–27. McConnell,T.C.1978,“TheArgumentfromPsychological EgoismtoEthicalEgoism,”AustralasianJournalof Philosophy,56:41–47. Moore,G.E.,1903,PrincipiaEthica,Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,sec.59. Nagel,T.,1986,TheViewFromNowhere,NewYork:Oxford UniversityPress,Ch.8. Prichard,H.A.,2002,MoralWritings,Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress. Rachels,S.,2002,“NagelianArgumentsagainst Egoism,”AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy,80: 191–208. Sidgwick,H.,1907,TheMethodsofEthics,Indianapolis: Hackett,seventhedition,1981,II.Vandconcludingchapter. Smith,M.,2003,“NeutralandRelativeValueafter Moore,”Ethics,113:576–98. RationalEgoism Brink,D.1992,“SidgwickandtheRationaleforRational Egoism,”inEssaysonHenrySidgwick,ed.B.Schultz, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Broad,C.D.,1971b,“SelfandOthers,”in Broad,Broad’sCriticalEssaysinMoralPhilosophy,London: GeorgeAllenandUnwin. Johnston,M,1997,“HumanConcernsWithoutSuperlative Selves,”inReadingParfit,ed.J.Dancy,Oxford: Blackwell,149–179. Kagan,S.,1986,“ThePresent-AimTheoryof Rationality,”Ethics,96:746–759. Hills,A.,2010,TheBelovedSelf,Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress. Kahane,G.,2011,“EvolutionaryDebunking Arguments,”Noûs,45:103–25. Kahane,G.,2014,“Evolutionand Impartiality,”Ethics,124:327–41. Korsgaard,C,2005,“TheMythofEgoism,”, inPracticalConflicts:NewPhilosophicalEssays, ed.P.BaumannandM.Betzler,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 59–91. Lazari-Radek,K.de,andSinger,P.,2014,ThePointofView oftheUniverse:SidgwickandContemporaryEthics,Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,chapter7. Parfit,D.,1984,ReasonsandPersons,Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress. Parfit,D.,1986,ReplytoKagan,Ethics,96: 843–846,868–869. Parfit,D.,2011,OnWhatMatters,Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress. Phillips,D.,2011,SidgwickianEthics,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Rachels,S.andAlter,T.,2005,“NothingMattersin Survival,”JournalofEthics,9:311–330. Shafer-Landau,R.,2012,“EvolutionaryDebunking,Moral Realism,andMoralKnowledge,”JournalofEthicsandSocial Philosophy,7.1.doi:10.26556/jesp.v7i1.68 Shaver,R.,1999,RationalEgoism,Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress. Shaver,R.,2011,“ReviewofHills,TheBeloved Self,”PhilosophicalQuarterly61:658–60. Sidgwick,H.,1907,TheMethodsofEthics,Indianapolis: Hackett,seventhedition,1981,II.I,IV.II,andconcludingchapter. Sterba,J.,2013,FromRationalitytoEquality,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,ch.3. Tersman,F.,2008,“TheReliabilityofMoralIntuitions:A ChallengefromNeuroscience,”AustralasianJournalof Philosophy86:389–405. AcademicTools Howtocitethisentry. PreviewthePDFversionofthisentryattheFriendsoftheSEPSociety. Lookuptopicsandthinkersrelatedtothisentry attheInternetPhilosophyOntologyProject(InPhO). EnhancedbibliographyforthisentryatPhilPapers,withlinkstoitsdatabase. OtherInternetResources Crisp,R.,2012, SummaryofaDiscussionatPEASoup: KatarzynadeLazari-RadekandPeterSinger,‘TheObjectivityofEthicsandtheUnityofPracticalReason’.” Papersonaltruismandpsychologicalegoism, atPhilPapers.org. RelatedEntries Aristotle,GeneralTopics:ethics| Hobbes,Thomas| Hume,David| Moore,GeorgeEdward:moralphilosophy| moralpsychology:empiricalapproaches| personalidentity:andethics| Plato:shorterethicalworks| Prichard,HaroldArthur| prisoner’sdilemma| Rand,Ayn| Sidgwick,Henry| Stoicism| well-being Copyright©2019by RobertShaver OpenaccesstotheSEPismadepossiblebyaworld-widefundinginitiative. 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