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The term “Positivism” not only defines a philosophical movement, but also, in the wider sense of the word deals with science and culture, in the same way and in ... Skiptomaincontent YouarehereHome Positivism Copyright©InterdisciplinaryEncyclopediaofReligionandScienceISSN:2037-2329andtheauthor.
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Torefertothecontentofthisarticle,quote:INTERS–InterdisciplinaryEncyclopediaofReligionandScience,editedbyG.Tanzella-Nitti,I.ColagéandA.Strumia,www.inters.orgDate: 2002DOI: 10.17421/2037-2329-2002-MM-1MicheleMarsonetI.TheBirthofPositivism-II.TheNeo-positivismoftheViennaCircle-III.AGeneralEvaluationofPositivismbetweenScientificThoughtandPhilosophicalReflection.I.TheBirthofPositivism Theterm“Positivism”notonlydefinesaphilosophicalmovement,butalso,inthewidersenseoftheworddealswithscienceandculture,inthesamewayandinmanysimilaraspectsasdoempiricismandpragmatism.Theterm“Positivism”wasfirstcoinedbySaintSimonandwaslaterpopularizedinthefirsthalfofthe19thCenturybytheFrenchsociologistandphilosopher,AugusteComte(1798-1857)whoisconsideredtobethefatherofthepositivistmovement.Comtealsoinventedtheword“sociology.”Inthesecondhalfofthe1800’sPositivismbegantospreadthroughouttherestofEuropeandtotheUnitedStates.IfweweretolookforexpressionsinthehistoryofphilosophywhichclearlyanticipatethespiritofPositivism,wehavetoturntothewordsofDavidHume:"Whenwerunoverlibraries,persuadedoftheseprinciples,whathavocmustwemake?Ifwetakeinourhandanyvolume,ofdivinityorschoolmetaphysics,forinstance;letusask,“Doesitcontainanyabstractreasoningconcerningquantityornumber?”No.“Doesitcontainanyexperimentalreasoningconcerningmatteroffactandexistence?”No.Commititthentotheflames.Foritcancontainnothingbutsophistryandillusion"(D.Hume,AnEnquiryConcerningHumanUnderstanding[Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2000],p.123). AdistinctivefeatureofPositivism,atleastasfarastheoriginalformulaputdownbyComtegoes,isthepropositionofdescribingthehistoryofhumanthoughtinevolution,inthreewell-definedstates.Whatinfactdoes“Positivism”mean?AccordingtotheFrenchthinker,startingfromthebeginningupuntilthe19thCentury,ourwayofthinkingisdividedintothreemajorphases:thefirstbeingthe“theological”phase,thesecondis“metaphysical”,andthethirdis“scientific,”orrather,tobemoreprecise,“positivist.”.Thefirst,thetheologicalphaseischaracterizedbyhesupremacyofmythology,seeingnatureasalivingbeing,manifestingdivineattributes.Thesecondphaseisdominatedbymetaphysics;herehumanbeingsclaimknowledgeconcerningnature,puttingforwardtheories(atthispoint,voidofanydivinecharacteristics)usingabstractthought.ComteheldthatalltheclassicalmetaphysicalsystemsofWesternphilosophyweretobefoundinthisphase;goingfromAntiquitywithPlatoandAristotle,thenthroughSt.AugustineandSt.ThomasAquinas,andfinallyreachingthemodernerawithSpinoza,Leibniz,KantandHegel.ThisiswhatComtehastosayonthematter:"Allofourspeculations,whatevertheymaybe,areinevitablysubject,eitherasfarastheindividualisconcernedorthespecies,topassingthroughthreedifferenttheoreticalstates:theological,metaphysicalandpositivist.Althoughinthefirstplaceitisindispensable,underalltheaspects,thefirststateistobeunderstoodfromnowonasbeingstrictlyprovisionalandpreparatory;thesecond,whichinreality,isnothingmorethanaslightmodificationofthefirst,carriesoutatransitionrole,graduallyleadingtothethird;thisonebeingtheonlyfullynormalone,toestablish,ineveryway,thedefinitiveregimeofhumanreason"(A.Comte,ADiscourseonthePositiveSpirit,1844). Comteheldthatinthe19thCentury,philosophy“hadto”becomepositivist.Inhisopinionitwasnotamatterofevaluatingthinkingofthepast,sinceithadtraveledalongquitea“natural”road,leadingitfromthemythicaltotheconceptualabstractprocess.Inbecomingpositivist,philosophyontheotherhandhadtorecognizethattheonlytrueknowledgeavailableisthatwhichcamefromthesciences,whichfromGalileoonwards,hadbeenliberatedfromphilosophicalcustody.Thisisaveryimportanttheorywhichwouldhavehugerepercussionsonthewayinwhichphilosophicalworkwastobeunderstoodinthe20thCentury.Inotherwordsitwasnecessaryforphilosopherstoletgooftheirclaimtoknow“privileged”objectsorambitsofrealitywhichshirkedfromscientificalenquiry.Thismeantthat“metaphysics”wouldhavetobeeliminated,sinceitrepresentedthemistakenandillusoryattempttoinvestigateandknowrealityusingnon-empiricalmethods.Comteannounced,inalmostmessianicterms,thatAristoteliantyperesearchofthemostuniversalprinciplesofbeingquabeing,wastobesubstitutedbythediscoveryofthegreatlawsofNature.Theparadigmaticexample,isthatofthelawofuniversalgravitationformulatedbyIsaacNewton.Suchlawsdescribeexperimentalfactsandpavethewayforotherfacts,thusconcreteandexperimentedrealityistheonlyreality,thatistosay,thatwhichcanbedescribedwithouthavingtoresorttoanyotherentityortranscendentprinciple. Itistobenoted,meanwhile,thatthisisadutywhichinvolvesthescientist,andnotthephilosopher.Ifthingsarereallythisway,thentheroleofphilosophyislesserandmuchmorelimitedthanthatwhichwasputforwardbymetaphysics.Thephilosopher’sdutyistopromotethe“scientificspirit”,whichhasenabledhumanitytoobtaindecisiveresultswhereourknowledgeoftheworldisconcerned,andto“dominateit”;thephilosophershouldlikewiseendeavortodiffusesuchaspiritinallthevariousfieldswhichithasnotyetreached.Yetwhichfieldsarewespeakingof,seeingastheworldofNatureisalreadysuccessfullyinvestigatedbyscience,whichdoesnotneed— oratleastintheory —theassistanceofphilosophysoastocarryoutitsenquiries?Obviouslywearedealingwiththesocialworld;aswehavealreadypreviouslypointedout,Comteistheinventorofatermwhichwasdestinedhaveanenormousimpact:“sociology.”However,itisnotsociologyinthewayinwhichthetermisunderstoodtoday,thatisthehistorical-socialsciencewhichstudiesvariousaspectsofsociety;herewearelookingatamuchvasterconcept;Comte’ssociologytakesonboardbothsocialorderaswellassocial“progress,”thelatterdependingonthespreadofthescientific-positivespirit.Atthepoliticallevel,theverysocialorderisconsideredaccordingtothespecificscientificcriteria.Thus,attheendofhislife,Comtemaintainedtheneedtobringaboutakindof“religionofhumanity”,ofwhichhehimselfwastheHigh-Priest.Theneedforrestrictingtheobjectofresearch— lateronlyscientific —tothe“positive”aspectsofreality,placestheComteandoctrineinclearcontrastwithanykindofreligiousvisionoflife.NeitherGodnorthe“firstcause”areinanywayabletobereached,andtherefore,thingsbeingthisway,wecannotusethesetypeofconceptsinordertoexplainfacts. Thefactofthematter,asithaspreviouslybeenpointedout,isthatComte’sscientificreligionhas,inamostremarkablewayinfluencedthevisionoftheworldandthenotionoflifeastheyhavebeencommonlyacceptedinindustrializedandsociallydevelopedcountriesoverthe19thand20thcenturies.Theinfluenceofpositivistmentalityisnotmerelyrestrictedtothefieldsofscienceandphilosophy,buthasalsoanimpactonotherdomains,forexampleinthatofliterature;oneonlyhastomentiontheworksofJulesVerneandArthurConanDoyletofindimmediateconfirmationofsuchanimpact.Theboundlessconfidenceplacedinscientificprogressautomaticallyspillsoverintotheprojectssetuptoreformsocietyandtoimprovethequalityofhumanlife,asforexample,theindustrialrevolutionthusviewedfromthepointofviewofitspositiveaspects. PositivismhoweverquicklyfoundamuchvaluedallywiththeevolutionismofCharlesDarwin(1809-1882),presentingbothdescriptiveandnormativecharacteristics.Itdescribedhowhumanthoughthadineffectdevelopedthroughoutthecourseoftime,andatthesametime,establishednormsonhowitshouldcontinuetoevolveinthefuture.Heretheconnectionismadeclearbetweentheideaof“unavoidableprogress”andanevolutionistictypeofethics.Thedutyofhumankindbeingthefosteringofanhistorical-naturalprocesstowhichitisimpossibletobeinopposition,sinceitisaninherentpartoftheveryorderofNature.Emphasizingtheinevitabilityofprogress,basedupon“immanent”historical-naturallaws,isalsopresentinMarxism;althoughithasbeenpointedoutthatthepositivistinfluenceisquiteclearlymoreapparentinthewritingsofFriedrichEngelsthaninthoseofKarlMarxhimself.Thepolemicwithregardtohistoricism,whichwasleadbyKarlPopperinthe20thCenturyisalsowell-known;historicismunderstoodasthetheoryaccordingtowhich historyhasagoal,thatisaplantobefulfilledfollowingsomecoherentmodelendowedwithanatureofinevitability. Inthesecondhalfofthe19thCenturythespreadofpositivismwassupportedbyDarwin’stheoryofevolution.TheBritishphilosopherHerbertSpencer(1820-1903)was,forexample,ofgreatinfluence:heheldthatthereexistsagenerallawofevolutionvalidforallfieldsofreality,whereasDarwinlimitedhisenunciationtothelawconcerningtheevolutionofthehumanspeciesupontheearth.However,stillwithinthesecondhalfofthe19thCenturycamethesummitofthepositivistmentality,withtheaffirmationofthe“mechanistictheory,”whichprovidedthepositivistswiththenecessarytoolssoastoofferacomprehensiveandunifiedsynthesisofallscientificknowledge.Theprojectthereforebegantotakeshape,thatis,theunderstandingthat,withinthemechanisticmodeloftheworld,eachnaturalfactwasincluded,alongwiththosewhichsciencewasdiscoveringatthatparticulartime. Atthispointitbecameobviousthat,inspiteofthetheoreticalenunciates,thepositivistswereputtingforwardanewmaterialisticandimmanentistictypeofmetaphysics.Themechanisticmodelisinfactanattempttotrytogettoknowtheultimateprinciplesofreality,justasinthesamewaytheAristotelianorHegelianmethodstriedtodo.Realityisconsideredasa“whole”,presentingclassicalcharacteristicsofmaterialisticmonism:thewholeofrealityismaterialandonlyscienceiscapableofinvestigatingit.Itwasthisconvinctiontodeterminethesubsequentcrisisofclassicalpositivism,whichcamelaterinthe19thCentury,andwhichwasduetocertain,obviousfacts.Inthefirstplace,thefactthatinsteadofeliminatingit,positivismadoptedanewformofmetaphysics,whichintimewouldalsobepronetocriticismandrefutation.Secondly,noteveryonewaswillingtoacceptsuchaclear-cut“monistic”approachtoreality.Inthethirdplace,thealmost“religious”attachmentshowedbythelaterComteseemedquiteabsurdforthosewhosupposedlyconsideredpositivismasaninstrumentwithwhichtofreehumanityfromtheinfluenceofreligion. Toallofthiscanbeaddedthefact,thatitwaspreciselytheprogressesmadeinscientificresearchwhichcreatedthebiggestproblems.InphysicstheNewtonianmodelofactionatadistancewasreplacedbythatofthefieldofforcesthroughelectricityandelectromagnetism.Inmathematicsthediscoveryofnon-EuclideangeometrycastdoubtupontheEuclidianconceptionofspace.Alsoinphilosophytherewasananti-positivistreactionduetosomerepresentativemembersofspiritualism,neo-idealismandneo-Kantism.AsfarasthepragmaticthinkerssuchasC.SPeirce(1839-1914)andW.James(1842-1910)wereconcerned,althoughbeingclosetopositivismincertainareas,theytoonotedthatscientificknowledge,beingintrinsicallyfallible,cannotbetransformedintoanewmetaphysics.19thCenturypositivismwastoinspireinthefollowingcenturyneo-positivismorlogicalempiricism,whichbroughtitsthesesuptodate,alongsidethemostrecentscientificdiscoveries. II.TheNeo-positivismoftheViennaCircle Intheearly1920’s,agroupofphilosophersandscientistscametogetherundertheguidanceofMoritzSchlick(1882-1936)inVienna,thusgivingrisetothefamous“Circle”,takingitsnamefromtheAustriancapital(DieWienerKreise).Amongthemainmembers,itisworthwhilementioningRudolphCarnap,OttoNeurath,HansHahn,FriedrichWaismannandKurtGödel;LudwigWittgensteinandKarlRaimundPopperwouldalsooccasionallyattendtheirmeetings,howevertheywerenotofficiallymembers.ThephilosophicalmovementwhichtheCirclegaverisetoisknowneitheras“logicalpositivism,”“logicalempiricism,”or“logicalneo-positivism,”thevariousappellationsbeingbasicallyanalogous.Itisalsointerestingtonotethat,similarcurrentsofthoughtcameaboutbothinGermanywiththeCircleofBerlin(HansReichenbachandCarlGustavHempel),andinPolandwiththeSchoolofLeopoli-Varsavia(StanislawLesniewski,JanLukasiewicz,TadeuszKotarbinski,KazimierzAjdukiewicz,AlfredTarski). 20thCenturyneo-positivismisamoreuptodate,sophisticatedversionofthatofthe19thCentury.Fromtheoldmovement,thenewmaintainedtheradicalempiricism,theattentiongiventothedevelopmentofthesciences(abovealltheformallogicandnaturalsciences),andtheclearaversiontometaphysics.Liketheclassicalpositivistsofthepreviouscentury,theneo-positivistsorlogicalempiricistsnolongerconsideredphilosophyasanattempttoelaboratecomprehensivevisionsoftheworld,butasameansorapossibilitytoclarifythemeaningofconceptsandlinguisticexpressions.Theaimwastoestablisha“scientific”philosophywhich,asfaraspossiblewouldrespectthecriteriaofrigorandexactitude.Itismainlythisaspectwhichdistinguishesnewpositivismfromthetraditionalkind.TherepresentativesoftheCircleofViennagaveanimportantandfundamentalroletoformallogicandtomathematics(whichexplainstheadditionoftheadjectivelogicaltopositivism).ItthenfollowedthatthelogicaltechniqueselaboratedinthefirstplacebyGottlobFregeandthenby BertrandRussellandAlfredNorthWhiteheadatthebeginningofthe20thCenturywiththehugeworkPrincipiaMathematica weretakenonboardandgreatlyacclaimed.Suchtechniquestriedtocreateartificialand“neutral”languagescapableofeliminatingtheunavoidableambiguitypresentinordinary,everydaylanguage.Allofthiscanbeinterpretedasaprogramofradicalre-foundationoftheknowledge,foundedupontheempiricalbases,whichwouldhavehadtoleadtoanelaborationofa“unifiedlanguage”forthewholeofscience,basedonthemodelofphysics. Withthisinmind,theneo-positivistsbroughtaboutanambitiouseditorialprojectwhichwasknownastheInternationalEncyclopediaofUnifiedScience,directedbyOttoNeurath(1882-1960),andareviewcalledtheJournalofUnifiedScience.Theywouldhaveprovidedallthatwasnecessaryfortheprojectofaunificationofthesciencesmadeonphysicalisticbases.AccordingtoNeurath,theEncyclopediawasanattempttodemonstratethepossibilityofsynthesizingthevariousscientificactivities,suchasobservation,experimentationandreasoning,soastofavortheprogressofscienceunderstoodinunitaryterms.Fortheneo-positivists,thevariousaspectsofepistemology,likeforexampletherelationshipbetweenawarenessandexperienceandthestructuringoftheories,werevalidforeverytypeofscientificdiscipline,betheynaturalorhistorical-social.TheprojecthoweverwasveryquicklyinterruptedandtheoneandonlyvolumeoftheEncyclopediawaspublishedinChicagoin1938.Thiswasduebothtothecrisisofneo-positivismwhichwerealreadyperceptibleinthe1930’sduetothecritiqueofPopperandofseveralothers,andtothedefectionofJohnDewey(1859-1952)theleaderofthepragmaticschool,whohadbeenpersuadedbyNeurathtocollaboratetotheprojectwithanarticleentitledTheUnityofScienceasaSocialProblem.Althoughhesharedwiththeneo-positiviststheirinterestinscientificmethodology,Deweycouldnotaccepttheirlogicalatomismandthestrictseparationoftheworldofscienceandtheworldofmoralswhichtheywereputtingforward. Aswiththeirforerunnersofthepreviouscentury,themembersoftheCircleofViennaretainedtheideathatsciencehadtotallyexhaustedknowledge,andthatthe“scientificspirit”shouldmoveoverintothephilosophicalambit.MoritzSchlickheldthat,thephilosopherwhoknewnothingbutphilosophywasincapableofcarryingouthisownwork:ifhewishedforhisdiscoursetobecoherent,heneededtobeanexpertinatleastonebranchofscience.Knowledgecomesfromscienceandmetaphysicalstatementsaremeaningless.ThistheorywasvividlyillustratedintheCircle’s“Manifesto”whereitstates:"IfsomeoneassertsthatthereisaGod,theprimarybasisoftheworldintheunconscious,thereisanentelechywhichistheleadingprincipleinthelivingorganism,wedonotsaytohim:whatyousayisfalse;butweaskhim:whatdoyoumeanbythesestatements?Thenitappearsthatthereisasharpboundarybetweentwokindsofstatements.Toonebelongstatementsastheyaremadebyempiricalscience;theirmeaningcanbedeterminedbylogicalanalysisor,morepreciselythroughreductiontothesimpleststatementsabouttheempiricallygiven.Theotherstatements,towhichbelongthosecitedabove,revealthemselvesasemptyofmeaningifonetakestheminthewaythatmetaphysiciansintend"(H.Hahn,O.Neurath,R.Carnap,WissenschaftlicheWeltauffassung,1929,partialEngl.Transl.inO.Neurath,EmpiricismandSociology [Dordrecht-Boston:Reidel,1973],pp.306-307). Thus,meaningpertainstotheempiricalpropositionsofscienceandoftheanalyticalpropositionsoflogicandmathematics.Thelatter,accordingtotheterminologyusedbyWittgensteininhisTractatuslogico-philosophicus,areamatteroftautology,assertionswhicharealwaystrueandthat,therefore,addnothing,assuch,toknowledge.Theonlyknowledgeavailabletousisthatoftheempiricalreality,and Kant’sapriorisyntheticpropositionsdonotexist.BymeansofhisTractatus,LudwigWittgensteinundoubtedlyhadahugeinfluenceonthemebersoftheCircleofVienna,butitmustalsobenotedthattheygaveasuperficialinterpretationofhisthoughtwithoutunderstandingthemostproblematicparts... Inthiswayphilosophyceasedtobeknowledgeinordertobecomeamereactivityorlinguisticclarification,andsincefortheneo-positiviststhewholeofknowledgehadbeenreducedtoempiricalscience,philosophersthemselvescoulddonothingotherthananalyzetheonlymeaningfuldiscourse,thatisthescientificone.Notonlywerethemetaphysicalpropositionsconsideredasbeingfalse,butalsomeaningless,sincetheyseektostudyaworldofentitiesofwhichnothingcanbesaid.Sothen,inharmonywiththefirstWittgenstein,whowroteintheTractatus:"Therightmethodofphilosophywouldbethis.Tosaynothingexceptwhatcanbesaid,i.e.thepropositionsofnaturalsciences,i.e.somethingthathasnothingtodowithphilosophy:andthenalways,whensomeoneelsewishedtosaysomethingmetaphysical,todemonstratetohimthathehadgivennomeaningtocertainsignsinhispropositions"(TractausLogico-Philosophicus,6.53). Neo-positivismbroughtaboutawholenewwayofdoingphilosophy.HoweveracarefulanalysiswouldshowthetthesophistsofancientGreece,certainmedievalnominalists,theBritishempiricistsandtheclassicalpositivistsofthe19thCentury,suchasComte,areactuallypartofitsancestry.Itwasduetoresultsobtainedfrommodernandcontemporaryscienceandfrommathematicallogic,thatthefollowersofneo-positivismwereabletoadoptanevenmoreradicalvision.Theaimbeingthereconstructionofphilosophy,takingawayanytracesofuselessmetaphysicalspeculations.Liketheir19thCenturyforerunners,theseconsideredthemselvesasbeingthehigh-priestsofthescientificspirit,andunlikeMaxWeber(1864-1920),theytookonboardatotallyoptimisticviewofscientificprogress.TheconclusionoftheirManifestoisanunconditionalexaltationofwesternscientificrationality:"Weseethatthespiritofthescientificconceptionoftheworldispermeatingintotheformsofpublicandprivateactivity,intoinstructionandmethodsofeducationandintoarchitectureinanever-increasingway,aswellasthecontributionitmakesinthepromotionofeconomicandsociallifeaccordingtorationalprinciples.Thescientificconceptionoftheworldisattheserviceoflifethatacknowledgesit"(H.Hahn,O.Neurath,R.Carnap,WissenschaftlicheWeltauffassung,1929) Thehingeonwhichthewholephilosophicalconceptionofneo-positivismhangsisthefamous“theoryofverification,”accordingtowhich,apropositionismeaningfulonlyifthetruthofitcanbeestablished,beitindirectorindirectmanner,usingempiricalexperimentation.However,itisworthnotingstraightawaythat,basedonthisassumption,theeliminationofmetaphysicsbecomesahopelessexploit.Howisitpossible,usingpurelyempiricalexperimentation,toverifythetruthoftheverypropositionwhichexpresstheprincipleofverification?Fromthemomentwhenitisunderstoodthatthisisnotpossible,itfollowsthatwehavetoadmitthatsuchapropositionfleesfromtheobservationcheck.Theneo-positivistshadtheintentionofeliminatingmetaphysicsusingaprinciplewhich,intheframeofthecanonstheyestablished,turnedouttobeametaphysicalone.Despitevariousattemptsof“liberalization”oftheprinciple,especiallyduetotheworkofRudolphCarnap,theydidnotsucceedinsolvingthebasicproblem.TheradicalprogramoftheCircle’smembersenteredintoacrisisandwastobereplacedbyKarlR.Popper’sfalsificationandpost-empiricalepistemology,whosemajorrepresentativeswereThomasKuhnandPaulFeyerabend. ThethesesofRudolphCarnap(1891-1970)deservespecialattention,duetotheinfluencetheyhadinthe20thCentury.Inanarticleinthe1930’s,Carnapspokeoftheeliminationofmetaphysicsusingthelogicalanalysisoflanguage.Heconsideredmetaphysicsasamassofpseudo-enunciateswhichdidnotabidebytherules,andheaffirmedthatusingtheinstrumentsprovidedbyformallogicwecouldstripmetaphysicsofitsdeceitfullanguage.InordertoreachhisgoalandsupporthispositionhetookquotationsofHegelandHeideggeroutofcontext.Thisiswhathesays:"Similartothetermspreviouslyconsidered,i.e.“principle”and“God,”alsomostoftheothermetaphysicaltermsaremeaningless,suchasforinstance,thetermstheIdea,theAbsolute,theUnconditioned,Infinity,thebeingoftheentity,thenon-entity,thething-in-itself,theabsolutespirit,theobjectivespirit,theessence,thein-itselfness,thethrough-itselfness,revelation,articulation,theSelf,thenon-Self,etc[...].Ametaphysicianwouldsaythathecannotprovideempiricalconditionsoftruthfulnessforthem.Whenheaddsthatbysuchandsuchawordhemeanssomething,weknowthat,inactualfact,heisonlyreferringtoassociationsbetweenideasandfeelings,bywhichthosewordsgainnomeaningwhatsoever.Theso-calledmetaphysicalsentences,thatcontainsuchmeaninglesswords,donotsayanythingatall:theyaremerelypseudo-propositions"(R.Carnap,"UberwindungderMetaphyiskdurchlogischeAnalysederSprache,"Erkenntis [1932],II,pp.219-241). Carnap’sinvestigationallowsustounderstandallthemorewhy,quiteafewthinkerswhoareunfamiliarwiththeanalyticaltradition(yetcertainlynotallofthem)indulgeinthemagicofwords.However,itseemsimportanttopointoutthefactthatobscurityorallusivenessarenotnecessarilysynonymouswithlackofmeaning,northatasaresultofthefactthatMartinHeideggeroftenusedobscurelanguageareweabletodeducethathispropositionsaremeaningless.Carnapandindeedneo-positivistsingeneralseemunawareofthefactthatthewordmetaphysicshasmanysemanticconnotations,besideswhichacarefulstudyofthehistoryofphilosophyshowsthatmanymetaphysicians,Aristotlebeinganoutstandingexample,wereextremelythoroughevenfromalogicalviewpoint. Thegreatrelevanceoftheroleplayedbylanguageinneo-positivistphilosophyisreflectedinthefundamentalcharacteristicsofthe“linguisticturn”whichwasstartedoffbyGottlobFrege(1854-1941);inthissenseneo-positivismcanalsobeconsidered,alongwithitsdistinguishingcharacteristics,asbeingapartofthevastanalyticaltradition.Withoutanydoubt,theViennaCircle’smembershadthemeritofturningtheattentionofmanyphilosopherstoarealproblem:inourownera,itisdifficulttodenythefactthatsciencehastrulyreplacedphilosophyinmanysectorsofknowledge.NorcanweignorethefactthatfollowingtheclassicalexamplesleftbyDescartes,LeibnizandKant,neo-positivistspointedthewaytorenewingthelinkbetweenscience,philosophyandmetaphysics,andnodoubtthatthestudyoftherelationshipamongthesedisciplinesbenefitedfromsomeoftheirscathinganalyses. Todaytheaspectofneo-positivistphilosophywhichseemsmoreup-to-datedistheprojectoftransformingphilosophersintolinguisticanalyzers;theywouldnothaveanecessarilyuselessroletoplay,butitwouldcertainlybeconsideredsecondaryorauxiliaryasfarasthatofscientistsisconcerned.Ifweweretoparaphrasethemedievalideaofphilosophybeingthehandmaidoftheology,wecouldsaythatphilosophymerelybeingunderstoodastheanalysisoflanguageitwouldsimplybecomethehandmaidofscience,havingnoautonomyandreadytoobeyeachandeverycommand.Facedwiththiskindofthinking,ErnstBloch(1885-1977)reacted,havingnotedthatphilosophyhadbeenrelegatedfromthepositionofscience’sforerunnertonowsimplyrunningbehind.However,itisworthwhilerememberingthatthescientiststhemselvesdonotseemtohavethesameperspective,atatimewhen,withintheboundariesofcontemporaryscience,questionsofadistinctlymetaphysical-philosophicalnaturearebeingraised. Infact,quiteanumberofscientiststodaycriticizephilosophersforneglectingthemetaphysicalquestionswhicharisewithintheirownsubjectareas. Itisinfact,inexaminingthepositionoftheBritishphilosopherAlfredJ.Ayer(1910-1989)thatthetransienceoftheneo-positivistvisioncanbeunderstoodevenmoreclearly.AyeristheauthorofthefamousvolumeLanguage,TruthandLogic,editedin1936andstillconsideredtheclearestintroductiontotheneo-positivisttheories.Uponreadingthealreadymentioned“Manifesto”oftheCircleofVienna,anunderlyingtheorycanbeclearlyseen,i.e.ifitisnotpossibletogiveverifiablepropositionstocertainexperiences,thentheyaremeaningless:thefateofsuchaconclusionnotonlyappliestometaphysicalenunciates,butalsotothoseintheareaofethicsandtheology. Ayerheldthataffirmationsofethicalvalueacquiredmeaninginasfarastheycouldbetranslatedintoempiricaloraffirmationsoffact.Hecontinued:"Ourcontentionissimplythat,inourlanguage,sentenceswhichcontainnormativeethicalsymbolsarenotequivalenttosentenceswhichexpresspsychologicalpropositions,orindeedempiricalpropositionsofanykind"(Language,TruthandLogic[London: CamelotPress,1953],p.105).Itfollowsthatfundamentalethicalconceptscannotbeanalysed,norisitpossibletogivereasonsforthat.Thereremainsonlyonepossibleconclusion:"Thereasonwhytheyareunanalysableisthattheyaremerepseudo-concepts.Thepresenceofanethicalsymbolinapropositionaddsnothingtoitsfactorialcontent[...].Wecanseenowwhyitisimpossibletofindacriterionfordeterminingthevalidityofethicaljudgments.Itisnotbecausetheyhaveanabsolutevaliditywhichismateriouslyindependentofordinarysense-experience,butbecausetheyhavenoobjectivevaliditywhatsoever.Ifasentencemakesnostatementatall,thereisobviouslynosenseinaskingwhetherwhatitsaysistrueorfalse"(ibidem, pp.107-108).Thesame,merelylinguistictypeofstrategyisusedagainsttheology:"Therecannotbeanytranscendenttruthsofreligion.Forthesentenceswhichthetheistusestoexpresssuchtruthsarenotliterallysignificant"(ibidem,pp.117-118).Inthelightofthis,wecaneasilyunderstandtheaccusationsof“philosophicalirrelevance”concerningthedoctrinesofneo-positivism,oftenputforwardbythemembersofotherschoolsofthought. III.GeneralEvaluationofPositivismbetweenScientificThoughtandPhilosophicalReflection Letusnowcontinuebydrawingupageneral,andasfaraspossibleschematic,evaluationofthemaintheoriesupheldbytheneo-positivistlogicians.Itisimportanttonotethatthepurelylinguisticconceptionofthetruth,ontheonehanditallowsustodetermineapreciseborderlinebetweenmathematical(andlogical)assertionsandtheassertionsoftheempiricalsciences,ontheotherhanditexplainsthesamelogical-mathematicalknowledgewithoutthehelpofthefirstprinciplesofmetaphysicsorabstractentitiessuchasconceptsandideas.Logicandmathematicshavingbeenputinasafeplaceaspurelyanalyticalknowledge,andmetaphysicstheoreticallyeliminatedasauselessdiscourse,allthatremained,wastofindasuitablecharacterizationforphilosophyassuch. Inactualfact,philosophywasreducedtothelogicalanalysisoflanguage.Themaindifferencebetweenphilosophy(understoodpreciselyaslinguisticanalysis)andrealscience(i.e.thevariousformsofempiricalsciencewithphysicsbeinginpoleposition,andthehistorical-socialsciencesunderstoodaccordingtototallyreductionisticnorms),consistsinthefactthatphilosophyisconcerneduniquelywithlanguageandmeaning,whereasfactualquestionsaretobeexclusivelydealtwithusingscientificcompetency.Allofthisisnotwithoutimportantconsequences;empiricalsciencetreatsallthequestionsoutsideofthelinguisticworldinanexclusiveway.Thefactthat,fromnowon,philosophyisdealingonlywiththedomainoflinguistics,meansthatthephilosopherhasnoareahigherthanthatofempiricalscienceinwhichhecanwork;ifhewantsto,thephilosophercandedicatehiswork,sotospeak,onlytolanguage,whichisthenusedbyscientiststocarryouttheirinvestigationsconcerningnon-linguisticreality.Theaimoftheanalysisismainlytheclarificationoflanguagesoastomakeitasclearandpreciseaspossible.Itisonlywhenactinginthiswaythat“pseudo-problems”(whichareinfactnearlyallofthosetakenintoconsiderationbytraditionalphilosophy)areabletobedistinguishedfromgenuineproblems.Itfollowsthatwhateverdifficultiestheneo-positivistsencounteredintryingtodefinethemethodoflogicalanalysis,itremainsclearthatthedifferencethatpassesbetweenphilosophyandscienceisthesameonewhichpassesbetween“language”ontheonehand,andthe“world”whichlanguageitselfdescribesontheother. Thesuperiorityoftherolewhichlanguageplayswithintheneo-positivistconceptionofphilosophyisinagreementwiththefundamentalcharacteristicsofthatmovementwhich,byFregelateron,isdefinedas“linguisticturn.”Suchaturnhadamajorinfluenceonalargepartof20thCenturythought,includingthephilosophicalcurrentsreferredtoashermeneutics.Theimportantproblemwhichthelogicalempiricistswereseekingtosolvewas:“Howcoulditbepossible,giventhegreatcognitiveachievementsmadebycontemporaryscience,tokeepholdoftheusefulnessandtherelevanceofaphilosophyunderstoodinanautonomousway?”Itisobvious,thatiftheneo-positivistpresumptionofthedeathofmetaphysicsisaccepted,thenitisnecessarytoprovidephilosophywithaproperareaofresearchandamethodologyindependentfromscientificpracticalknowledge. Whattherefore,isthereasonbehindthefact,thattheanalysisoflanguageissoimportanttothemodelofphilosophicalinvestigation,assetoutbytheneo-positivists?Theanswertosuchaquestioncanonlybegivenwhenavoidingthemostsuperficialinterpretationofneo-positivism;thatis,admittingthattheanalysisofscientificlanguagemadebythisschoolisquitesimilartoametaphysicaltypeofundertakingwhichaimstoestablishthe“limitsofmeaning”inaverypreciseway.ItisobviousthatwearedealingwithastrategywhoserootsarefoundinWittgenstein’sTractatus.Thatexplainsthefactthat,languageanalysists,movingalonginthispersuasivedirection,foundawaytoassumeanimportanttask. Eventhoughitisincorrect,historicallyspeaking,toclaimthatthelinguisticturnhassimply“replaced”Kant’stranscendentalpointofview,itdoeshoweverrepresentitsnaturalcontinuation.Letustakeforgranted,atleastforonemoment,theneo-positivistassumptionthatphilosophyhasbeenentirelysubstitutedinthecognitivefieldbythesciences(eithernaturalorhistorical-social).Inotherwords,thingsbeingthisway,wecanconcludethatwenolongerneedphilosophy.Philosophershavingbeenconvertedintolanguageanalysists,wouldassumetheirtasks,whichalthoughnotuseless,wouldallthesame,turnouttobe,secondaryandauxiliarycomparedtothetasksofscientists. Itisknownthat,inaffirmingthatscienceshouldtakeonasitsmainreferencepointstheperceptiveandconceptualcharacteristicsofourexperience,KanthadwantedtoprotectknowledgefromHumeanskepticism,withoutfallingintorationalistexcesses.Itwasnaturalthatinidentifyingthescientificdiscoursewiththeunderstandingofappearances,Kantianthoughtshouldendupinterestingitselfonaterrainwhich,takingseriouslyhistheories,couldcertainlynotbereducedtoappearancesalone.NorshoulditbeforgottenthatinrejectingtheKantianbridgeof“apriorisyntheticpropositions”,neo-positivismsetouttoblockanyopeningwhichcouldeventuallyleadtoareturntothefieldofmetaphysics;itisinthissensethattheneo-positivistreductionofanykindofknowledgetopurelyempiricalorlinguisticfactorswithoutanyremains,shouldbeproperlyevaluated.Inthiswayitisexplainedthedifferencebetweenphilosophyandscience:philosophyshoulddealwithnothingelseexceptforthesearchformeaning,whilstallthequestionsregardingthetrutharetobedealtwithexclusivelybyscience. Asfarasthephilosopherisconcerned,whatisexpectedofhim,isataskofclarificationandreconstructionofmaterialwhichhasalreadybeengiven;thephilosopher’sdutyisinmakingclearthemeaningofsentencesinscienceandreconstructingitslanguageinapreciseway.Thescientist,ontheotherhand,dealswithestablishingtruthconcerningpropositionswhichrefertotheworld,andelaboratestheorieswhicharesubjecttotheprocessofverification.However,baseduponthisidea,toreachtheconclusionthattheneo-positivistphilosophersareonlythe“water-bearers(servants)”ofscientists,wouldbeamisunderstanding.Ifthetaskbothofstudyingnatureandtheextensionofmeaningfuldiscourseisattributedtotheanalyticalphilosophers,itisobviousthat,everyone,includingscientists,willhavetofirstofall“eattheirhumblepie.”Thediscusssionaboutthemeaningfulnessofthediscourseincludesthescientificone,anditfollowsthatthephilosophicaldomainstretchesouteventothepointofestablishingtheparametersthatscientificresearchisboundtorespectifitwantstobeallowedtoenterintothepreviouslymentionedsignificantdiscourse.Scientificinquirytherefore,iseverythingbutindependentfromphilosophy,understoodastheanalysisoflanguage,insofarasitisthelatterwhichdeterminesthelimitationsbeyondwhichsciencecannotgo(sanction,reprimand,turningintononsense). Whatthenbecomesoflogical-linguisticanalysisfromnowonunderstoodintheseterms?Canitbeseriouslyheldthatitislimitedtothemereexaminationoftermsandpropositions?Ithastobeclear,basedonwhathasjustbeensaid,thattheanswertothesecondquestionhastobe“no”.Insteadofeliminatingmetaphysics,linguisticanalysisturnsitselfintoanother“firstphilosophy”,which,establishesthelimitsofmeaninganddeterminesthepossibilitiesofhumanknowledge.Afterhavingpointedoutallofthis,itbecomesevenmoredifficulttodenythefactofKant’sinfluenceontheneo-positivistsandtheanalyticalphilosophers.Althoughhisinfluenceisindirect,itisneverthelesseasilynoticeable.JustasKantwasopposedtotheextremesofrationalism,inthesameway,therepresentativesofthelinguisticturnreactedtotheextremesofidealism(itisinthiswaythatthecompletelynegativeandparadoxicalCarnap’sreadingofHegelianthoughtmustbeinterpreted).ParallelscanalsobefoundbetweenKant’sintentionoflimitingthedamagecausedbyHumeanskepticismandtheeffortmadebyneo-positivist/analyticalphilosophyinprotectingknowledgefromtheproblemscausedbythefundamentalcrisiswhichbetweenthe19thand20thCenturybesetthemainscientificdisciplines. Thatofcourseisnottheendoftheanalogies.ForKant,ourknowledgeofrealityisalways“indirect,”inthesensethatitcannotescapethosecategorieswhich,alonecanprovideformtohumanexperience,theresultbeingthetotalimpossibilityofanykindofabsoluteknowledgeofreality:knowledgemakessenseinsofarasitisrelativetotheconceptualapparatus.Neo-positivsimandanalyticalphilosophydoesnothingmorethantransferthisapparatus—which“filters”experience—movingitfromintellecttolanguage.Inbothcaseswefindourselvesfacedwithpre-conditionswhichcarryoutthenecessaryandfundamentalroleintheacquisitionofknowledge.AsKantaskedquestionsconcerningtheconditionswhichprecededthepossibilityofknowledge,inasimilarway,theneo-positivistsandanalyticalphilosophersaskedwhatwerethenecessaryconditionspreviouslyrequiredforthepossibilityofameaningfuldiscourse. Kant’sinfluenceisalsoquiteclearregardingthethesisthatholdsthatknowledgeofrealityisalways“relativetolanguageandtotheconceptualschemaswhichtheseinclude”.SuchaninfluenceemergesconsideringthefamouspassageinwhichOttoNeurathaffirmsthat,rightfromthestarthumanbeingshavesetoutonaconceptualshipfromwhichtheycannotdisembarkandwhichcanonlyberepairedduringthesailingontheopensea.Ifthingsarereallythisway,itisquiteobvioustoreachtheconclusionthatwecangettoknowtheextra-linguisticworld,ifweadmitthatsuchaworldexists,onlythankstotheconceptualapparatus.Suchtheorieswerelatertakenupagainbypost-positivistauthorssuchasW.Quine(1908-2000). Accordingtotheneo-positivists,scientificknowledgeisuniversalanda-temporal.Themethodologicalrulesofscienceareofsuchkindasifthey“wouldtakeflesh”invariousepochsandculturalcontexts,withoutundergoingsignificantchanges.Itshouldbequiteclearthatthismodeloffersanessentialistexplanationofthechangesinscientifictheories.Theessentialismcomesfromthefactofseekingtoeliminatethetemporalfactorofscience,thusgivingtheexplanationofthechangessufferedbytheoriesinpurelysynchronicterms.However,onthebasisoftheneo-positivistvisiontheystillremainunjustifiedassumptions.Forexample,noonehaseversucceededindemonstratingthefactthatthepresenceofmeaningcoincideswiththeempiricalverification,norprovingindubitablethesupremacyofthe“logical-linguistic”dimensionoverthe“practical”one(thatis,whatthescientistsdo).Itistakenforgrantedthattheobjectivetruthbereallyavailableandcanbecommunicatedviathecreationofaprescribedartificial(logic)language.Doubtwascastuponeachoneoftheseassumptionsbythatwhichiscommonlydefinedtodayasthe“newphilosophyofscience.” Carnapandtheotherneo-positivistrepresentativesshowedverylittleinterestconcerningtheproblematicofscientificchanges,andthisishardlysurprisingifwetakeintoconsiderationtheexclusivelylogical-linguisticlayoutoftheirworks.AcertaininterestregardingtheproblemofchangesinscientifictheoriescanbefoundinthewritingsofH.Reichenbach(1891-1953),neo-empiricistfromBerlinwhomovedtotheUnitedStatesduringthe1930’s.However,itwaswiththethinkingofKarlR.Popperthatsuchaproblembecamereallycrucial.Inthepopperianmodel,scienceceasestobecomeastaticsystem,andbecomesadynamicundertakingcapableofmodifyingitselfincessantly.Inotherwords,thescientificrevolutionsarealwaysdestinedtofolloweachother,asituationthatmaybedescribedbyusingthesametitleofPopper’sautobiography,an“unendedquest." Betweentheendofthe1950’sandthebeginningofthe1960’sthetheoriesofcertainauthors,whohadfollowedthesamedirectionasPopperwiththeintentionofbreakingdowntheschemasetupbytheneo-positivists,andconsideredbytheformerasunrealisticandunfaithfultothewaysofscience,begantomakeacertainbreakthroughintheambitofepistemology.AmongthemostimportantofthemwereThomasS.Kuhn,ImreLakatosandPaulK.Feyerabend.Theproblemofchangesinscienceisapredominantfeatureoftheirwritings,anditisalsoduetothemthatthehistorical-temporaldimensionofsciencewasunderlined.Theseauthorsdifferentiatethemselvesfromtheneo-positivistwritersforvariousreasons.Inthefirstplace,indevelopingthePopperianlessonwhichholdsthatobservationisalwaystheory-laden,theydenytheexistenceofaradicalantithesisbetweenthetheoreticalandobserveddimensions.Theyalsorejecttheconceptionthata“cumulativeknowledge”doesremainwhenonemovesfromascientifictheorytoanother,asthecontentsofatheoryarenotentirelypreservedwhenthetheoryinquestionisreplacedbyanother.Itiseasytounderstandthatinthisway,duringaprocessoftheoreticalchange,theinvarianceofmeaningoftheenunciatesoftheobservedphenomenashallbedenied.Thescientificchangesacquireanessentiallytemporalcharacteranditisgreatlyinfluencedbythechangeswhichoccurinanhistorical-socialcontext.Itfollows,then,thatinsistingonthepurelylogicalaspectsofthejustificationofscientificstatements,leadtoneglectingthe“dynamic”aspectofscience—asforexamplehadhappenedintheneo-positivistambit—andthevastercontext(practical,historicalandsocial)inwhichitcomesaboutanddevelops.Readalso: EpistemologyEncyclopedismExperienceMaterialismRealismTruthDocumentsoftheCatholicChurchrelatedtothesubject: Abbreviationsandcompletetitlesofthedocuments DH4511-4512;DH4810;Fidesetratio,88;BenedictXVI,AddresstotheBundestag,Berlin,22.09.2011.Bibliography: Someworksofpositivistsandneopositivists:A.J.AYER,Language,TruthandLogic(London:CamelotPress,1953);R.CARNAP,LogicalSintaxofLanguage(London:Rotledge,2000);R.CARNAP,Meaningandnecessity.Astudyinsemanticsandmodallogic(Chicago:Univ.ofChicagoPress,1964);R.CARNAP,Thelogicalstructureoftheworld.Pseudoproblemsinphilosophy(Berkeley:Univ.ofCaliforniaPress,1969);R.CARNAP,C.MORRIS,O.NEURATH(eds.),Foundationsoftheunityofscience.TowardanInternationalencyclopediaofunifiedscience,2vols.(Chicago:Univ.ofChicagoPress,1970-1971);A.COMTE,ThePositivePhilosophy(NewYork:AMSPress,1974);A.COMTE,ADiscourseonthePositiveSpirit(London:Reeves,1903);H.HAHN,O.NEURATH,R.CARNAP,“WissenschaftlicheWeltauffassung.DerWienerKreis,”VeroeffentlichungendesVereinesErnstMach,A.Wolf(Wien:1929);C.G.HEMPEL,PhilosophyofNaturalScience(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall,1966);C.G.HEMPEL,AspectsofScientificExplanationandotherEssaysinthePhilosophyofScience(NewYork:FreePress,1970);O.NEURATH,EmpiricismandSociology(Dordrecht:Reidel,1973);O.NEURATH,PhilosophicalPapers,1913-1946(Boston–Dordrecht:Reidel,1983);H.Reichenbach,Theriseofscientificphilosophy(Berkeley:Univ.ofCaliforniaPress,1957);H.REICHENBACH,Thetheoryofrelativityandaprioriknowledge(Berkeley:Univ.ofCaliforniaPress,1965);H.REICHENBACH,FromCopernicustoEinstein(NewYork:Dover,1980);H.REICHENBACH,Modernphilosophyofscience.Selectedessays(Westport(CT:GreenwoodPress,1981);H.SPENCER,Firstprinciples(London:Routledge,1996);R.VONMISES,Positivism.AStudyinHumanUnderstanding(NewYork:Dover,1968);L.WITTGENSTEIN,TractatusLogico-Philosophicus,int.byB.Russell,KeganPaul(London:1922). Onlogicalpositivismandneopositism:D.ANTISERI,Filosofiaanaliticaesemanticadellinguaggioreligioso(Brescia:Queriniana,19743);F.BARONE,Ilneopositivismologico(Roma-Bari:Laterza,1977);G.BERGMANN,TheMetaphysicsofLogicalPositivism(NewYork-London:Longmans,Green&Co.,1954);J.A.COFFA,TheSemanticTraditionfromKanttoCarnap.TotheViennaStation(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993);A.JANIK,S.TOULMIN,Wittgenstein’sViennarevisited(NewBrunswick–London:TransactionPublishers,2001);L.KOLAKOWSKI,Positivistphilosophy.FromHumetotheViennaCircle(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1972);G.LENZER(ed.),AugusteComteandPositivism.TheEssentialWritings(NewBrunswick,NJ:TransactionPublishers,1998);M.MARSONET,Lametafisicanegata(Milano:Angeli,1990);M.Marsonet,Scienzaeanalisilinguistica(Milano:Angeli,1994);M.MARSONET,Introduzioneallafilosofiascientificadel’900(Roma:Studium,1994);C.J.MISAK,Verificationism.ItsHistoryandProspects(London-NewYork:Routledge,1995);D.OLDROYD,Thearchofknowledge.Anintroductorystudyofthehistoryofthephilosophyandmethodologyofscience(Kensington:Univ.ofNewSouthWalesPress,1989);P.PARRINI,Unafilosofiasenzadogmi.Materialiperunbilanciodell’empirismocontemporaneo(Bologna:IlMulino,1980);J.O.URMSON,Philosophicalanalysis.Itsdevelopmentbetweenthetwoworldwars(London:OxfordUniv.Press,1967);J.R.WEINBERG,AnExaminationofLogicalPositivism(London:Routledge,2000). 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