The China Lobby | Encyclopedia.com

"China lobby" is a pejorative phrase first applied in the 1940s to a disparate collection of Chinese and Americans who tried to influence the people and ... SkiptomaincontentSocialsciencesEncyclopediasalmanacstranscriptsandmapsTheChinaLobbyTheChinaLobbygaleviewsupdatedTheChinaLobbyWarrenI.Cohen"Chinalobby"isapejorativephrasefirstappliedinthe1940stoadisparatecollectionofChineseandAmericanswhotriedtoinfluencethepeopleandgovernmentoftheUnitedStatesonbehalfoftheNationalistregimeofChiangKai-shek(JiangJie-shī;)andinoppositiontotheChinesecommunists.OpponentsofaidtotheNationalistscommonlyusedthetermtoimplythatChiang'sAmericansupporterswerepaidandthattheiractivitieswerecoordinatedbyChiangandotherofficialsofhisgovernmentormembersofhisfamily.AsecondusageimpliedtheexistenceofanorganizationofChineseNationalistofficialsandAmericanrightistsjoinedtostimulateanticommunismintheUnitedStates.AmericansmostcommonlyassociatedwiththeChinalobbywerethenotedpublisherHenryR.Luce;AlfredKohlberg,aretiredNewYorkimporter;FrederickC.McKee,awealthyPittsburghmanufacturerandphilanthropist;RepublicanRepresentativeWalterH.JuddofMinnesota;andtheRepublicansenatorsWilliamF.KnowlandofCaliforniaandJosephR.McCarthyofWisconsin.ThelobbywaspresumedtohavetremendousinfluenceinAmericanpoliticsbycontemporaries.IthasbeencreditedwithforcingareluctantTrumanadministrationtocontinueaidtoChiangduringtheChinesecivilwar,preventingrecognitionofthePeople'sRepublicofChinaandbarringitfromtheUnitedNations,andblockingthedistributionofabookexposingtheoperationsoftheChinalobby.AlthoughtheChineseNationalistregimeemployedAmericanlobbyistsandpublicrelationsoperativesandhadthesupportoftheAmericanrightinthestruggleagainstcommunisminChina,supportforChiang'sChinacannotbewrittenoffaseitherhiredorrightwing.IntheUnitedStatespopularsupportforChiang—or,moreprecisely,oppositiontocommunistcontrolofChina—wasbroadlybased,includingliberalsandconservatives,DemocratsandRepublicans,andsoutherners,northerners,easterners,andwesterners.PopularantipathytowardtheChinesecommunistsderivedfromawidespreadandprofounddistasteforcommunismandfromtraditionalsympathiesfortheheathenChinese.ButitwastheKoreanWar—especiallytheinterventionofthePeople'sRepublicofChinainthewar—thatbroughtabouttheresultsforwhichChiang'ssupportersworkedinthelate1940sandearly1950s.WithouttheKoreanWar,thelimitedpublicinterestinAsianaffairsandtherealityofthecommunistvictoryinChinamightwellhaveledtoanearlyaccommodationbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheregimeofMaoTse-tung(MaoZedong),despitetheeffortsofthefriendsofNationalistChina.LOBBYINGEFFORTSFROMTHE1920STHROUGHWORLDWARIIPressuregroupactivityonbehalfoftheNationalistregimedatesbacktotheNationalistrevolution(1925–1928),whenChiangKai-shekwasstrugglingtouniteChinawithSovietandChinesecommunistassistance.FearinginterventionbytheUnitedStatesandothergovernments,agroupofAmericanmissionariesandeducators,ledbyindividualslikeA.L.Warnshuis,secretaryoftheInternationalMissionaryCouncil;J.LeightonStuart,presidentofYenchingUniversity(Beijing);andRogerS.GreeneoftheChinaMedicalBoardoftheRockefellerFoundation,workedtoalertpolicymakers,membersofCongress,andthepublictotheneedforanaccommodationwithChinesenationalism.LinksbetweenChiang'sgovernmentandAmericanmissionariesandreformerscontinuedintothe1930sasMadameChiangKai-shekandotherAmerican-educatedChineseleaderssporadicallyattemptedtogainAmericanassistanceinthemodernizationofChina.Majorlobbyingactivitiesdidnotbegin,however,untilaftertheoutbreakoftheSecondSino-JapaneseWarin1937.OfthevariousgroupsthatwereorganizedtoinfluenceU.S.policyonbehalfofChinabetween1937and1941themostimportantwastheAmericanCommitteeforNon-ParticipationinJapaneseAggression,alsoknownasthePriceCommittee.In1938,appalledbytheinactionoftheU.S.governmentinthefaceofJapaneseaggressioninChina,FrankandHarryPrice,sonsofthefamousmissionaryP.FrankPrice,calledtogetherasmallgroupofmen,includinganAmericanemployedasapropagandistfortheChinesegovernment.TocampaignagainsttheflowofAmericansuppliestoJapan,theycreatedanorganizationthatsoonreceivedfinancialsupportfromtheChinesegovernment.ThereisnoevidencethattheformationofthecommitteewasinspiredbyChineseauthorities,butgiventherelationsbetweenthetwo,especiallyduringtheearlystages,thispossibilitycannotbeignored.Furthermore,theChinesegovernmentconsidereditselfentitledtoreports.DespitetheinitialroleoftheChinese,thePriceCommitteesubsequentlyattemptedtorestrictcontributorstoAmericansandtoseverpotentiallyembarrassingtiestoChineseofficials.OnememberwhowasemployedbytheChinesegovernmentandrequiredtoregisterastheagentofaforeignprincipalresignedfromthecommittee.RogerGreeneandHenryL.Stimsonservedrespectivelyaschairmanandhonorarychairman;HarryPrice,asexecutivesecretary;andWalterJudd,aformermedicalmissionary,provedtobeitsmosteffectivespeaker.FrederickMcKeeandGeraldineFitch,wifeofthewell-knownmissionaryGeorgeA.Fitch,werealsoimportantmembersoftheorganization.ThecentralprogramofthePriceCommitteecalledforanembargoonsuppliesofmilitaryvaluetoJapan.Beginningin1939,itworkedcloselywithkeyfiguresintheU.S.government,especiallywithStanleyK.HornbeckoftheDepartmentofStateandwithStimson,whobecamesecretaryofwarin1940.Individualmembers,likeGreeneandMcKee,werealsoactiveandinfluentialinthemostimportantofthepressuregroupsespousingcollectivesecurity.TheactivitiesofthesefriendsofChinamayhavebeenresponsibleforPresidentFranklinD.Roosevelt'sdecisioninJuly1939tonotifyJapanoftheintentionoftheUnitedStatestoterminatethecommercialtreatybetweenthetwonations,thusfacilitatingeconomicsanctions.WithaccesstoRooseveltandothertopadministrationofficials,GreeneandPricemayhaveshapedanumberofimportantgovernmentactions,suchascreditstoChinaforthepurchaseoftrucksandtheNationalDefenseActof1940,whichgaveRooseveltauthoritytocontrolexports.Similarly,theselobbyistsonbehalfofChinautilizingthemostsophisticatedpublicrelationsmethodsthenavailable—massmailings,pressreleases,speakertours,petitiondrives—mobilizedopinionleadersinthecolleges,churchesandcivicorganizationsacrossthecountrybehindadministrationeffortstohelpChina.Indeed,theygeneratedpressuresdesignedtopushRooseveltfasterthanhewantedtomove.Intheautumnof1941,theirwarningagainstaFarEasternMunichmadeamodusvivendiwithJapanextremelydifficult.AftertheUnitedStatesenteredWorldWarII,manygroupsemergedtoraisemoneyforChina,enlistingmenandwomenwhohadparticipatedinthePriceCommittee'sefforts.MostofthesegroupswerebroughttogetherunderUnitedChinaRelief,akindofholdingcompanythatattemptedtocoordinateprivateaidtoChina.TypicalofthenewgroupsthatwereorganizedduringthewarwastheAmericanBureauforMedicalAidtoChina(ABMAC),withwhichGreenewasinvolvedandinwhichKohlbergplayedamajorrole.AlloftheseorganizationsremindedtheAmericanpeopleofthelongsufferingoftheirChineseallies,filledthecountrywithstoriesofChineseresistanceandheroism,and,tosimplifytheirstory,personifiedChinainthefiguresofGeneralissimoandMadameChiangKai-shek.FromtheWeeklyReadertothenewsreelsandthepublicprints,theseglamorousfiguresappearedasthespiritofFreeChina,withgreatlyexaggeratedreferencestotheirdedicationtodemocracyandtotheFourFreedomsthatRoosevelthadofferedassymbolsoftheidealsforwhichAmericansfought.From1937on,asAmericanswhobelievedChinatobeworthyofAmericansupportexercisedtheirrighttoattempttoinfluencethepoliciesoftheirgovernment,variousChineseofficialsworkedtowardthesameend.TheChineseambassador,HuShih,madestrenuouseffortstoobtainaidforhiscountry;andhewassupportedbyahostofotherofficials,mostprominentamongthemMadameChiang'sbrother,T.V.Soong.MadameChiangwasherselfprobablythemosteffectivepropagandistforhercountry:anattractive,American-educatedChristianwhomademarvelouscopyforthemassmedia.LinYu-tang,awell-knownpopularizerofChineseculture,alsospentthewaryearsintheUnitedStatesonadiplomaticpassport,advertisingthevirtuesofChiang'sregimetotheAmericanpeople.TheseandsimilarChineseactivitiesweresometimesirritatingtoU.S.officialswhoresentedpressurestodomoreforChina,buttheChinesewerenotknowntobeviolatinganylawsandwereengagedinpracticeswhoselegitimacywassanctionedbycustomintheUnitedStates.ChineseofficialsandAmericanfriendsofChinanaturallycametogetherfrequentlytodiscussChina'sneedsandstrategyforvariouscampaigns.Again,therewasnothingimproperaboutthissortofcooperation.MostoftheAmericanparticipantswerenotactingasagentsfortheChinesegovernmentandthosewhoweredidsoopenlyandlegally.TheysharedaconcernforChina,andtheircountrieswerealliesinwar,sharinganinterestintheefforttodefeatJapan.ProblemsdevelopedonlyasquestionsaroseastowhetherChineseandAmericaninterestsremainedcongruous,andwhetherChiang'sregimerepresentedthebestinterestsoftheChinesepeople.In1943thecohesivenessthatJapaneseaggressionhadproducedamongAmericansinterestedinChinabegantowearaway.TheinitialfrictionbetweentheChineseandU.S.governmentshadcomeaboutbecauseofthelimitedChineseshareoflend-leasematerial,andAmericanfriendsofChinagenerallysharedChinesedissatisfaction.Butin1943thefocuswasshiftingtotheChinesewareffortandtotensionsbetweenChiang'sregimeandtheChineseCommunists—tensionsthatthreatenedtoeruptintocivilwarandalreadypreventedChineseforcesfromdevotingtheirfullattentiontotheJapaneseinvader.MoreandmorecriticismofChiangwasheardinU.S.governmentcirclesandleakedtothepress.AfewknowledgeableAmericansbegantoargueinfavorofsendingaidtotheChinesecommunists,whoseemedmorewillingtofightagainstJapanandmorecommittedtodemocraticprinciplesthanwereChiang'sNationalists.AmongChina'sAmericanfriendsagrowingnumberdespairedofChiang'srepressivetendencies,broodedovercorruptioninhisregimeand,althoughapprehensiveoftheChinesecommunists,wonderediftheU.S.governmentmightfindanalternativetoitstotalsupportofChiang.OnatriptoChinain1943,KohlbergwastroubledbycriticismsheheardofChiang'sregime—criticismsthatdidnotappeartohimtobejustified.Increasinglyhebroodedaboutthesourceofthesecharges.IncreasinglytheChinesegovernmentbecamefearfuloftheeffectsonAmericansupportifacorruptandrepressiveimageprevailed.LinYu-tangandHuShihpubliclyandprivatelycontendedthatcommunistagentswereresponsiblefortheattacksonChiang.HuShihmaintainedthatAmericanscholarsaffiliatedwiththeInstituteofPacificRelations(IPR)dependedonChineseresearcherswhowereinfactcommunists.GreenewastroubledbythepublicationofarticlesthatappearedtosubstantiateHuShih'sargument.KohlberggraduallybecameconvincedofacommunistconspiracytodeceivetheAmericanpeople,convincedthattheIPR,thecenterofEastAsianstudiesintheUnitedStates,wasaninstrumentofthisconspiracy.AsChiang'sregimeandsomeofitsstaunchestAmericanfriends,suchasJuddandFitch,triedtopreservetheidealizedimageoftheearlywaryears,KohlbergattackedtheIPR.Amanofgreatenergyandconsiderablewealth,Kohlbergconductedaone-mancampaigntopurgetheIPRofallegedcommunistdomination.Hisinitialchargesin1944wereignored,buthepersistedtirelessly,gainingsupportfromprofessionalex-communistsandRed-baiterswhohelpedhimtoformulatechargesandtoobtainbroaderpublicityforhiseffort.Inparticular,GeorgeE.Sokolsky,awidelysyndicatedHearstcolumnistwithstrongtiestotheHouseUn-AmericanActivitiesCommittee,helpedKohlbergwithcontactsandprovidedapublicplatformforhisaccusations.COLDWARANDTHE"TWOCHINAS"AttheendofWorldWarII,Chinafacedcivilwar,andU.S.effortstomediatefailed.ThefewAmericansinterestedinEastAsianaffairsfellintotwomaincategories.OnegrouparguedthatAmericaninterestswouldbeservedbestbyascrupulousneutrality,allowingChiangandhiscommunistenemiestoworktowardtheirownresolutionofChina'sproblems.AnothergroupcontendedthattheinterestsoftheUnitedStateswouldbeservedbestbyprovidingwhateveraidshortoftroopswasnecessarytomaintainChianginpower.MembersoftheformergroupgenerallywarnedthatthecommunistsenjoyedgreatersupportamongtheChinesepeopleandwouldultimatelytriumph.TheycontendedthatU.S.aidtoChianglefthimunwillingtocompromisewhilepeacewaspossibleandwouldprolongthewarandtheagonyoftheChinesepeopleoncetheconflictbegan.ThelattergroupgenerallymistrustedtheChinesecommunists,fearingtheywouldserveSovietratherthanChineseinterestsandbringmiserytotheChinesepeople.Theyarguedthatacommunist-controlledChinawouldbeanegationoftheendsforwhichtheUnitedStateshadfoughtinthePacific.AsfearoftheSovietUnionincreasedintheUnitedStatesinthelate1940s,anticommunistsentimentgrewapace,andmoreandmoreAmericansbecamereceptivetotheargumentsofChiang'ssupporters—thatis,totheChinalobby.Inthelate1940sthetwomajororganizationscallingforAmericanaidtoNationalistChinaweretheAmericanChinaPolicyAssociationandtheCommitteetoDefendAmericabyAidingAnti-CommunistChina.TheAmericanChinaPolicyAssociationwasfoundedbyKohlberg;JohnB.Powell,oneofthebest-knownAmericanjournalistsinChinaduringthe1920sand1930s;andChristopherEmmett,awriterwithdecidedlyliberalpretensions.ThemembersworkedtorevealwhattheyconsideredtheinsidiousnatureoftheChinesecommunistmovement,and,withinthematrixofintenseanticommunistfeeling,theassociationbeganonamoderatenote.Soon,however,itwasdominatedbyKohlberg,whowashimselfbecomingincreasinglyirresponsibleinhischargesagainstdiplomatsandscholarscriticalofChiangKai-shek.TheCommitteetoDefendAmericabyAidingAnti-CommunistChinawasrunbyFrederickMcKee,whohadlongcontributedtoliberalcausesandtothecollectivesecuritywingofthepeacemovement.Sincethelate1930s,hehadcontributedbothtimeandmoneyinChina'sbehalf,joiningexistinggroupsandorganizinghisown.UnlikeKohlberg,McKeedidnotbecomeinvolvedinextremistactivities.Restrainedandresponsible,McKeewaseasilyovershadowed.MembershipintheKohlbergandMcKeeorganizationsoverlapped,butMcKeewasabletomusterthesupportofseveralprominentmennotidentifiedwithChineseaffairs,suchastheformerDemocraticNationalCommitteechairmanJamesA.FarleyandthelaborleaderDavidDubinsky.IftheKohlbergandMcKeeoperationscouldclaimsomedegreeofrespectability,therewereotheroperationsthatcouldnot.TheChineseembassyinWashington,D.C.,andavarietyofmoreorlessindependententrepreneurslikeT.V.Soongandhisbrother-in-law,H.H.Kung,lobbiedfreneticallyforaid.Althoughtheiroperationsappeartohaveremainedwithinthelaw,thereisevidenceofsomesleightofhandwithintheembassy,resultinginthedisappearanceoflargesumsofmoney,thedisappearanceofseniorChinesemilitaryofficersattachedtothemissionwhopresumablyhadthemoney,andtheappearanceofChinesedocumentsrevealingsomeoftheiroperationsandincludingextravagantclaimsofsuccesswithU.S.congressmen.TheseactivitieshadnodiscernibleeffectonAmericanpolicy,andonlytheChinesegovernmentseemstohavebeenswindled.AnotherunsavorybutlegalChineseactivitywastheemploymentofWilliamJ.Goodwinasalobbyist.Inthe1930s,GoodwinhaddistinguishedhimselfbyhisaffiliationwiththeChristianFrontandwiththeAmericanfascistsGeraldL.K.SmithandtheReverendCharlesE.Coughlin.LiketheChineseoperativesintheembassy,GoodwinwasprobablymosteffectiveatobtainingmoneyfromtheChinesegovernmentwhileclaimingtobeinfluencingAmericanpoliticians.AmajorityofcongressmeninbothhousesweresympathetictotheChineseNationalistcauseandwillingtovoteforaidtoChianginhisfightagainstthecommunists.ThereisnoevidencethatanyofthesecongressmenhadbeenboughtbytheChinesegovernmentorbyKohlbergorMcKee.VirtuallyallofthesepeopleequatedtheChinesecommunistmovementwithSoviettotalitarianismandlookedwithregretuponthelikelihoodofsuchoppressionbeingleviedupontheirerstwhileChineseallies.MostofthesecongressionalsupportersoftheChineseNationalistswerenotcommittedtoChiangorhisregimebutrathertowhattheysawasaworldwidestruggleagainstinternationalcommunism.Furthermore,iftheadministrationaskedforfundstoprotectendangeredGreeksandTurksagainstcommunistsubversion,whynotaidtheChineseaswell?Havingonceconjuredupfearsofaninternationalcommunistconspiracyforworlddomination,theTrumanadministrationfailedtoconvinceCongressortheAmericanpeoplethatChinacouldbeorhadtobewrittenoff.WhenprovidingaidforabeleagueredEurope,CongressforcedtheadministrationtocontinueaidtoChiangKai-shekandanticommunistChina.DespitecongressionalandpublicsympathyforChiang,andtheintimidatingeffortsofKohlbergandhisalliesintheHearstpress,whenthecommunistsdroveChiangfrommainlandChina,theTrumanadministrationwaspreparedtorecognizethePeople'sRepublicofChinaandtoallowittotaketheChineseseatintheUnitedNations.Eveninearly1950,whenKohlbergandSokolskyfoundanallyinSenatorJosephR.McCarthy,theTrumanadministrationproceededwithplanstothwartthemandtocometotermswithreality.TheoutbreakofwarinKoreaandthesubsequentconfrontationbetweentroopsfromtheUnitedStatesandtroopsfromthePeople'sRepublicofChinaaccomplishedwhatKohlbergandhisfriendsandtheChineseembassycouldnothaveaccomplishedbythemselves.ItcreatedaclimateofopinionintheUnitedStatesinwhichKohlberg'schargesoftreasoninhighplacescouldbetakenseriouslyandinwhichanaccommodationwiththePeople'sRepublicofChinaprovedimpossible.Ironically,itwastheDemocraticsenatorPatMcCarranofNevada,anarchconservativewhosereelectionMcKeehadearliertriedtoprevent,whochairedthecongressionalcommitteethatinvestigatedtheKohlberg-McCarthychargesagainsttheInstituteofPacificRelations.The1952hearingswereusedtodiscreditandintimidateAmericancriticsofChiangKai-shek.Butfrom1951to1953itwasMcCarthy—advisedbyKohlberg,Sokolsky,andRoyCohn—whosucceededindrivingsomeoftheStateDepartment'sablestmenfromChineseaffairsandfromtheforeignservice.WhetherfromMcCarranorMcCarthy,KohlbergorSokolsky,thestorywasalwaysthesame:ChinahadbeenlosttothecommunistsbecausedisloyalAmericanshadpreventedChiangfromreceivingtheaidwithwhichhecouldhavewon;andAmericanboysdiedinKoreabecausetheyhadbeenbetrayedbydisloyalandstupidliberalswhohadturnedChinaovertothecommunists.ItwasnotuntilthemarkedchangeintheclimateofopinionthatcamewithrevulsionagainstthewarinVietnamthatsomeofthemenvilifiedduringtheMcCarthyerawerevindicated.By1952,thelegitimateconcernsomeAmericanshadforthefutureofChinahadbeentransformedintoaninstrumentwithwhichtheextremerighttriedtodestroyliberalismintheUnitedStates.Sokolsky,whoseearlierwritingsshowedhimtobeunusuallywellinformedaboutthehistoryoftheChinesecommunistmovement,consistentlymisledhisreaders,inkeepingwithhisassumedroleasaspokespersonfortheextremeright.ThesuccessthatheandhiscolleaguesenjoyedindiscreditingDeanAcheson,GeorgeC.Marshall,JohnS.Service,andOwenLattimoredemonstratedthevalidityofGeorgeWashington'swarningabouttheconsequencesof"excessivepartiality"foraforeignnation.Inthe1950s,whencriticismofChiangKai-shekinvitedchargesofdisloyaltytotheUnitedStates,foreignserviceofficersandscholarswereintimidated,withaconsequentcripplingofbothnationalpolicyandscholarship.TherewerereactionsagainsttheworkofChiang'sfriendsevenattheheightoftheirpower,buttonoavail.TheTrumanadministrationtriedtoneutralizethemin1951,promisingfriendlysenatorsthatitwouldcooperateinaninvestigationoftheChinalobby.InCongress,however,therewaslittleinterestintheinvestigationandtheadministration'sowneffortcouldturnupnothingtostimulateinterestonCapitolHillorinthepress.InApril1952,theReporterpublishedtwolongarticlesthatnamedsomeoftheparticipants(Kohlberg,McKee,andGoodwin),impliedmoreshadydealingsthancouldbeproven,andprovidedlessthanamodelexampleofinvestigativereporting.Nonetheless,thearticlescontributedtothenotorietyoftheChinalobby,andtherewerereportsthatmysteriousChinesewerebuyingenormousquantitiesoftheissuesoftheReporter,inwhichthearticlesappeared.InApril1952,theRepublicansenatorWayneL.MorseofOregonintroducedintotheSenateChinesedocumentsoutliningtheplansoftheNationalistregimetoinfluenceAmericanpolicy.SomeofthedocumentsreferredtocooperationwithGoodwin,Judd,andKnowland,whowassometimesreferredtoasthesenatorfromFormosa.Althoughtheauthenticityofthedocumentswasneverproven,theChineseembassyadmittedthattheywerecablessentfromitsoffices,butdeniedthatthecounseloroftheembassyhadsentthem,asallegedbyMorse.Therewaslittletobelearnedfromthedocuments,whichcontainedmerelyevidenceofthedeceitstheembassywaspracticingonitsprincipal—anditsagentswerepracticingonit.AsaresultoftheKoreanWar,AmericandeterminationtokeepthePeople'sRepublicofChinaoutoftheUnitedNationsintensified,andapowerfulnewpressuregroupwascreatedtoretaintheseatforChiang'srumpregime.Beginningwithapetitiondrive,aCommitteeofOneMillionAgainsttheAdmissionofCommunistChinatotheUnitedNationsemergedin1953.Aftercollectingtherequisitemillionsignatures,includingthoseofprominentDemocratsandRepublicans,theorganizersdisbandedin1954,onlytoreorganizeastheCommitteeofOneMillionin1955.LiberalDemocraticandRepublicansenatorslenttheirnamestothenewcommittee,includingtheDemocratsPaulDouglasofIllinois,WilliamProxmireofWisconsin,andHubertH.HumphreyofMinnesota,andRepublicanThomasH.KuchelofCalifornia.Aswithearlierorganizations,anticommunismratherthanapprovalofChiang'sregimeexplainsthewidespreadsupportfortheCommitteeofOneMillion,runbyMarvinLiebman,anex-communist.In1960,RossY.Koen,ayoungprofessorinCalifornia,preparedtopublishhisdissertation,TheChinaLobbyinAmericanPolitics,butthebookwasnotdistributed.TheChineseembassyreportedlythreatenedlegalactionagainstthepublishersfordefamatorystatementsinthebook,anditwaswidelyassumedthatthepoweroftheChinalobbyhadsucceededinfrighteningthem.ThatpowercontinuedtoseemimpressiveasPresidentJohnF.KennedyshiedawayfromarapprochementwiththePeople'sRepublic,secretlypromisingChiangthattheUnitedStateswouldvetoanyefforttoseatthecommunistregimeintheUnitedNations.LyndonJohnson'spresidencybroughtnohopeofchange,althoughMcCarthy,Kohlberg,andSokolskyweredead,JuddandKnowlandhadlosttheirnationaloffices,andtherealityoftheSino-SovietsplithadfinallypenetratedtheAmericanconsciousness.RECOGNITIONOFTHEBEIJINGGOVERNMENTANDDEMISEOFTHECHINALOBBYTheelectionofRichardM.Nixonin1968providednoexpectationofnewdirectionsinAmericanpolicytowardChina.Nixon,thepersonificationofthecoldwarrior,hadbeenclosetomanyofChiang'sstaunchestsupportersandhadrepeatedmanyofthesameinflammatoryandunsubstantiatedaccusationsthatKohlberghadlevied.But,slowlyandcautiously,theNixonadministrationmovedtoimproverelationswiththePeople'sRepublic,andinJuly1971presidentialadviserHenryKissingersuddenlyturnedupinBeijing.AfewmonthslaterastunnedworldwatchedRichardNixonandMaoZedongexchangingpleasantriesinMao'sstudy.In1972theUnitedStatesfacilitatedtheadmissionofthePeople'sRepublictotheUnitedNationsandacquiescedintheexpulsionofChiang'sgovernment.Therewashardlyawhimperofopposition—andthatfromafewsupportersofthepresidentwhofelttheyhadbeenbetrayed.ThedayoftheChinalobbyhadpassed.AmericanrecognitionofthePeople'sRepublicofChinain1979didnotendlobbyingactivitiesaimedatinfluencingAmericanpolicytowardChinaandTaiwan.ThegovernmentsinBeijingandTaipeiremainedintenselyactiveandfoundsupportacrossthepoliticalspectrumintheUnitedStates.TheRepublicofChina,headquarteredinTaipei,andledbyChiangKai-shek'sson,ChiangChing-kuo,wasnotabandoned.TheCarteradministrationhadwonagreementfromDengXiaopingtoallowtheUnitedStatestomaintain"unofficial"relationswithTaiwanandtopermitcontinuedarmssalestoTaipei.Taiwan'sdiplomatsquicklyralliedtheirfriendsintheU.S.CongressandwonamuchstrongerTaiwanRelationsAct(TRA)thantheadministrationhadintended.TheTRAexplicitlystatedthattheuseofforceagainstTaiwanwouldbeamatterof"graveconcern"totheUnitedStatesandcommittedtheUnitedStatestoprovidesucharmsasTaiwanrequiredtodefenditself.Inthe1980sand1990s,asTaiwanevolvedintoademocraticsociety,andespeciallyaftertheTiananmenmassacresinBeijingin1989,supportforTaiwanincreaseddramaticallyamongtheAmericanpeopleandtheirelectedrepresentatives.Theisland'seconomicsuccessallowedittospendvastsumstowootheAmericanmediaaswellasAmericanofficials.Taiwan'slobbyingactivities,consideredbyspecialistsinforeignpolicysecondonlytothoseofIsraelineffectiveness,frequentlyforcedadministrationofficialstotakeactionstheyconsideredundesirable.MostnotableamongthesewasthedecisiontoissueTaiwan'spresident,LeeTeng-hui,avisatovisittheUnitedStatesin1995,precipitatingacrisisinrelationsbetweenBeijingandWashingtonandgeneratingserioustensionsintheTaiwanStrait.Lesseffectively,thePeople'sRepublicalsolobbiedforsupportinWashington.HamperedbyitshumanrightsrecordandAmericanadmirationfordemocraticTaiwan,BeijingwasfortunatetowinpowerfulfriendswithintheAmericanbusinesscommunity.TheU.S.–ChinaBusinessCouncil,theEmergencyCommitteeforAmericanTrade,andmajorcorporations,mostprominentlyBoeing,laboredassiduouslytopersuadeCongressofthecongruityofChineseandAmericaninterests.Inthe1990s,theysucceededinprotectingChina'smost-favored-nationtraderelationswiththeUnitedStatesagainstattacksfromhumanrightsandlabororganizations,ultimatelywinningpassageofthePermanentNormalTradeRelationsAct.ChinawasthusassuredthatincreasedtariffsonitsgoodswouldnotbeusedasaweaponbyitsadversariesintheUnitedStates.Intheearlytwenty-firstcentury,lobbyingbybothBeijingandTaipeicontinued,withmostofthepubliccriticismdirectedagainstpresumablypro-ChinagroupswhowereaccusedbysomeconservativesofsacrificingU.S.securityinterests.ComplaintsagainstTaiwan'sactivitiescameprimarilyfromwithintheexecutivebranchoftheU.S.government,wherethoseresponsibleforpolicytowardChinafearedbeingpushedintoanunnecessaryanddangerousconfrontationwithBeijing.ButthenotoriousChinalobbyoftheColdWarerawasgone.BIBLIOGRAPHYBachrack,StanleyD.TheCommitteeofOneMillion:"ChinaLobby"Politics,1953–1971.NewYork,1976.Borg,Dorothy.AmericanPolicyandtheChineseRevolution,1925–1928.NewYork,1947.IncludesreferencestotheactivitiesofAmericanssympathetictotheChineseNationalistcauseduringthe1920s.Cohen,WarrenI."TheRoleofPrivateGroupsintheUnitedStates."InDorothyBorgandShumpeiOkamoto,eds.PearlHarborasHistory:Japanese-AmericanRelations,1931–1941.NewYork,1973.Discussesthelobbyingactivitiesofanumberofgroupsandindividualsbetween1931and1941.Friedman,DonaldJ.TheRoadfromIsolation:TheCampaignoftheAmericanCommitteeforNon-participationinJapaneseAggression,1938–1941.Cambridge,Mass.,1968.Ausefulstudyoftheorganizationanditswork.Keeley,Joseph.TheChinaLobbyMan:TheStoryofAlfredKohlberg.NewRochelle,N.Y.,1969.AbiographythatepitomizesKohlberg'sexploitationbytheAmericanright.Koen,RossY.TheChinaLobbyinAmericanPolitics.NewYork,1974.AcomprehensiveaccountofChineseNationalistandpro-NationalistactivitiesintheUnitedStatesduringTruman'stermaspresident.KoenisbetteratdescribingtheimpactoftheseactivitiesthanatexplaininghowtheChineseandtheirAmericanfriendsfunctioned.Liebman,Marvin.ComingOutConservative:AnAutobiography.SanFrancisco,1992.Afirst-personaccountoftheoriginandactivitiesofmostoftheright-wingfrontsoftheColdWarera,includingtheCommitteeofOneMillion.Sutter,RobertG.U.S.PolicyTowardChina:AnIntroductiontotheRoleofInterestGroups.Lanham,Md.,1998.FocusesonlobbyingactivitiesonbehalfofChinaandTaiwaninthepost–ColdWarera.Thomas,JohnN.TheInstituteofPacificRelations:AsianScholarsandAmericanPolitics.Seattle,Wash.,1974.AnunsympatheticstudyoftheorganizationwithausefulchapteronKohlberg.SeealsoCongressionalPower;EconomicPolicyandTheory;ForeignAid;PublicOpinion;Recognition.EncyclopediaofAmericanForeignPolicy×CitethisarticlePickastylebelow,andcopythetextforyourbibliography.MLAChicagoAPA"TheChinaLobby ."EncyclopediaofAmericanForeignPolicy..Encyclopedia.com.25Apr.2022."TheChinaLobby ."EncyclopediaofAmericanForeignPolicy..Encyclopedia.com.(April25,2022).https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/china-lobby"TheChinaLobby 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JosephStilwellwasbornonMarch19,…HuShih,HuShih HuShih TheChinesephilosopherHuShih(1891-1962)wasintheliteraryandintellectualavant-gardeduringtheNewThoughtmovementof1915-…Tibet,Tibet TibethasbeenanindependentcountrythroughoutthehistoricalperiodandsincetimeimmemorialaccordingtoTibetans'ownmyth-basedsenseof…ZhouEnlai,ZhouEnlai ZhouEnlai Huaian,Kiangsuprovince,China DiedJanuary8,1976 Peking,People'sRepublicofChina Premierandforeignministerof People'…AboutthisarticleTheChinaLobbyUpdatedAboutencyclopedia.comcontentPrintArticleYouMightAlsoLikeChina-U.S.RelationsandChineseAmericansChin.ChinaEnterstheWarChen-yenOpenLettertoDengXiaopingTheSongSistersDengYingchao(1903–1992)DengYingchao(1903–1992)NEARBYTERMSTheChinaLakeMurdersTheChillingTheChildren’sHourTheChildren'sHourTheChildrenofTimesSquareTheChildrenofTheatreStreetTheChildrenofParadiseTheChildrenofNoisyVillageTheChildrenofAnLacTheChildrenofAmericaTheChildrenAreWatchingUsTheChildren1990TheChildren1980TheChildofQueenVictoriabyWilliamPlomer,1933TheChildofPleasureTheChild2005TheChild1976TheChiffonsTheChickenChroniclesTheChicagoStyleofArchitectureTheChicagoSevenTheChicagoCubsTheChicagoBearsTheCheyenneSocialClubTheChessPlayerTheChinaLobbyTheChinaSyndromeTheChinatownKidTheChinatownMurders:ManagainsttheMobTheChineseCatTheChineseExclusionBillTheChineseInventtheMagneticCompassTheChineseInventionofGunpowder,Explosives,andArtilleryandTheirImpactonEuropeanWarfareTheChipmunksTheChisholmsTheChocolateDeal('IskatHa-Shokolad)TheChocolateSoldierTheChocolateWarTheChoiceTheChoirTheChoirboysTheChoppersTheChordettesTheChorusTheChosenTheChosen1977TheChosen1981TheChosenOne:LegendoftheRavenTheChristianBibleTheChristianBroadcastingNetwork,Inc.TheChristianParapsychologist